Condonation of Delay: Meaning, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Sufficient Cause, Good Reasons and How to Apply

Authors:

1. Nikhil Prasad Singh, 4th Sem, BALLB (Hons.), National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi
2. Himanshu Prasad Singh, 6th Sem, BLS. LLB, Government Law College, Mumbai

Condonation of delay means that a court excuses the lateness of an appeal or an application and hears it even though it was filed after the period of limitation, because the person filing it has shown “sufficient cause” for the delay. The power comes from Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” When a court records that the “delay is condoned”, it has accepted the explanation and the matter goes ahead on its merits; if it refuses, the appeal or application fails as time-barred under Section 3.

Section 5 does not apply to suits, and special laws can limit or exclude it. Whether a cause is “sufficient” depends on the facts. The Supreme Court has said that “Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion” (N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998), but also that the power “is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established” where there is “inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence” (Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024).

Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Limitation Act, 1963 is quoted from its English text on India Code (as on 30 August 2026) and its official Hindi text; the Code of Civil Procedure (as on 10 January 2026), the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (as on 1 June 2026), the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (as on 1 September 2026), the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Commercial Courts Act (India Code texts, which carry no ‘as on’ date) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (as on 6 October 2025) from India Code; and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.

Condonation of delay: meaning

To “condone” something is to excuse or overlook it. In court practice, condonation of delay is the court’s decision to excuse the time lost after a limitation period has run out, so that a late appeal or application can still be heard. The Limitation Act does not use the word “condonation”; Section 5 is headed “Extension of prescribed period in certain cases”. The courts call the exercise of that power condoning the delay; in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (19 February 1987) the Supreme Court explained that it was conferred “in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ‘merits'”.

The phrases people search for all point to the same step. “Condone the delay” is what the applicant asks the court to do. “Delay condoned” in an order means the court has accepted the cause shown and the late appeal or application will now be heard; in Katiji the order ended: “Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court.” A “condonation of delay application” or “condone delay petition” is the application under Section 5 (Section 2(b) says an “application” includes a petition). The “prescribed period” is the period of limitation “computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act” (Section 2(j)).

In Hindi, the Act is परिसीमा अधिनियम, 1963. Its official Hindi text calls Section 5 “विहित काल का कतिपय दशाओं में विस्तारण” (extension of the prescribed period in certain cases), uses “पर्याप्त हेतुक” for “sufficient cause” and “विहित काल” for “prescribed period”, and heads Section 3 “परिसीमा द्वारा वर्जन” (bar of limitation). The Hindi text has no separate word for “condonation”; in plain Hindi, condoning the delay is simply excusing it (देरी माफ करना). A fuller summary in Hindi is given further below.

What happens when an appeal or application is late: Section 3

Section 3(1) is the starting point: “Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” The court has to apply it even if the other side does not object. In Pathapati Subba Reddy the Supreme Court said that “The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions”, and that “Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings.” Section 5 is one of the exceptions in Sections 4 to 24. The reason for the strict rule, in the Court’s words, is that “The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation” (see the firm’s legal maxims explained).

For a continuing breach of contract or a continuing tort, Section 22 provides that “a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues”; the firm’s note on Section 22 of the Limitation Act explains that rule.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act: the text

Section 5, headed “Extension of prescribed period in certain cases”, reads:

“Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

Three things follow from the words. The burden is on the person who is late: he must satisfy the court. The word is “may”: even when a cause is shown, the court has a discretion. And the Explanation gives one example of a cause that can be sufficient, namely being misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court when working out the period. India Code’s text (as on 30 August 2026) shows no amendment of Section 5.

Section 5 in Hindi (official text)

The official Hindi text of the Act on India Code, परिसीमा अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का अधिनियम संख्यांक 36), gives Section 5 as follows:

“5. विहित काल का कतिपय दशाओं में विस्तारण—कोई भी अपील या कोई भी आवेदन, जो सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता, 1908 (1908 का 5) के आदेश 21 के उपबंधों में से किसी के अधीन के आवेदन से भिन्न हो, विहित काल के पश्चात् ग्रहण किया जा सकेगा यदि अपीलार्थी या आवेदक, न्यायालय का यह समाधान कर दे कि उसके पास ऐसे काल के भीतर अपील या आवेदन न करने के लिए पर्याप्त हेतुक था ।

स्पष्टीकरण—यह तथ्य कि अपीलार्थी या आवेदक विहित काल का अभिनिश्चय या संगणना करने में उच्च न्यायालय के किसी आदेश, पद्धति या निर्णय के कारण भुलावे में पड़ गया था, इस धारा के अर्थ के भीतर पर्याप्त हेतुक हो सकेगा ।”

Where Section 5 applies, and where it does not

Section 5 covers appeals and applications except applications under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure (execution of decrees). It does not cover suits: Section 2(l) says that “suit” does not include an appeal or an application. A late suit is dismissed under Section 3 unless another exception in Sections 4 to 24, such as a legal disability (Section 6) or an exclusion of time, saves it.

For periods fixed by other laws, Section 29(2) applies Sections 4 to 24 only “to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law” (examples below). Section 29(3) adds that, “Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.”

Exclusion of time is not condonation (Sections 4, 12 and 14)

Before asking whether a delay can be condoned, check whether there is a delay at all. Several sections of the Act leave time out of the count, or extend the last day, automatically. Unlike Section 5, they do not depend on the court’s discretion; they are part of computing the “prescribed period”.

Section	What it does	Who decides
Section 12(1)	“the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded”	Automatic, by computation
Section 12(2) and (3)	For an appeal, revision or review: the day the judgment was pronounced and “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” of the decree or order, and of the judgment, are excluded; time the court took to prepare the decree before the copy was applied for is not (Explanation)	Automatic, by computation
Section 12(4)	For an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award is excluded	Automatic, by computation
Section 4	If the period expires on a day the court is closed, the case may be filed “on the day when the court re-opens”	Automatic
Section 14	Time spent “with due diligence” and “in good faith” in another civil proceeding in a court which, “from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it” is excluded	The court decides whether the conditions are met
Section 5	A late appeal or application “may be admitted” if sufficient cause is shown	The court’s discretion

The difference matters in practice. If the time needed to obtain a certified copy is properly excluded under Section 12, an appeal that looked late may in fact be within time, and no condonation is needed. If, after every exclusion, the filing is still late, only Section 5 (where it is available) can save it.

What is “sufficient cause”? The Supreme Court’s principles

The Act does not define “sufficient cause”. Its meaning has been worked out by the courts, case by case. The judgments below are quoted from the Supreme Court’s own copies; where an earlier judgment could not be opened, it is quoted only in the words of the later judgment that reproduced it.

Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)

The High Court had dismissed the State’s appeal in a land acquisition case as “time barred, being four days beyond time”. A bench of Justices M.P. Thakkar and B.C. Ray held that “The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice”, and set out the reasons for a liberal approach, including: “3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.”; “4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.”. It added that “There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the ‘State’ is the applicant praying for condonation of delay”, condoned the delay and sent the appeal back to the High Court to be decided on merits.

N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998)

The applicant was 883 days late in moving to restore his application against an ex parte decree. His explanation was that his advocate had not told him that the application had been dismissed for default and had done nothing further, and had later left the profession. The trial court condoned the delay; the High Court reversed it. Justices S. Saghir Ahmad and K.T. Thomas restored the trial court’s order, holding: “Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.” It added that “If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation.” The Court restored the condonation on condition that the applicant pay ₹10,000 to the other side, noting that he had recovered ₹50,000 from the advocate through a consumer forum, and saying that “when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.”

Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013)

Landowners filed their appeals in the High Court about five and a half years late; “The only explanation offered for approaching the court at such a belated stage has been that one of the appellants had taken ill.” The High Court refused to condone the delay, and on 22 August 2013 Justices B.S. Chauhan and S.A. Bobde upheld that refusal. The Court summarised the law: “where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay.” It also disapproved High Court orders that had condoned delays merely on the condition that the landowners would give up interest for the period of delay.

Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013)

A school’s managing committee, which said that its newly elected members did not know of a High Court order, had been allowed by a Division Bench to appeal 2449 days late. On 13 September 2013 Justices Anil R. Dave and Dipak Misra set that aside, finding that the “Plea of lack of knowledge in the present case really lacks bona fide.” The judgment collected thirteen principles, beginning with “a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach”, and including: “(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.”; “(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.”; “(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.”; “(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.”; and “(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” It added that “An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner”.

Delays by the Government: Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012)

The Supreme Court noted in Katiji that, because of the “inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos”, delay by the State “is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve”. In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, as quoted by the Supreme Court in Borse Brothers (2021), the Court said: “In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us”, and “The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” As summarised in Sheo Raj Singh (2023), the department in that case had offered no proper explanation “for condonation of a huge delay of 427 days apart from simply mentioning various dates”, and condonation was refused.

Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers (2021): commercial and arbitration appeals

On 19 March 2021 a bench of Justices R.F. Nariman, B.R. Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy decided how Section 5 works for appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It overruled the earlier judgment in N.V. International, which “does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days”, but held that “a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned”. It repeated from Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields (1962) that “even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right”, and on the facts refused condonation where there was “no explanation worth the name … beyond the usual file-pushing and administrative exigency”, and where a delay of 75 days beyond the 60-day period was explained by internal approvals and bulky records.

Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (2023): an explanation, not an excuse

The Delhi High Court had condoned a delay of about 479 days in a Union of India land acquisition appeal, with costs of ₹10,000. On 9 October 2023 Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Dipankar Datta declined to interfere, though the explanation revealed “lamentable institutional inefficiency and the deplorable bureaucratic inertia”. The Court restated that “exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial”, and drew a line: “the courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’. An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something”, whereas “An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack.” Because it was sitting in appeal over the High Court’s discretion, it applied the rule that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”, and found the order was not “clearly wrong”.

Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (2024): the principles today

Heirs of a land acquisition claimant sought to appeal 5659 days late, saying they had not known of the case until a grandson visited the land acquisition office in 2015. The High Court refused to condone the delay, and on 8 April 2024 Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal upheld that refusal: “the claimants were negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed appeal”, most of the other claimants had accepted the decision, and “there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing the matter.” The judgment summarised the law in eight points:

• “(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;”
• “(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;”
• “(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;”
• “(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;”
• “(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;”
• “(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;”
• “(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and”
• “(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

Good reasons for condonation of delay: what was accepted and what was refused

There is no list of approved reasons; each application is decided on its own facts. The table shows only what the Supreme Court judgments discussed above actually record. It is a guide to how courts reason, not a promise that a similar reason will succeed.

Judgment	Delay	Reason given	Result
Katiji (1987)	4 days (appeal by the State)	Not set out in detail	Condoned; the State is not to be treated less favourably than a private party
N. Balakrishnan (1998)	883 days	The advocate did not inform the client of the dismissal, did nothing further and later left the profession	Condoned (trial court’s order restored), on payment of ₹10,000 to the other side
Postmaster General (2012), as quoted in later judgments	427 days (Government department)	Only a list of dates; “impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology”	Refused
Basawaraj (2013)	About 5½ years	Only that “one of the appellants had taken ill”	Refused
Esha Bhattacharjee (2013)	2449 days	New managing committee said it did not know of the order	Refused; the plea “really lacks bona fide”
Borse Brothers (2021)	131 days beyond 60 (Government of Maharashtra); 75 days beyond 60; 227 days	Internal approvals, legal opinions, bulky records; “the usual file-pushing and administrative exigency”	Refused (in the 75-day case the High Court’s condonation was set aside)
Sheo Raj Singh (2023)	About 479 days (Union of India)	Late application for a certified copy by counsel, internal approvals, court-fee funds, a misplaced copy	The High Court’s condonation, with costs of ₹10,000, was not disturbed
Pathapati Subba Reddy (2024)	5659 days	Heirs said they did not know of the dismissed case	Refused; negligence and want of due diligence

Read together: a short delay with a genuine, specific explanation is treated liberally, without a “pedantic” day-by-day account (Katiji); a long delay is looked at more strictly (Esha Bhattacharjee, principle (viii)); and negligence, inaction, lack of bona fides, a “concocted” or “fanciful” explanation, or a mere list of dates count against the applicant. A lawyer’s failure was accepted as sufficient cause in N. Balakrishnan, where the client’s own conduct was not found irresponsible, but “gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of” (Esha Bhattacharjee).

Special laws that limit or exclude condonation

Under Section 29(2), Sections 4 to 24 apply to a special law’s period only “to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded”. Some laws give their own power to condone, some a short fixed window, and some none. From the Acts as printed on India Code:

Law and provision	Time limit	Can the delay be condoned?
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34(3) (application to set aside an award)	Three months from receipt of the award (or from disposal of a request under Section 33)	Only within “a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter”, if the applicant “was prevented by sufficient cause”
Arbitration Act, Section 37 appeals and Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Section 13(1A)	90 or 30 days (Articles 116 and 117) or 60 days	Yes, but “by way of exception and not by way of rule” (Borse Brothers, 2021)
Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Section 69 (complaint)	Two years from the date on which the cause of action arose	Yes, if the complainant shows sufficient cause, and the Commission “records its reasons for condoning such delay”
Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Section 41 (appeal to the State Commission)	Forty-five days from the date of the order	Yes, if the State Commission “is satisfied that there was sufficient cause”; fifty per cent of the amount ordered must be deposited
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 142(1)(b) (cheque bounce complaint)	One month from the date the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138	Yes: “the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause”
Commercial suits: Order VIII Rule 1 CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act	Written statement within 30 days; extension up to 120 days from service of summons	No: after 120 days “the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record”

The firm’s guides on cheque bounce cases and on the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 explain those procedures in more detail.

Condonation of delay in criminal cases: Section 519 BNSS

Chapter XXXVIII of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 deals with a different question from appeals: the time within which a court may take cognizance of certain offences. Section 514 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 468 CrPC) bars cognizance after six months if the offence is punishable with fine only, one year if it is punishable with imprisonment up to one year, and three years if it is punishable with imprisonment of more than one year but not more than three years; for computing the period, “the relevant date shall be the date of filing complaint under section 223 or the date of recording of information under section 173.” Section 519 BNSS (formerly Section 473 CrPC, carried over without change) then allows a late start: “Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice.”

The BNSS came into force on 1 July 2024; under Section 531(3), a period that had already expired under the old Code is not revived merely because the BNSS provides for “the extension of time”. Cheque bounce complaints have their own rule in Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, shown in the table above. A late criminal appeal or revision is a separate matter: Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to “Any appeal or any application”, and the Schedule to that Act fixes periods for criminal appeals and revisions (Articles 114, 115 and 131, which still refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898). The period that applies to a particular appeal should be checked before filing. The firm’s CrPC to BNSS comparison tool gives the old and new section numbers.

Condonation of delay in CPC: how the application is made

For a late first appeal in a civil case, Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 sets the procedure: “(1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefore, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.” If the court does not reject the application at once, notice is issued to the respondent and “the matter shall be finally decided by the Court before it proceeds to deal with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13” (Rule 3A(2)). Where such an application is made, the court is not to stay execution of the decree until, after hearing under Rule 11, it decides to hear the appeal (Rule 3A(3)). The same Section 5 power is available for other applications under the Code, except those under Order XXI, which deals with execution.

The official texts and the judgments above suggest what such an application needs:

• the dates: the judgment or order, the period, any time excluded under Sections 12 or 14 (and any extension under Section 4), the last day, the filing date and the days of delay;
• the facts explaining the whole period, not just a list of dates (in Postmaster General, as summarised in Sheo Raj Singh, the department had offered nothing “apart from simply mentioning various dates”);
• an affidavit supporting those facts (Order XLI Rule 3A), drafted “with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner” (Esha Bhattacharjee);
• an explanation, not an excuse (Sheo Raj Singh).

Section 148 of the Code is different: it lets a court enlarge a period that the court itself has fixed, “not exceeding thirty days in total”. A court that condones a delay may impose costs or order compensation: in N. Balakrishnan the applicant had to pay ₹10,000 to the other side, and in Sheo Raj Singh the High Court had condoned the delay subject to costs of ₹10,000 imposed on the Union of India; but conditions cannot replace sufficient cause, because “No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever” (Basawaraj). The firm’s guide to review, revision and appeal under the CPC and CrPC explains the remedies whose time limits are listed below.

How to calculate the delay

The delay is counted from the day after the prescribed period ends, as worked out under the Act, up to the day of filing. In practice:

1. Find the period and its starting point: the article of the Schedule (the third column says from when time runs) or the special law.
2. Leave out the starting day (Section 12(1)) and, for an appeal, revision or review, the day the judgment was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining certified copies (Section 12(2) and (3)); add any time excluded under Section 14.
3. Find the last day. If the court was closed on that day, the filing may be made on the day it re-opens (Section 4).
4. Count the days from the day after the last day up to the filing date. That number is the delay for which condonation is sought.

For example, an appeal under the CPC to a court other than the High Court must be filed within thirty days from the date of the decree (Article 116(b)). If the decree is dated 1 June 2026 and, for simplicity, no copying time is to be excluded, that day is left out, the thirty days run from 2 June and end on 1 July 2026. An appeal filed on 15 July 2026 is fourteen days late and needs an application under Section 5 and Order XLI Rule 3A. If the time needed to obtain a certified copy is excluded under Section 12, the last day moves later by that time and the delay may shrink or disappear.

Appeal or application	Period	Time runs from	Provision
Appeal under the CPC to a High Court	90 days	Date of the decree or order	Article 116(a)
Appeal under the CPC to any other court	30 days	Date of the decree or order	Article 116(b)
Appeal from a High Court decree or order to the same court	30 days	Date of the decree or order	Article 117
Leave to defend a summary suit	10 days	When the summons is served	Article 118
Setting aside an ex parte decree	30 days	Date of the decree, or knowledge of it where summons was not duly served	Article 123
Review (court other than the Supreme Court)	30 days	Date of the decree or order	Article 124
Revision under the CPC	90 days	Date of the decree or order	Article 131
Special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (other cases)	90 days	Date of the judgment or order	Article 133(c)
Any other application with no period provided	3 years	When the right to apply accrues	Article 137
Appeal from a Commercial Court or Commercial Division	60 days	Date of the judgment or order	Section 13, Commercial Courts Act
Consumer appeal to the State Commission	45 days	Date of the order	Section 41, Consumer Protection Act

The firm’s free Limitation Calculator (Days Calculator) helps with the arithmetic. It has two modes: enter a “From” and a “To” date to get the “Total Number of Days”, or enter a starting date and a “Limitation Period” to see when the limitation ends. As the page itself says, “The calculator counts plain calendar days”, so the exclusions under Section 12 and the closed-court rule in Section 4 have to be applied by the user, and the result should be verified before it is relied on.

विलंब की माफी (Condonation of Delay) – हिंदी में सारांश (Summary in Hindi)

Condonation of delay का अर्थ: अंग्रेज़ी शब्द “condone” का सामान्य अर्थ है माफ करना। कानून में condonation of delay का अर्थ है कि न्यायालय, पर्याप्त कारण दिखाए जाने पर, समय-सीमा बीत जाने के बाद दायर की गई अपील या आवेदन को स्वीकार कर ले और उसे सुने। किसी आदेश में “delay condoned” लिखा हो, तो इसका अर्थ है कि न्यायालय ने देरी का कारण मान लिया है और अब अपील या आवेदन पर गुण-दोष (merits) के आधार पर सुनवाई होगी; देरी माफ न होने पर वह समय-वर्जित होकर खारिज हो जाता है। परिसीमा अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का अधिनियम संख्यांक 36) के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में “condonation” के लिए अलग शब्द नहीं है; धारा 5 का शीर्षक “विहित काल का कतिपय दशाओं में विस्तारण” है और उसमें “पर्याप्त हेतुक” (sufficient cause) शब्द आता है। धारा 5 का पूरा आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ ऊपर दिया गया है।

धारा 3 (“परिसीमा द्वारा वर्जन”) के अनुसार, धारा 4 से 24 के अधीन रहते हुए, विहित काल के बाद संस्थित हर वाद, की गई हर अपील और किया गया हर आवेदन खारिज कर दिया जाएगा, भले ही दूसरे पक्ष ने परिसीमा का प्रश्न न उठाया हो। धारा 5 केवल अपील और आवेदन पर लागू होती है, वाद (suit) पर नहीं, क्योंकि धारा 2(ठ) के अनुसार “वाद” के अन्तर्गत अपील या आवेदन नहीं आता; सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश 21 (डिक्री का निष्पादन) के अधीन आवेदनों पर भी यह लागू नहीं होती।

समय का अपवर्जन और देरी की माफी अलग हैं। धारा 12 के अनुसार गणना में आरंभ का दिन छोड़ा जाता है, और अपील, पुनरीक्षण या पुनर्विलोकन के लिए निर्णय का दिन और प्रमाणित प्रति प्राप्त करने के लिए अपेक्षित समय भी; धारा 4 के अनुसार अंतिम दिन न्यायालय बंद हो तो खुलने के दिन दायर किया जा सकता है; धारा 14 के अनुसार अधिकारिताहीन न्यायालय में सद्भावपूर्वक चलाई गई कार्यवाही का समय छोड़ा जाता है।

पर्याप्त हेतुक क्या है? अधिनियम में परिभाषा नहीं है। कटीजी (1987) में राज्य की चार दिन की देरी माफ करते हुए सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि “Every day’s delay must be explained” (हर दिन की देरी का स्पष्टीकरण) का अर्थ अति-तकनीकी (pedantic) दृष्टिकोण नहीं है। एन. बालकृष्णन (1998) में वकील की लापरवाही से हुई 883 दिन की देरी, दूसरे पक्ष को 10,000 रुपए देने की शर्त पर, माफ की गई; कोर्ट ने कहा कि देरी की लंबाई नहीं, स्पष्टीकरण की स्वीकार्यता ही कसौटी है। बसवराज (2013) में साढ़े पाँच वर्ष की देरी का एकमात्र कारण एक अपीलार्थी की बीमारी था; देरी माफ नहीं हुई, और कोर्ट ने कहा कि लापरवाही, निष्क्रियता या सद्भाव के अभाव में देरी माफ करने का उचित आधार नहीं रहता। ईशा भट्टाचार्जी (2013) में 2449 दिन की देरी की माफी रद्द हुई, क्योंकि जानकारी न होने का तर्क सद्भावपूर्ण नहीं था।

सरकारी विभागों के बारे में पोस्टमास्टर जनरल (2012) में, जैसा बोर्से ब्रदर्स (2021) में उद्धृत है, कहा गया कि परिसीमा का कानून सरकार सहित सभी पर लागू होता है। बोर्से ब्रदर्स में कहा गया कि Commercial Courts Act की धारा 13(1A) की 60 दिन की अपील में देरी अपवाद के रूप में ही माफ की जाए, नियम के रूप में नहीं। पथपति सुब्बा रेड्डी (2024) में 5659 दिन की देरी माफ न करने को सही ठहराया गया और कहा गया कि धारा 3 कठोरता से और धारा 5 उदारता से पढ़ी जाती है, पर अत्यधिक देरी, लापरवाही या सम्यक् तत्परता के अभाव में देरी माफ करने से इनकार किया जा सकता है।

विशेष कानून और आपराधिक मामले: धारा 29(2) के अनुसार विशेष कानून की अवधि पर धारा 4 से 24 तभी तक लागू होती हैं जब तक वह कानून उन्हें स्पष्ट रूप से अपवर्जित न करे। Arbitration and Conciliation Act की धारा 34(3) में पंचाट को चुनौती के लिए तीन महीने और पर्याप्त कारण होने पर तीस दिन और मिलते हैं, उसके बाद नहीं। भारतीय नागरिक सुरक्षा संहिता, 2023 की धारा 519 (पहले दंड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा 473) के अनुसार, देरी का समुचित स्पष्टीकरण हो या न्याय के हित में आवश्यक हो, तो न्यायालय परिसीमा काल के बाद भी संज्ञान ले सकता है। देर से दायर आपराधिक अपील या पुनरीक्षण अलग प्रश्न है; उसके लिए परिसीमा अधिनियम की धारा 5 और उसकी अनुसूची (अनुच्छेद 114, 115 और 131) देखें।

आवेदन और गणना: सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश 41 नियम 3क के अनुसार देर से प्रस्तुत अपील के साथ शपथपत्र (affidavit) द्वारा समर्थित आवेदन लगाना होता है, जिसमें देरी के पर्याप्त कारण के तथ्य हों; यदि न्यायालय उसे तुरंत अस्वीकार न करे, तो प्रत्यर्थी को सूचना देकर पहले इसी आवेदन का निर्णय करता है। आवेदन में आदेश की तारीख, लागू अवधि, छोड़ा गया समय, अंतिम तारीख, दायर करने की तारीख, देरी के दिन और पूरी अवधि का तथ्यपूर्ण स्पष्टीकरण होना चाहिए; केवल तारीखों की सूची पर्याप्त नहीं मानी गई है। देरी गिनने के लिए अवधि लें, धारा 12, 14 और 4 की छूटें घटाएँ, फिर अंतिम दिन के अगले दिन से दायर करने की तारीख तक दिन गिनें।

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

Condonation of delay is the court’s power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to admit a late appeal or application when the person shows sufficient cause. It is not available for suits or for execution applications under Order XXI, it can be cut down or shut out by special laws, and it comes into play only after the automatic exclusions in Sections 4, 12 and 14 have been applied.

The Supreme Court reads “sufficient cause” liberally (Katiji, N. Balakrishnan) but refuses to excuse negligence, lack of bona fides or long unexplained delays (Basawaraj, Borse Brothers, Pathapati Subba Reddy). The applicant must satisfy the court with a true explanation of the whole period, supported in a civil appeal by an affidavit, rather than a list of dates or an excuse.

Sources used for this post: the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. 36 of 1963), Sections 2(b), (j) and (l), 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 22 and 29 and Articles 116, 117, 118, 123, 124, 131, 133 and 137 of the Schedule, in its English text on India Code (A1963-36.pdf, as on 30 August 2026) and its official Hindi text on India Code (H1963-36.pdf; Section 5 quoted from the printed pages); the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 148 and Order XLI Rule 3A (India Code, as on 10 January 2026); the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34(3) (India Code, as on 1 June 2026); the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Sections 41 and 69 (India Code, as on 1 September 2026); the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 142 (India Code); the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, Section 13 and the Schedule amending Order VIII Rule 1 CPC (India Code); the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 514, 519 and 531 (India Code, as on 6 October 2025, and the firm’s section-by-section data checked against the Gazette text); and the Supreme Court’s own copies of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (19 February 1987, api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/8799.pdf), N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (3 September 1998, api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/13016.pdf), Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (22 August 2013, api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/40680.pdf), Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (13 September 2013, api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/40763.pdf), Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors (19 March 2021, quoting Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563, and Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1962), Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India (9 October 2023) and Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA) (8 April 2024), the last three at https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2021/195/195_2021_33_1501_27050_Judgement_19-Mar-2021.pdf, https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/3283/3283_2012_5_1502_47483_Judgement_09-Oct-2023.pdf and https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/14596/14596_2017_15_1502_52056_Judgement_08-Apr-2024.pdf.