An admission is a statement, oral, documentary or electronic, that suggests an inference about a fact in issue or a relevant fact, made by one of the persons the law lists. A confession is a narrower thing: an admission by a person accused of a crime that he committed the offence. Since 1 July 2024 the rules are in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA): admissions in Sections 15 to 21 and 25 (formerly Sections 17 to 23 and 31 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), confessions in Sections 22 to 24 (formerly Sections 24 to 30). As the Supreme Court put it in the Parliament attack case (2005), “every confession must necessarily be an admission, but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession”.
An admission is “substantive evidence” against its maker but not conclusive. A voluntary and true confession can support the maker’s conviction, though courts as a matter of prudence generally look for some corroboration; but a confession to a police officer, or one made in police custody without a Magistrate immediately present, cannot be proved against the accused (Section 23 BSA). The only exception is information that leads to the discovery of a fact, the old Section 27, now the proviso to Section 23(2) BSA.
Admissions and confessions at a glance
- Admission defined: Section 15 BSA (formerly Section 17 Evidence Act): a statement, oral, documentary or electronic, suggesting an inference as to a fact in issue or relevant fact.
- Confession defined: no Act defines it; the courts follow the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami (1939): it must admit “the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence”.
- Value of an admission: substantive evidence, “not conclusive proof”, may estop (Section 25 BSA, formerly Section 31).
- Induced confession: irrelevant if caused by “inducement, threat, coercion or promise” from a person in authority (Section 22 BSA, formerly Section 24; “coercion” is new).
- Police confession: never provable against the accused (Section 23(1) BSA, formerly Section 25); in police custody, only if made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate (Section 23(2), formerly Section 26).
- Discovery exception: the part of the information that “relates distinctly to the fact discovered” may be proved (proviso to Section 23(2) BSA, formerly Section 27).
- Before a Magistrate: Section 183 BNSS (formerly Section 164 CrPC), with audio-video recording allowed in the presence of the accused’s advocate.
- Co-accused: the court may “take into consideration” one accused’s confession against others tried jointly for the same offence, only to lend assurance to other evidence (Section 24 BSA, formerly Section 30).
Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are quoted from India Code (each as on 6 October 2025, the current versions on 23 October 2026), the Hindi terms from the official Hindi text of the Adhiniyam on India Code, the Constitution from the Legislative Department’s 2026 edition, and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.
From the Evidence Act to the BSA: where the sections are now
Section 170 of the BSA repealed the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with effect from 1 July 2024. The BSA kept the law of admissions and confessions almost word for word, but renumbered the sections and turned several old confession sections into provisos. Under both Acts the confession sections sit under the cross-heading “Admissions”.
The table shows each change as recorded in the firm’s comparison data (checked against the Gazette text). You can look up any other section with the firm’s IEA to BSA section comparison tool.
| Evidence Act, 1872 | BSA, 2023 | Subject | What changed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Section 17 | Section 15 | Admission defined | No change |
| Section 18 | Section 16 | Admission by party, agent or interested person | Paragraphs renumbered as sub-sections and clauses |
| Section 19 | Section 17 | Persons whose position must be proved | No change |
| Section 20 | Section 18 | Persons expressly referred to | No change |
| Section 21 | Section 19 | Proof of admissions | “coin” replaced by “currency” in an illustration |
| Section 22 | Section 20 | Oral admissions about documents | No change |
| Section 22A | Omitted | Oral admissions about electronic records | Covered by Section 20 |
| Section 23 | Section 21 | Admissions in civil cases | “barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil” replaced by “advocate” |
| Section 24 | Section 22 | Induced confession | “coercion” added; old Sections 28 and 29 became its provisos |
| Section 25 | Section 23(1) | Confession to a police officer | Wording of heading only |
| Section 26 | Section 23(2) | Confession in police custody | “whilst” → “while”; “such person” → “him”; heading dropped |
| Section 27 | Proviso to Section 23(2) | Discovery of a fact | Now a proviso; heading dropped |
| Section 28 | Section 22, first proviso | Impression of inducement removed | Now a proviso |
| Section 29 | Section 22, second proviso | Secrecy, deception, drunkenness | Now a proviso |
| Section 30 | Section 24 | Co-accused tried jointly | New Explanation II on absconding accused |
| Section 31 | Section 25 | Admissions not conclusive; estoppel | No change |
Three procedural sections that go with them moved from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS): statements to police and their use, Section 181 BNSS (formerly Section 162 CrPC); the bar on inducements, Section 182 BNSS (formerly Section 163 CrPC); and recording of confessions by a Magistrate, Section 183 BNSS (formerly Section 164 CrPC).
Which Act applies to an old case? Under Section 170(2) BSA, any “application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal” pending immediately before the BSA came into force “shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872”. Because the wording is almost the same, the firm’s view is that judgments on the old sections remain the guide to the new ones.
What is an admission? Section 15 BSA (formerly Section 17 Evidence Act)
Section 15 BSA reads: “An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.”
- Any form. An admission can be spoken, written or “contained in electronic form”, such as an e-mail or chat message, though an electronic record must still be proved as the BSA requires (see the firm’s guide to electronic records as evidence under Section 63 BSA).
- An inference is enough. The statement need only “suggest any inference” about a fact in issue or relevant fact; it need not concede the whole case.
- Only certain persons. Sections 16 to 18 list whose statements count. The earlier version of this post said an admission “can be made by any person”; that is not correct.
Who can make an admission: Sections 16, 17 and 18 BSA
Parties and their agents (Section 16(1), formerly Section 18). “Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party, whom the Court regards, under the circumstances of the case, as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them, are admissions.”
Persons with an interest (Section 16(2)). A party suing or sued in a representative character makes admissions only while holding that character. Statements of persons with “any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter”, and of persons “from whom the parties to the suit have derived their interest”, are admissions “if they are made during the continuance of the interest”.
Persons whose position must be proved (Section 17, formerly Section 19). If B sues his rent collector A for not collecting rent from C, and A denies C owed any, “A statement by C that he owed B rent is an admission” against A.
Persons a party refers to (Section 18, formerly Section 20). “Statements made by persons to whom a party to the suit has expressly referred for information in reference to a matter in dispute are admissions.” In the illustration, A sells B a horse and says, “Go and ask C, C knows all about it”. What C says is an admission against A.
Who can prove an admission: Section 19 BSA (formerly Section 21)
The basic rule is one-way: admissions “are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them, or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them”. A party cannot build his own case on his own self-serving statements. In the illustration, if A says a deed is genuine and B says it is forged, “A may prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine”, but “A cannot prove a statement by himself that the deed is genuine”.
The maker may prove his own admission only in three cases: where it would be relevant under Section 26 BSA if he were dead; where it states a state of mind or body at the time and “is accompanied by conduct rendering its falsehood improbable”; and where it “is relevant otherwise than as an admission”.
Oral admissions about documents and “without prejudice” talks: Sections 20 and 21
Section 20 BSA (formerly Section 22): “Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document”, or unless “the genuineness of a document produced is in question”. The old Section 22A on electronic records has been omitted; Section 20 now covers them.
Section 21 BSA (formerly Section 23) protects settlement talks in civil cases: “In civil cases no admission is relevant, if it is made either upon an express condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances from which the Court can infer that the parties agreed together that evidence of it should not be given.” This is the basis of “without prejudice” settlement talks; it applies only in civil cases.
Admissions are not conclusive, but may estop: Section 25 BSA (formerly Section 31)
Section 25 BSA reads: “Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.” The earlier version of this post cited Section 21 of the Evidence Act for this rule; the correct old section is Section 31.
An admission can therefore be explained or shown to be wrong. But a person who “intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief” cannot later deny it in a proceeding between them: that is estoppel, Section 121 BSA (formerly Section 115).
Judicial admissions: Section 53 BSA (formerly Section 58)
Admissions made in the case itself are stronger. Under Section 53 BSA no fact needs to be proved which the parties “agree to admit at the hearing”, admit in writing before it, or are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings, though the court may “in its discretion” require proof.
The Supreme Court explained the difference in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam (30 November 1973): “Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under s. 58 of the Evidence Act … stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof.” Evidentiary admissions, made outside the case, “are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”
What is the evidential value of an admission?
An admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted. In Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad (30 October 1973), a partition suit decided on the plaintiffs’ admissions in an earlier suit, the Supreme Court adopted this statement from Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi: “Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of ss. 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted.”
Such an admission need not even be put to the party in the witness box, because it is “evidence proprio vigore” (by its own force), unlike a witness’s earlier statement used to contradict him under Section 148 BSA (formerly Section 145). “Admissions are usually telling against the maker unless reasonably explained.” The earlier version of this post said this case gave admissions “only … a corroborative value”; the judgment says the opposite.
What is a confession, and where does the law define it?
Neither the Evidence Act nor the BSA defines “confession”. In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar (4 May 1965) the Supreme Court noted that Indian courts once used Stephen’s definition, “an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime”, but that this definition “was discarded by the Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. The King Emperor”. Lord Atkin’s words in that 1939 Privy Council case, as quoted by the Supreme Court, are the test still used:
“…no statement that contains self-exculpatory matter can amount to confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which if true would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. Moreover, a confession must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the accused is the owner of and was in recent possession of the knife or revolver which caused a death with no explanation of any other man’s possession.”
“Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence.” Two consequences follow.
- A confession is read as a whole. “If the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each part of it” (Aghnoo Nagesia); the prosecution cannot use its motive or preparation parts as “non-confessional” statements.
- Exculpatory statements. In Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (22 October 1952) a wife admitted disposing of her husband’s body but said he had taken poison by accident; read as a whole the statement was exculpatory, and confessions and admissions “must either be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole”. In Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (2 December 1968) an exculpatory part was rejected only because it was “not only inherently improbable but also contradicted by the other evidence”.
Judicial and extra-judicial confessions
A confession recorded by a Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS (formerly Section 164 CrPC) is commonly called a judicial confession. One made to anyone else, such as a relative, friend or village head, is an extra-judicial confession (spelt “extrajudicial” in Pawan Kumar Chourasia, 2023); it is tested under the same Sections 22 and 23 and the courts’ rules of caution (see below).
Difference between admission and confession
In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (4 August 2005) the Supreme Court called confessions “a species of ‘admissions’ as defined in Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act”: “every confession must necessarily be an admission, but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession”. The main differences:
| Point | Admission | Confession |
|---|---|---|
| Law | Sections 15–21 and 25 BSA (formerly 17–23 and 31 IEA) | Sections 22–24 BSA (formerly 24–30 IEA); Section 183 BNSS |
| Definition | Defined in Section 15 BSA | Not defined; Pakala Narayana Swami test |
| What it concedes | Any fact in issue or relevant fact, which may not amount to guilt | The offence, or substantially all the facts that make it up |
| Who makes it | A party, its agent, or a person listed in Sections 16–18 | A person accused of an offence |
| Proceedings | Civil and criminal | Criminal (Section 22 speaks of “a criminal proceeding”) |
| Weight | Substantive evidence, not conclusive; may estop | If voluntary and true, can by itself support conviction of the maker |
| Against others | Generally only against the maker and his representative in interest | The court may “take into consideration” it against co-accused tried jointly for the same offence (Section 24) |
| To police | A non-confessional FIR by the accused can be an admission (Aghnoo Nagesia); statements made during investigation are barred by Section 181 BNSS | Never provable against the accused, except the discovery proviso |
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (India Code, as on 6 October 2025) and the Supreme Court’s judgments in Aghnoo Nagesia (1965), Pyare Lal Bhargava (1962), Bishwanath Prasad (1973) and Navjot Sandhu (2005).
When is a confession inadmissible? Sections 22 and 23 BSA
The rules on police confessions, said the Supreme Court in Aghnoo Nagesia, “are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them”. There are three bars, each with limits.
Bar 1: inducement, threat, coercion or promise (Section 22 BSA, formerly Section 24)
Section 22 BSA: “A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat, coercion or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him”.
“Coercion” is new; the old Section 24 said “inducement, threat or promise”. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (22 October 1962) four judges read the section as four conditions: the inducement, threat or promise must appear to have caused the confession, relate to the charge, come from a person in authority, and be sufficient to make the accused reasonably suppose he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil. “Appears” “imports a lesser degree of probability than proof”, and “the criterion is the reasonable belief of the accused”. A person in authority need not be a police officer: the Chief Secretary holding a departmental inquiry was one.
First proviso (formerly Section 28): “if the confession is made after the impression caused by any such inducement, threat, coercion or promise has, in the opinion of the Court, been fully removed, it is relevant”.
Second proviso (formerly Section 29): an otherwise relevant confession “does not become irrelevant merely because” it was made under a promise of secrecy, through a deception, when the accused was drunk, in answer to questions he need not have answered, or without a warning that he need not confess.
Section 182(1) BNSS (formerly Section 163 CrPC) forbids any police officer “or other person in authority” to offer such an inducement, threat or promise.
Bar 2: confession to a police officer (Section 23(1) BSA, formerly Section 25)
“No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” The bar is absolute: it covers a confession made “under any circumstances”, including one made “when he was free and not in police custody” or “before any investigation has begun” (Aghnoo Nagesia).
The case concerned a confessional FIR: Aghnoo Nagesia went to the police station and lodged a report confessing to four murders. The whole report was barred except the formal part identifying him as its maker and the information that led to discovery (“the separability test is misleading”), and his death sentence was set aside. A non-confessional FIR by an accused is admissible against him “as an admission”. Statements to the police during investigation are also restricted by Section 181 BNSS (formerly Section 162 CrPC): they are not signed and, apart from exceptions such as the discovery proviso, can be used at trial only to contradict a witness. The firm’s guide to filing a police complaint and FIR explains how an FIR is recorded.
Bar 3: confession in police custody (Section 23(2) BSA, formerly Section 26)
“No confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate shall be proved against him”. This covers confessions to anyone else while the person is in police custody; it “does not qualify the absolute ban” on confessions to the police themselves (Aghnoo Nagesia).
The discovery exception: proviso to Section 23(2) BSA (formerly Section 27)
The proviso reads: “Provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, may be proved.” Section 181(2) BNSS calls it “the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 23”. Even old Section 27 began with “Provided that”; it “lifts the ban … to a limited extent” (Navjot Sandhu, 2005).
The classic explanation is the Privy Council’s in Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor, which Navjot Sandhu noted “has been described as a locus classicus”, and quoted:
“…it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this … Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’ these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.”
Navjot Sandhu added the conditions: the officer must depose to a discovery, of a fact not already known to the police, “in consequence of the information received from an accused person in police custody”; the information “should be free from any element of compulsion”; and “only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” can be proved. As the Privy Council added in Pulukuri Kottaya, such information “is only one link in the chain of proof”.
Prepared by Century Law Firm from Sections 22 and 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 and Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (India Code, as on 6 October 2025), and the Supreme Court’s judgments in Aghnoo Nagesia (1965) and Navjot Sandhu (2005).
Confession before a Magistrate: Section 183 BNSS (formerly Section 164 CrPC)
Because a confession to the police is barred, confessions during investigation are recorded by a Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS.
- Who records it: “Any Magistrate of the District in which the information about commission of any offence has been registered”, “whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case”, before the inquiry or trial begins; never “a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred” (Section 183(1) and second proviso).
- Audio-video recording: it “may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the person accused of an offence” (first proviso; see Section 2(1)(a) BNSS).
- Warning and voluntariness: the Magistrate must first explain “that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence against him”, and must not record it “unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily” (Section 183(2)).
- Refusal: if the person says before recording that he is not willing to confess, “the Magistrate shall not authorise the detention of such person in police custody” (Section 183(3)).
- Record: made as in Section 316 BNSS, signed by the person, with the Magistrate’s memorandum that he gave the warning and believes the confession “was voluntarily made” (Section 183(4)).
A lapse in procedure is not always fatal: under Section 509 BNSS (formerly Section 463 CrPC) the court may still admit the statement “if satisfied that such non-compliance has not injured the accused in his defence on the merits and that he duly made the statement recorded”. Navjot Sandhu called the old Section 164 “a salutary provision” to ensure voluntariness, and held five or ten minutes’ reflection time before a confession under the anti-terror law POTA “utterly inadequate”.
Confession of a co-accused: Section 24 BSA (formerly Section 30)
Section 24 BSA: “When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession.” “Offence” includes abetment and attempt (Explanation I). New Explanation II deems a trial held in the absence of an accused who has absconded, or who fails to comply with a proclamation under Section 84 BNSS, to be a joint trial for this purpose.
How much weight? Very little on its own. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (4 March 1952) the Supreme Court held that such a confession “is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term”: it is not on oath, not made in the accused’s presence and cannot be cross-examined. The court must “first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether”, and may then use the confession only “to lend assurance to the other evidence”.
A Constitution Bench confirmed this in Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar (3 February 1964): “the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution”. An accomplice who testifies (Section 138 BSA, formerly Section 133) gives evidence; a co-accused’s confession is not evidence in that strict sense.
A confession that cannot be proved even against its maker cannot be used against others. In Navjot Sandhu, confessions recorded by a police officer under POTA could not be used against co-accused, even under Section 30, because a police confession “cannot be proved against such person, not to speak of the co-accused”.
Retracted confessions
A retraction does not wipe out a confession, but it calls for caution. In Pyare Lal Bhargava (1962) the Supreme Court held: “A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only rule of prudence.” As a general rule of practice, “it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confession, unless the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars.”
Navjot Sandhu quoted Bharat v. State of U.P. (1971): a voluntary and true confession “is the most patent piece of evidence against the maker”, and “must fit into the proved facts”; a retracted one “requires the general assurance that the retraction was an after-thought”.
Extra-judicial confessions
An extra-judicial confession is admissible if it is not hit by Sections 22 and 23 BSA, but courts treat it with care. In Pawan Kumar Chourasia v. State of Bihar (14 March 2023) the Supreme Court said: “As far as extrajudicial confession is concerned, the law is well settled. Generally, it is a weak piece of evidence. However, a conviction can be sustained on the basis of extrajudicial confession provided that the confession is proved to be voluntary and truthful. It should be free of any inducement.”
Its value “depends on the person to whom it is made”: people normally confide only in someone “in whom he has implicit faith”. Corroboration is not required “as a matter of rule”, but adds “more credibility”. There the witnesses were not shown to be close to the accused, did not go to the police and disagreed about where he confessed, so the confession was discarded and he was acquitted. In Nishi Kant Jha (1968), by contrast, a statement made before a village Mukhiya was held voluntary and used.
Silence, the Constitution and “scientific” confessions
Article 20(3) of the Constitution says: “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” In Selvi v. State of Karnataka (5 May 2010) the Supreme Court held that compulsory narco-analysis, polygraph and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) tests violate this right. Even with consent, “the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence”, although “any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act” (now the proviso to Section 23(2) BSA).
The earlier version of this post said such results are admissible with consent; that has been corrected. See also the firm’s guides to forensic evidence and the rights of an arrested person.
Landmark Supreme Court judgments on admissions and confessions
| Case | Date | What it decided |
|---|---|---|
| Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P. | 4 March 1952 | Co-accused’s confession only lends assurance to other evidence. |
| Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab | 22 October 1952 | Exculpatory statement is not a confession; accept or reject as a whole. |
| Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan | 22 October 1962 | Inducement rule explained; retracted confession needs corroboration as a rule of prudence. |
| Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar (Constitution Bench) | 3 February 1964 | Court cannot start with a co-accused’s confession. |
| Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar | 4 May 1965 | Confessional FIR to police barred, except formal part and discovery. |
| Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar | 2 December 1968 | Improbable, contradicted exculpatory part may be rejected. |
| Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad | 30 October 1973 | Admission is substantive evidence. |
| Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam | 30 November 1973 | Judicial admissions bind and waive proof. |
| State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu | 4 August 2005 | Every confession is an admission; Section 27 explained; police confessions not usable against co-accused. |
| Selvi v. State of Karnataka | 5 May 2010 | No forced narco or polygraph tests; results not evidence. |
| Pawan Kumar Chourasia v. State of Bihar | 14 March 2023 | Extra-judicial confession generally weak; usable if voluntary and true. |
The Privy Council’s decisions in Pakala Narayana Swami (1939) and Pulukuri Kottaya, quoted above through the Supreme Court, remain the starting points.
स्वीकृति और संस्वीकृति – हिंदी में सारांश (Summary in Hindi)
यह हिस्सा फर्म का अपना हिंदी सारांश है। “स्वीकृति” (admission) और “संस्वीकृति” (confession) जैसे शब्द भारतीय साक्ष्य अधिनियम, 2023 के राजपत्र में प्रकाशित आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ से लिए गए हैं, जिसे हमने इंडिया कोड पर उपलब्ध स्कैन किए गए पृष्ठों से पढ़ा है। धारा 15 और 23(1) के नीचे दिए गए उद्धरण भी उसी पाठ से हैं।
कानून अब कहाँ है? 1 जुलाई 2024 से पुराने Indian Evidence Act, 1872 की जगह भारतीय साक्ष्य अधिनियम, 2023 (Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, BSA) लागू है। स्वीकृति के नियम अब धारा 15 से 21 और 25 में हैं (पहले धारा 17 से 23 और 31), और संस्वीकृति के नियम धारा 22 से 24 में हैं (पहले धारा 24 से 30)। जो आवेदन, विचारण, जांच, अन्वेषण, कार्यवाही या अपील 1 जुलाई 2024 से ठीक पहले लंबित थे, वे धारा 170 BSA के अनुसार पुराने अधिनियम के तहत ही चलेंगे।
स्वीकृति क्या है? आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में धारा 15 कहती है: “स्वीकृति वह मौखिक या दस्तावेजी या इलैक्ट्रानिक प्ररूप में अंतर्विष्ट कथन है, जो किसी विवाद्यक तथ्य या सुसंगत तथ्य के बारे में कोई अनुमान इंगित करता है और जो ऐसे व्यक्तियों में से किसी के द्वारा और ऐसी परिस्थितियों में किया गया है जो इसमें इसके पश्चात् वर्णित है।” यानी केवल वे व्यक्ति स्वीकृति कर सकते हैं जिनका उल्लेख धारा 16 से 18 में है, जैसे पक्षकार और उसका अभिकर्ता (एजेंट)।
स्वीकृति का साक्ष्यिक मूल्य: सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने बिश्वनाथ प्रसाद बनाम द्वारका प्रसाद (1973) में कहा कि स्वीकृति अपने आप में सारभूत (substantive) साक्ष्य है, यानी स्वीकृत तथ्य का प्रत्यक्ष साक्ष्य, पर निर्णायक नहीं। धारा 25 के अनुसार स्वीकृतियां, स्वीकृत विषयों का निश्चायक सबूत नहीं हैं, किन्तु वे विबंध (estoppel) के रूप में काम कर सकती हैं। अदालत में या अभिवचनों (pleadings) में की गई स्वीकृति और भी मज़बूत होती है; धारा 53 के अनुसार ऐसे स्वीकृत तथ्य को साबित करने की ज़रूरत नहीं होती, हालांकि न्यायालय अपने विवेक से सबूत मांग सकता है।
संस्वीकृति क्या है? कानून में संस्वीकृति की कोई परिभाषा नहीं है। अदालतें प्रिवी काउंसिल के पकाला नारायण स्वामी (1939) मामले की कसौटी अपनाती हैं: संस्वीकृति में अपराध को सीधे स्वीकार किया जाना चाहिए, या कम से कम अपराध बनाने वाले लगभग सभी तथ्यों को। केवल कोई गंभीर रूप से आपत्तिजनक तथ्य मान लेना संस्वीकृति नहीं है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट के शब्दों में हर संस्वीकृति एक स्वीकृति है, पर हर स्वीकृति संस्वीकृति नहीं होती।
कब संस्वीकृति साबित नहीं की जा सकती?
- धारा 22: अभियुक्त व्यक्ति द्वारा की गई संस्वीकृति दाण्डिक कार्यवाही में विसंगत (irrelevant) है, यदि वह किसी प्राधिकारवान् व्यक्ति की उत्प्रेरणा, धमकी, प्रपीड़न या वचन से कराई गई प्रतीत हो। “प्रपीड़न” (coercion) शब्द नया जोड़ा गया है। अगर उस दबाव का असर पूरी तरह हट जाने के बाद संस्वीकृति की गई हो, तो वह सुसंगत है।
- धारा 23(1): आधिकारिक पाठ: “किसी पुलिस अधिकारी से की गई कोई भी संस्वीकृति, किसी अपराध के अभियुक्त व्यक्ति के विरुद्ध साबित नहीं की जाएगी।”
- धारा 23(2): पुलिस अधिकारी की अभिरक्षा (custody) में किसी और से की गई संस्वीकृति भी तब तक साबित नहीं की जा सकती, जब तक वह मजिस्ट्रेट की साक्षात् उपस्थिति में न की गई हो।
- अपवाद (धारा 23(2) का परंतुक, पहले धारा 27): पुलिस अभिरक्षा में अभियुक्त से मिली जानकारी से अगर कोई तथ्य पता चलता है, जैसे छिपाया गया हथियार, तो जानकारी का केवल उतना हिस्सा साबित किया जा सकता है जो पता चले तथ्य से स्पष्ट रूप से जुड़ा हो।
मजिस्ट्रेट के सामने संस्वीकृति: धारा 183 BNSS (पहले धारा 164 CrPC) के तहत मजिस्ट्रेट पहले समझाता है कि व्यक्ति संस्वीकृति करने के लिए बाध्य नहीं है और वह उसके विरुद्ध साक्ष्य बन सकती है; संस्वीकृति तभी दर्ज होती है जब मजिस्ट्रेट को विश्वास हो कि वह स्वेच्छा से की जा रही है। इसे अभियुक्त के अधिवक्ता की उपस्थिति में ऑडियो-वीडियो माध्यम से भी दर्ज किया जा सकता है।
सह-अभियुक्त की संस्वीकृति (धारा 24): जब कई व्यक्तियों पर एक ही अपराध के लिए संयुक्त रूप से विचारण हो रहा हो, तो एक की संस्वीकृति को दूसरे के विरुद्ध भी विचार में लिया जा सकता है। पर अदालत पहले बाकी साक्ष्य देखती है और यह संस्वीकृति केवल उसे भरोसा देने के काम आती है (कश्मीरा सिंह, 1952)।
वापस ली गई और न्यायेतर संस्वीकृति: वापस ली गई संस्वीकृति पर भी सज़ा हो सकती है, अगर अदालत संतुष्ट हो कि वह सच्ची और स्वैच्छिक थी, पर सामान्य व्यवहार-नियम (rule of practice) के तौर पर अदालत आम तौर पर उसकी पुष्टि (corroboration) देखती है; यह कोई अटल नियम नहीं है (प्यारे लाल भार्गव, 1962)। न्यायेतर संस्वीकृति (मजिस्ट्रेट या न्यायालय के अलावा किसी और, जैसे रिश्तेदार या मित्र, के सामने की गई) आम तौर पर कमज़ोर साक्ष्य है, जो स्वैच्छिक और सच्ची साबित होने पर ही काम आती है (पवन कुमार चौरसिया, 2023)।
Frequently asked questions
Under Section 15 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, unchanged), an admission is “a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact”, made by one of the persons listed in Sections 16 to 18, such as a party, its authorised agent, a person with an interest in the subject matter, or a person the party referred to for information.
Neither the Evidence Act nor the BSA defines it. Courts follow the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami (1939), as quoted by the Supreme Court in Aghnoo Nagesia (1965): a confession “must either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence”, and an admission of “a gravely incriminating fact” is not by itself a confession. The rules are in Sections 22 to 24 BSA (formerly Sections 24 to 30).
An admission concedes any fact in issue or relevant fact and can arise in civil or criminal cases; a confession is made by an accused and admits the offence itself, or substantially all its facts, and belongs to criminal proceedings. An admission is substantive evidence but not conclusive (Section 25 BSA); a voluntary and true confession can by itself support the maker’s conviction. A confession to the police is barred (Section 23 BSA).
A confession is a special kind of admission: one by an accused that admits the offence. An admission of a single fact, such as owning the weapon used, is not a confession. The Supreme Court in Navjot Sandhu (2005) said: “every confession must necessarily be an admission, but, every admission does not necessarily amount to a confession”. The confession sections, Sections 22 to 24 BSA, sit under the cross-heading “Admissions”.
In the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 17 to 23 dealt with admissions, Sections 24 to 30 with confessions and Section 31 with admissions not being conclusive. In the BSA, 2023, admissions are Sections 15 to 21 and 25, and confessions Sections 22 to 24. Old Sections 28 and 29 became provisos to Section 22, and old Section 27 the proviso to Section 23(2).
Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act defined “admission”; that definition is now Section 15 BSA, word for word. Section 17 of the BSA is a different rule (formerly Section 19 of the Evidence Act): statements of persons “whose position or liability, it is necessary to prove as against any party to the suit” are admissions, if they would be relevant against those persons in a suit by or against them and were made while they held that position or liability.
Section 24 of the Evidence Act made a confession irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if caused by an inducement, threat or promise from a person in authority. It is now Section 22 BSA, with “coercion” added. Section 25 of the BSA (formerly Section 31) says: “Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate as estoppels”. Do not confuse it with old Section 25 of the Evidence Act (confession to police), which is now Section 23(1) BSA.
An admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, though not conclusive. In Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad (1973) the Supreme Court held that “Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves … though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted”, and that they need not be put to the party before being used. They can be shown to be wrong, but “are usually telling against the maker unless reasonably explained”. Admissions in pleadings or at the hearing are binding and ordinarily need no further proof, though the court may in its discretion require proof (Section 53 BSA; Nagindas Ramdas, 1973).
A confession found to be voluntary and true can support the conviction of the person who made it; the Supreme Court has called it “the most patent piece of evidence against the maker” (Bharat v. State of U.P., quoted in Navjot Sandhu, 2005). It must fit the proved facts. A retracted confession is, as a general rule of practice, acted on only if corroborated in material particulars (Pyare Lal Bhargava, 1962), and a co-accused’s confession only lends assurance to other evidence (Section 24 BSA; Kashmira Singh, 1952).
No. Section 23(1) BSA (formerly Section 25 Evidence Act): “No confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.” The Supreme Court in Aghnoo Nagesia (1965) held this covers a confession made “under any circumstances”, even before arrest or investigation, including a confessional FIR lodged by the accused himself. The only exception is the part of information from an accused in custody that “relates distinctly to the fact discovered” (proviso to Section 23(2)).
Section 23(2) does not bar it, but it must still not be caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise (Section 22) and must be voluntary and true. Section 23(2) BSA (formerly Section 26) bars a confession made by a person in police custody “unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate”. Confessions during investigation are normally recorded by a Magistrate under Section 183 BNSS (formerly Section 164 CrPC), who must warn the person that he need not confess and record it only if satisfied it is voluntary. The bar on confessions made to a police officer himself remains absolute.
Section 27 allowed proof of so much of the information given by an accused in police custody “as relates distinctly to the fact discovered”, whether or not it amounted to a confession. It is now the proviso to Section 23(2) BSA; Section 181(2) BNSS refers to it in those words. Following Pulukuri Kottaya, as quoted in Navjot Sandhu (2005), “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” is provable, but “with which I stabbed A” is not.
Under Section 22 BSA (formerly Section 24), when it appears to the court to have been caused by an inducement, threat, coercion or promise that relates to the charge, comes from a person in authority, and is enough to make the accused reasonably suppose he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil of a temporal nature in the proceedings. “Appears” means less than strict proof (Pyare Lal Bhargava, 1962). The confession becomes relevant again if made after the impression was “fully removed”.
Yes, if it is otherwise relevant. The second proviso to Section 22 BSA (formerly Section 29 of the Evidence Act) says such a confession “does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk”, or because he was not warned that he need not confess.
It is a confession made to someone other than a Magistrate or court, such as a relative, friend or village head. It is relevant unless excluded by Sections 22 and 23 BSA (formerly Sections 24 to 26). In Pawan Kumar Chourasia v. State of Bihar (2023) the Supreme Court said it is “Generally … a weak piece of evidence”, but a conviction can rest on it if it is proved “voluntary and truthful”; its value depends on the person to whom it was made.
Yes, in law. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (1962) the Supreme Court held that “A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made”. Corroboration is “not a rule of law, but is only rule of prudence”; as a general rule of practice it is “unsafe” to rely on a retracted confession unless it “has been corroborated in material particulars”.
Only where they are tried jointly for the same offence. Section 24 BSA (formerly Section 30) lets the court “take into consideration” such a confession against the co-accused. But it is not evidence in the strict sense: the court must first assess the other evidence and may use the confession only “to lend assurance” to it (Kashmira Singh, 1952; Hari Charan Kurmi, 1964, Constitution Bench). A confession to the police cannot be used against a co-accused at all (Navjot Sandhu, 2005).
Under Section 183 BNSS (formerly Section 164 CrPC) any Magistrate of the district where the information about the offence was registered may record it before the inquiry or trial begins. He must explain that the person need not confess and that it may be used against him, and record it only if he believes it voluntary. The first proviso to Section 183(1) allows it to be recorded “by audio-video electronic means in the presence of the advocate of the person accused”. A police officer with Magistrate’s powers cannot record a confession.
If the FIR is a confession, no part of it can be used, except the formal part identifying him as its maker and any information that led to a discovery (Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, 1965, applying old Section 25, now Section 23(1) BSA). If it is not confessional, it is admissible against him as an admission, and the fact that he gave it is relevant as his conduct.
Generally no. In Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1952) the Supreme Court held that confessions and admissions “must either be accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole”. In Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1968) it allowed the exculpatory part to be rejected only because it was “not only inherently improbable but also contradicted by the other evidence”. In Aghnoo Nagesia (1965) it held that an inadmissible confession is excluded in all its parts.
They cannot be used as one. In Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) the Supreme Court held that no one can be forced to undergo narco-analysis, polygraph or Brain Electrical Activation Profile tests, because of Article 20(3) and because forced tests intrude on personal liberty and mental privacy, and that “Even when the subject has given consent … the test results by themselves cannot be admitted as evidence”. Information or material later discovered with the help of a voluntarily taken test can be admitted under the discovery rule, now the proviso to Section 23(2) BSA.
भारतीय साक्ष्य अधिनियम, 2023 की धारा 15 के अनुसार स्वीकृति (admission) वह कथन है जो किसी विवाद्यक या सुसंगत तथ्य के बारे में अनुमान इंगित करता है; यह दीवानी और फौजदारी दोनों मामलों में हो सकती है और निर्णायक सबूत नहीं होती (धारा 25)। संस्वीकृति (confession) अभियुक्त द्वारा अपराध की स्वीकृति है (धारा 22 से 24)। पुलिस अधिकारी से की गई संस्वीकृति साबित नहीं की जा सकती (धारा 23(1))। हर संस्वीकृति स्वीकृति है, पर हर स्वीकृति संस्वीकृति नहीं। (यह फर्म का हिंदी सारांश है; शब्द आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ से हैं।)
Conclusion
The BSA changed the numbers more than the law: admissions are Sections 15 to 21 and 25, confessions Sections 22 to 24, with old Sections 27, 28 and 29 now provisos. “Coercion” is expressly a ground of exclusion, and a trial held in the absence of an absconding co-accused is deemed a joint trial for Section 24. Confessions during investigation are still recorded by a Magistrate, now under Section 183 BNSS, which allows audio-video recording in the presence of the accused’s advocate.
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court over seventy years still decide cases: an admission is substantive but not conclusive evidence; a confession must admit the offence; confessions to the police, or in police custody without a Magistrate, cannot be proved; only the part of information that leads to a discovery survives; and retracted, extra-judicial and co-accused confessions are used only with caution. For how evidence fits into the course of a trial, see the firm’s guide to how civil suits and criminal cases move in Indian courts.
Sources used for this post: the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (Act 47 of 2023), Sections 15 to 26, 53, 121, 138, 148 and 170 (India Code, as on 6 October 2025), and its official Hindi text as published in the Gazette of India (India Code file hh202347.pdf, Sections 15, 22, 23 and 25, read from the page images); the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (Act 46 of 2023), Sections 2(1)(a), 84, 181, 182, 183, 316 and 509 (India Code, as on 6 October 2025); the Constitution of India, Article 20(3) (Legislative Department, English edition of 2026); the firm’s Gazette-checked comparison data for the old Evidence Act and CrPC sections; and the Supreme Court’s official copies of Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 1951, 4 March 1952 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/1145.pdf), Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, 22 October 1952 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/1112.pdf), Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 1962, 22 October 1962 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/3730.pdf), Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeals Nos. 208 and 209 of 1963, 3 February 1964 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/3350.pdf), Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 37 of 1965, 4 May 1965 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/2946.pdf), Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 1966, 2 December 1968 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/1886.pdf), Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, Civil Appeal No. 1787 of 1967, 30 October 1973 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/6433.pdf), Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, Civil Appeal No. 2479 (N) of 1972, 30 November 1973 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/6400.pdf), State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, Criminal Appeals Nos. 373–375 of 2004 and connected appeals, 4 August 2005 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/27092.pdf), Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (Privy Council, AIR 1939 PC 47), as quoted in Aghnoo Nagesia and Navjot Sandhu, Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor (Privy Council) and Bharat v. State of U.P. (1971), as quoted in Navjot Sandhu, Smt. Selvi v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004, 5 May 2010 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/36303.pdf), and Pawan Kumar Chourasia v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 2230 of 2010, 14 March 2023 (https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2010/23776/23776_2010_16_1501_42672_Judgement_14-Mar-2023.pdf).
