Emergency Provisions in the Indian Constitution: Articles 352 to 360 Explained (National Emergency, President’s Rule, Financial Emergency)

Part XVIII of the Constitution of India, Articles 352 to 360, lets the Union take extraordinary powers in three situations: a threat to the security of India from war, external aggression or armed rebellion (National Emergency, Article 352); the failure of the constitutional machinery in a State (President’s Rule, Article 356); and a threat to the financial stability or credit of India (Financial Emergency, Article 360). Each has its own ground, its own approval procedure in Parliament, its own time limits and its own effect on the federal balance and on fundamental rights. This guide sets out the text of each Article as it stands after the 44th Amendment of 1978, what has actually happened under them since 1950, and what the Supreme Court has said about them, in the order a student or a reader of the news needs them.

Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Constitution as in force on that date.

Where the emergency provisions come from

The framers did not invent these provisions. When the draft Articles were debated in the Constituent Assembly on 4 August 1949, Algu Rai Sastri objected that “Articles 188, 275, 276 and 278 of the Draft Constitution are exactly on the lines of Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935”, the colonial provision under which the Governor of a province could take over its government. Dr Ambedkar, replying on the draft Article that became Article 356, said he shared the hope that such Articles would “never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter”, and that if they were ever used, “the first thing he will do would be to issue a mere warning”. The comparison with the emergency Article of Germany’s Weimar Constitution was also raised in the House and was rejected by Brajeshwar Prasad with the words “It was not because of any article that Hitlerism came into power”. So the usual examination answer, that the emergency provisions were borrowed from the Government of India Act, 1935 (with the Weimar Constitution often named as the second source), has support in the debates themselves, at least for the 1935 Act.

Two amendments have shaped the provisions since. The 42nd Amendment of 1976, passed during the Emergency, allowed a Proclamation to be confined to a part of India and widened the Union’s powers in the rest of the country. The 44th Amendment Act, 1978, which came into force on 20 June 1979 for these Articles, undid most of what had made the 1975 Emergency possible. Its Statement of Objects and Reasons opens with the words “Recent experience has shown that the fundamental rights, including…” and goes on to explain the changes: “internal disturbance” was replaced by “armed rebellion”, so that internal disturbance not amounting to armed rebellion would no longer be a ground; an Emergency “can be proclaimed only on the basis of written advice tendered to the President by the Cabinet”; it must be approved “by the two Houses of Parliament by the same majority which is necessary to amend the Constitution”; “Ten per cent. or more of the Members of Lok Sabha can requisition a special meeting” to consider disapproving it; and the power to suspend the enforcement of fundamental rights “cannot be exercised in respect of the fundamental right to life and liberty”. Everything below describes the Articles as they stand after that amendment.

National Emergency under Article 352: grounds and the written Cabinet decision

Article 352(1) allows the President to issue a Proclamation of Emergency if satisfied “that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion”. The Proclamation may cover the whole of India or only a part of it. The Explanation added in 1978 makes clear that the Proclamation can be issued “before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion, if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof”. A Proclamation can be varied or revoked by a later Proclamation (Art. 352(2)), and the President may issue separate Proclamations on different grounds even while an earlier one is in force (Art. 352(9)).

The safeguard that answers the question “who really decides” is Article 352(3): the President shall not issue a Proclamation, or vary one, “unless the decision of the Union Cabinet (that is to say, the Council consisting of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Cabinet rank appointed under article 75) that such a Proclamation may be issued has been communicated to him in writing”. The 1975 Proclamation had been issued on the Prime Minister’s advice alone; since 1979 a written Cabinet decision is a condition precedent. The earlier clause, inserted by the 38th Amendment of 1975, which had declared the President’s satisfaction “final and conclusive” and beyond question in any court, was deleted by the 44th Amendment, so the Proclamation is no longer immune from judicial review.

Approval, continuation and revocation of a National Emergency

Every Proclamation must be laid before each House of Parliament and, unless it merely revokes an earlier one, it ceases to operate at the end of one month unless both Houses approve it by resolution before then (Art. 352(4)). The majority required is special: a resolution under Article 352(4) or (5) must be passed “by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members of that House present and voting” (Art. 352(6)), the same majority that is needed to amend the Constitution. If the Lok Sabha has been dissolved, or is dissolved during the month, and the Rajya Sabha has approved the Proclamation, it survives until thirty days after the new Lok Sabha first sits, and lapses then unless that House also approves it.

Once approved, the Proclamation continues for six months from the date of the second of the two resolutions and then lapses, unless both Houses pass fresh resolutions continuing it, each for a further six months, “if and so often as” they do (Art. 352(5)). There is no outer limit on the number of extensions, which is why the usual statement is that a National Emergency can be continued indefinitely with Parliament’s approval every six months. Two provisions give the Lok Sabha a check of its own: under Article 352(7) the President “shall revoke” the Proclamation if the Lok Sabha passes a resolution disapproving it or its continuance (a simple majority is enough for that resolution), and under Article 352(8), if not less than one-tenth of the total membership of the Lok Sabha gives written notice of an intention to move such a resolution, a special sitting of the House must be held within fourteen days to consider it. That notice goes to the Speaker if the House is in session and to the President if it is not.

What a National Emergency changes

A Proclamation of Emergency alters the ordinary distribution of power between the Union and the States in four ways. Under Article 353(a) the executive power of the Union extends to giving directions to any State on how its executive power is to be exercised, and under Article 353(b) Parliament may make laws on any matter even if it is not in the Union List; Article 250 says in terms that while a Proclamation is in operation Parliament may legislate for the whole or any part of India on any matter in the State List (including goods and services tax under Article 246A), and that such a law ceases to have effect six months after the Proclamation ends. The 42nd Amendment’s proviso to Article 353 extends these powers to a State outside the emergency area if the security of India is threatened by activities in the area covered. Under Article 354 the President may, by order laid before Parliament, modify the revenue-sharing provisions of Articles 268 to 279 for the financial year in which the Proclamation operates. And under the provisos to Articles 83(2) and 172(1), Parliament may by law extend the life of the Lok Sabha or of a State Legislative Assembly “for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not extending in any case beyond a period of six months after the Proclamation has ceased to operate”. It is this cluster of provisions that textbooks summarise as the federal structure becoming unitary for the duration.

The effect on fundamental rights is governed by Articles 358 and 359, and it is narrower today than it was in 1975. Article 358(1) suspends Article 19 (the six freedoms of speech, assembly, association, movement, residence and profession) automatically, but only “while a Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression is in operation”; a Proclamation on the ground of armed rebellion does not touch Article 19. Any law made in the shadow of Article 358 ceases to have effect, to the extent it would otherwise have been incompetent, as soon as the Proclamation ends, except as to things already done, and under Article 358(2) the protection is available only to a law that contains a recital that it relates to the Proclamation, and to executive action under such a law.

Article 359 is different: nothing is suspended automatically. The President may by order declare that “the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III (except articles 20 and 21) as may be mentioned in the order” and all pending proceedings for those rights remain suspended for the period of the Proclamation or a shorter period stated in the order. The words “except articles 20 and 21” were inserted by the 44th Amendment, so the protection against retrospective punishment, double jeopardy and self-incrimination, and the protection of life and personal liberty, can never be suspended. An order under Article 359 must be laid before each House, and under Article 359(1A) and (1B) it protects only laws that carry the recital and executive action under them. Article 32(4) completes the picture: the right to move the Supreme Court “shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution”, which means only under Article 359.

The three National Emergencies: 1962, 1971 and 1975

India has had three Proclamations under Article 352, and the Supreme Court’s own judgments record their dates. The first was issued on 26 October 1962, during the war with China. The second was issued on 3 December 1971, as the Supreme Court put it, “consequent upon the Pakistani aggression”. The third was issued on 25 June 1975 and declared that “a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturbances”; it was proclaimed while the 1971 Proclamation was still in force, so two Proclamations ran together until 1977. The ground of “internal disturbance” no longer exists.

What made the 1975 Emergency so severe was the use of Article 359. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde (25 January 1977) sets out the orders: on 27 June 1975 the President suspended the right to move any court for the enforcement of Articles 14, 21 and 22, and on 8 January 1976 Article 19 was added. Article 19 was in any event suspended under Article 358 because the 1971 Proclamation was still in force. The nine-judge bench in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) summarised the position in one sentence: Article 19 was suspended under Article 358, and Articles 14 and 21 under Article 359, “from 26 June 1975 to March 1977”. Earlier orders had done the same on a smaller scale: an order of 3 November 1962 under the first Proclamation suspended the enforcement of Articles 21 and 22 (Article 14 was added on 11 November 1962), and an order of 16 November 1974 covered detentions under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.

The constitutional response came in two stages. The 42nd Amendment of 1976 had gone the other way, enlarging the emergency powers; the 44th Amendment of 1978 reversed it and added the safeguards described above. The judicial response took longer. In ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976), a Constitution Bench held by a majority of four to one that, with the Article 359 order in force, no person could move any court for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge a detention, because Article 21 was “the sole repository of rights to life and personal liberty against the State” and its enforcement stood suspended; Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, holding that the right not to be deprived of life or liberty without the authority of law did not depend on Article 21 alone. Forty-one years later a nine-judge bench in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (24 August 2017) said that “the judgments rendered by all the four judges constituting the majority in ADM Jabalpur are seriously flawed”, that “life and personal liberty are inalienable to human existence”, and that “ADM Jabalpur must be and is accordingly overruled”, together with Bhanudas, which had followed it. The 44th Amendment had already made sure that the situation cannot recur, by taking Articles 20 and 21 out of Article 359 altogether.

President’s Rule under Article 356: what it is

Article 356 is headed “Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States”. Under clause (1), “if the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution”, the President may by Proclamation (a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers of the Governor or of any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature; (b) declare that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; and (c) make incidental and consequential provisions, including suspending the operation of any provision of the Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State. The words “or otherwise” mean that a Governor’s report is the usual but not the only basis. The proviso is important and often forgotten: nothing in the clause authorises the President to assume any of the powers of a High Court or to suspend any constitutional provision relating to High Courts. Article 365 adds a deemed case: where a State has failed to comply with directions given by the Union in the exercise of its executive power, “it shall be lawful for the President to hold” that the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The popular name “President’s Rule” is not in the Constitution; “State Emergency” and “constitutional emergency” are the other names examiners use for the same thing.

In practice the State’s Council of Ministers ceases to hold office and the Governor administers the State on behalf of the President, while the Legislative Assembly is either kept in suspended animation or dissolved. Article 357 provides for the law-making side: Parliament may confer the State Legislature’s law-making power on the President, who may delegate it to another authority; Parliament, the President or that authority may make laws conferring powers on the Union and its officers; and when the Lok Sabha is not in session the President may authorise expenditure from the State’s Consolidated Fund pending Parliament’s sanction. Laws so made continue in force after the Proclamation ends until a competent Legislature alters or repeals them.

President’s Rule: approval and the time limits

A Proclamation under Article 356 must be laid before each House of Parliament and ceases to operate at the end of two months unless both Houses have approved it by resolution, with the same thirty-day rule if the Lok Sabha is dissolved in the meantime (Art. 356(3)). An ordinary majority suffices. Once approved, it continues for six months from the date of the Proclamation and can be continued by further resolutions six months at a time, but “no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force for more than three years” (Art. 356(4)); the one exception, written into the Article itself, is the Punjab Proclamation of 11 May 1987, for which the limit was five years. The 44th Amendment restored the six-month periods that the 42nd Amendment had lengthened to a year.

Article 356(5), also from 1978, is the real brake. A resolution continuing President’s Rule beyond one year from the Proclamation cannot be passed by either House unless two conditions are both met: “a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as the case may be, in the whole or any part of the State” at the time, and “the Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the Proclamation” beyond one year “is necessary on account of difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned”. In normal times, therefore, President’s Rule in a State cannot last more than a year.

Judicial review of President’s Rule: S.R. Bommai and after

The first full challenge came in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (6 May 1977), when six States sued to stop the dissolution of their Assemblies after the 1977 Lok Sabha election. A seven-judge bench dismissed the suits. The majority held that the then clause (5) of Article 356, inserted in 1975, made the President’s satisfaction final and beyond judicial examination, and that the political reasons for seeking a fresh mandate were for the executive; Justice Bhagwati, however, held that even so the satisfaction could be challenged if it was mala fide or based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds, because in that case there would be no satisfaction at all. That clause was deleted by the 44th Amendment within two years.

The law as it stands was settled by the nine-judge bench in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (11 March 1994), which examined the dismissal of six State governments. The Court held that a Proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review: the President’s satisfaction must rest on material, the Court can examine whether that material exists and is relevant, and the Proclamation can be struck down for illegality, irrationality or mala fides, though the Court will not sit in judgment on the sufficiency of the material. On the facts the Karnataka, Meghalaya and Nagaland Proclamations were held unconstitutional, the first because the Governor’s conduct “clearly smacked of mala fides” and the Nagaland one because the Chief Minister was not allowed to test his majority, while the Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh Proclamations were upheld as resting on sufficient material. Three rules from Bommai govern every later case. Where a government’s majority is in doubt, “the proper course for testing the strength of the Ministry is holding the test on the floor of the House”, not the Governor’s private assessment. The Legislative Assembly cannot be dissolved before both Houses of Parliament have approved the Proclamation: “the dissolution of the assembly prior to the approval of the Proclamation by the Parliament … will be per se invalid”, and the President may only keep it in suspended animation in the meantime. And if the Proclamation is struck down, “the necessary consequence of the invalidation of the Proclamation would be to restore the status quo ante”, that is, the dismissed government and the Assembly, though the Court may mould the relief where fresh elections have already been held, as it did for the three States in Bommai itself. The judgment also declared secularism to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (24 January 2006) applied Bommai to the Bihar Assembly of 2005, which had been kept in suspended animation after the election and was then dissolved on 23 May 2005, on the Governor’s report, before it had ever met. By a majority, the five-judge bench held that “the Proclamation dated 23rd May, 2005 dissolving the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar is unconstitutional”, but declined to restore the Assembly because a fresh election was already under way. It also held that the Governor’s personal immunity under Article 361 “does not, however, take away the power of the Court to examine the validity of the action including on the ground of malafides”.

Financial Emergency under Article 360

Article 360(1) allows the President to proclaim a Financial Emergency on being satisfied “that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened”. Since 1979 the Proclamation must be laid before each House and ceases to operate at the end of two months unless both Houses approve it by resolution, with the usual thirty-day rule where the Lok Sabha is dissolved (Art. 360(2)); the old clause making the President’s satisfaction final was removed at the same time. Once approved, a Financial Emergency continues until it is revoked; the Article contains no six-month renewal and no maximum period.

While it is in force the executive authority of the Union extends to giving any State directions “to observe such canons of financial propriety as may be specified in the directions” and any other directions the President considers necessary (Art. 360(3)). Those directions may require the reduction of salaries and allowances of all or any class of persons serving the State, and may require all Money Bills and other financial Bills passed by the State Legislature to be reserved for the President’s consideration (Art. 360(4)(a)). The President may also direct the reduction of salaries and allowances of persons serving the Union, “including the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts” (Art. 360(4)(b)). No Financial Emergency has ever been proclaimed in India, which is why “financial emergency case laws” do not exist: there has been nothing for the courts to decide.

The three emergencies compared

Point	National Emergency (Art. 352)	President’s Rule (Art. 356)	Financial Emergency (Art. 360)
Ground	Security of India or a part threatened by war, external aggression or armed rebellion, or imminent danger of any of them	Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution (Governor’s report “or otherwise”; Art. 365 deemed case)	Financial stability or credit of India or a part threatened
Who proclaims	President, only after the Union Cabinet’s written decision (Art. 352(3))	President	President
Approval by Parliament	Both Houses within one month; majority of total membership and two-thirds present and voting	Both Houses within two months; simple majority	Both Houses within two months; simple majority
Duration	Six months from approval, renewable six months at a time without limit	Six months from the Proclamation, renewable six months at a time; maximum three years; beyond one year only with a National Emergency in force and an Election Commission certificate	Until revoked; no renewal needed
Ending	Revocation by the President; the Lok Sabha can compel revocation by a simple-majority resolution; one-tenth of its members can force a sitting within 14 days	Revocation by the President	Revocation by the President
Effect on rights	Art. 19 suspended if the ground is war or external aggression (Art. 358); court enforcement of other rights can be suspended by order, never Arts. 20 and 21 (Art. 359)	None directly	None directly
Used	1962, 1971, 1975	Many times since 1950	Never

Landmark cases in one place

Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde (1977) applied the ADM Jabalpur rule to hold that petitions under Article 226 by detenus were not maintainable while the Article 359 orders of 1975 and 1976 were in force; its chief value today is as the Supreme Court’s own record of the dates of every Proclamation and Article 359 order from 1962 to 1976. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) is the habeas corpus case described above, remembered for the majority’s holding that even an illegal detention could not be questioned during the Emergency and for Justice Khanna’s dissent; it was overruled in Puttaswamy (2017). State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) is the first Article 356 case, decided while the finality clause was still on the books. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980), as the nine-judge bench in I.R. Coelho later summarised it, struck down the clauses the 42nd Amendment had added to Article 368 to place constitutional amendments beyond judicial review, holding judicial review to be part of the basic structure; it is not an emergency case as such, but it is the reason the courts’ power to examine emergency action survived. S.R. Bommai (1994) is the authority on Article 356: judicial review, the floor test, no dissolution before parliamentary approval, restoration, and secularism as a basic feature. Rameshwar Prasad (2006) applied Bommai to the Bihar dissolution and held that the Governor’s immunity does not shield the Proclamation from review. I.R. Coelho (2007) records that ADM Jabalpur had been “impliedly overruled” by later decisions and that judicial review cannot be taken away. Puttaswamy (2017) overruled ADM Jabalpur in terms.

भारतीय संविधान में आपातकालीन प्रावधान – हिंदी में (Emergency provisions in Hindi)

भारतीय संविधान के भाग XVIII (अनुच्छेद 352 से 360) में आपातकालीन उपबंध हैं। आपातकाल तीन प्रकार के हैं: राष्ट्रीय आपातकाल (अनुच्छेद 352), राज्य में संवैधानिक तंत्र की विफलता यानी राष्ट्रपति शासन (अनुच्छेद 356), और वित्तीय आपातकाल (अनुच्छेद 360)। तीनों की घोषणा राष्ट्रपति करते हैं। राष्ट्रीय आपातकाल युद्ध, बाह्य आक्रमण या सशस्त्र विद्रोह (या इनके आसन्न खतरे) के आधार पर घोषित किया जा सकता है; 44वें संशोधन (1978) के बाद “आंतरिक अशांति” इसका आधार नहीं रहा और घोषणा से पहले मंत्रिमंडल का लिखित निर्णय ज़रूरी है। संसद के दोनों सदनों को एक महीने के भीतर इसे विशेष बहुमत (सदन की कुल सदस्य-संख्या का बहुमत और उपस्थित तथा मत देने वाले सदस्यों का दो-तिहाई) से मंज़ूर करना होता है, और इसके बाद यह हर छह महीने पर संसद की मंज़ूरी से चलता रहता है; लोकसभा साधारण बहुमत के प्रस्ताव से इसे समाप्त करा सकती है। राष्ट्रीय आपातकाल में केंद्र राज्यों को निर्देश दे सकता है और संसद राज्य सूची के विषयों पर कानून बना सकती है; युद्ध या बाह्य आक्रमण के आधार पर घोषित आपातकाल में अनुच्छेद 19 स्वतः निलंबित हो जाता है (अनुच्छेद 358), और राष्ट्रपति आदेश से अन्य मूल अधिकारों को लागू कराने के लिए अदालत जाने का अधिकार निलंबित कर सकते हैं, लेकिन अनुच्छेद 20 और 21 कभी निलंबित नहीं हो सकते (अनुच्छेद 359)। भारत में अब तक तीन बार राष्ट्रीय आपातकाल लगा है – 1962, 1971 और 1975। राष्ट्रपति शासन दो महीने के भीतर संसद की मंज़ूरी से छह-छह महीने करके अधिकतम तीन साल तक चल सकता है, और एक साल से आगे केवल तब जब राष्ट्रीय आपातकाल लागू हो और चुनाव आयोग प्रमाणित करे कि चुनाव कराना संभव नहीं है; एस.आर. बोम्मई (1994) के बाद इसकी न्यायिक समीक्षा हो सकती है और बहुमत की परीक्षा सदन के पटल पर ही होती है। वित्तीय आपातकाल में केंद्र राज्यों को वित्तीय अनुशासन के निर्देश दे सकता है और वेतन घटा सकता है; यह भारत में आज तक कभी नहीं लगाया गया।

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

The emergency provisions are the part of the Constitution that was designed for the worst day, and the text that governs them today is the product of the worst day having happened. After 1975 the 44th Amendment rewrote Articles 352, 356, 358, 359 and 360 so that a National Emergency needs a written Cabinet decision, a special majority within a month and renewal every six months, can be ended by the Lok Sabha alone, cannot touch Articles 20 and 21, and no longer carries any clause putting the President’s satisfaction beyond the courts. The Supreme Court then did its part: Bommai (1994) made President’s Rule reviewable and the floor test compulsory, Rameshwar Prasad (2006) applied it, and Puttaswamy (2017) overruled ADM Jabalpur. For a student the structure to remember is three emergencies, three grounds, three approval periods (one month, two months, two months), and three time limits (indefinite with renewal, three years with a one-year brake, until revoked); for a citizen the point to remember is that the right to life and personal liberty can no longer be suspended by anyone.

Sources used for this post: the Constitution of India as on 1 May 2024 (Legislative Department), Articles 32, 83, 172, 250, 352 to 360 and 365 with their amendment footnotes; the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 and its Statement of Objects and Reasons; the Constituent Assembly Debates of 4 August 1949; and the Supreme Court of India in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (6 May 1977), Union of India v. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde (25 January 1977), S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (11 March 1994), Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (24 January 2006), I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (11 January 2007), Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (24 August 2017) and S. Kasi v. State (19 June 2020), each read from the Court’s own website.