Res gestae is the rule of evidence under which facts that form part of the same transaction as the fact in issue are relevant, even though they are not themselves in issue. In practice it is how a court hears what the victim, the accused or a bystander said or did at the time of the incident, or so close to it that there was no chance to invent a story. Since 1 July 2024 the rule is in Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA); before that it was Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which is the section most textbooks and older judgments still cite. This guide gives the text of both, explains the “same transaction” test with the statute’s own illustrations, shows how the Supreme Court decides whether a statement was close enough in time, and sets out how res gestae differs from hearsay and from a dying declaration. Other posts in this series cover Section 122 (communications during marriage), Section 164 (a document refused on notice) and Section 141 (leading questions).
Res gestae at a glance
- Section: Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872), headed “Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction”.
- Rule: facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue (or, under the BSA, a relevant fact) as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.
- Test for statements: the statement must have been made at the time of the act or immediately after it; “if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae” (Supreme Court, Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao, 1996).
- Hearsay: the Supreme Court describes the rule as, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible.
- Weight: a statement admitted under the section is substantive evidence (Rattan Singh, 1996), but the court still asks whether the witness who reports it is reliable (Sukhar, 1999).
- Not to be confused with: Section 26(a) BSA (formerly Section 32(1)), the dying declaration, and Section 6 BSA (formerly Section 8), which deals with motive, preparation and conduct.
Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date.
What res gestae means
The Latin words res gestae mean “things done”. In the law of evidence they describe the whole of a transaction: the act that is being tried, and the words and acts that accompanied it. Indian law does not use the Latin phrase in the statute; it uses the idea of facts that “form part of the same transaction”. The Supreme Court has explained the link in these words: “The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue ‘as to form part of the same transaction’ becomes relevant by itself.”
The reason the law lets such facts in is their spontaneity. In the same judgment the Court said: “The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue.” A cry of a victim naming the attacker as the blow falls, the words of the attacker while beating the victim, or the shouts of people running to the spot are part of what happened, not a later account of it.
Section 4 BSA and Section 6 Evidence Act: the text
Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 read: “Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.”
Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 reads: “Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue or a relevant fact as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.” The rule is the same, with one addition: the new section also covers facts connected in this way with “a relevant fact”, not only with a fact in issue. The four illustrations were carried over, with “jails” in place of the old “gaols”. Section 4 BSA is therefore the section to cite for anything that happened, or any trial that began, under the new law, while judgments on Section 6 continue to explain what “same transaction” means.
The illustrations are the best guide to the section, so here they are in short. In the first, A is accused of murdering B by beating him, and “Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.” In the second, A is accused of waging war against the Government of India by taking part in an armed insurrection in which property is destroyed, troops are attacked and jails are broken open; these events are relevant “as forming part of the general transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them.” In the third, a civil case, A sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a correspondence, and the other letters between them relating to the subject are relevant though they do not contain the libel itself. In the fourth, the question is whether goods ordered from B were delivered to A, the goods having passed through several intermediate persons, and “Each delivery is a relevant fact.”
Two points follow from the illustrations. The section is not confined to criminal trials; the libel and delivery examples are ordinary civil disputes. And a “transaction” can be spread out: an insurrection or a chain of deliveries happens at different times and places, yet each part belongs to one transaction. What ties the parts together is their connection with each other, not a single moment.
The “same transaction” test for statements
Most res gestae disputes are about words: something a victim or a witness said, which the prosecution wants to prove through the person who heard it. Here the Supreme Court applies a strict rule of timing. In Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) it said: “But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae.”
The same idea appears in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011), which the Court later quoted: to bring a statement within Section 6, “what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there could not be an interval which would allow fabrication. In other words, the statements said to be admitted as forming part of res gestae must have been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately thereafter.” In Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1996) the Court admitted a statement because the events were “so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction.”
Put simply, the court asks three questions. Is the fact or statement connected with the fact in issue (or, under the BSA, with a relevant fact)? Is it part of the same transaction, judged by how close it is in time and place and whether the events run on without a break? And, for a statement, was it made at the time or so soon afterwards that there was no opportunity to think up a false account? Only if all three answers are yes is the statement relevant under Section 4.
The questions courts ask before treating a statement as part of the same transaction.
Res gestae and the hearsay rule
Indian law insists that oral evidence be direct. Section 55 of the BSA (formerly Section 60 of the Evidence Act) says that oral evidence “shall, in all cases whatever, be direct”: a fact that could be heard must be proved by “a witness who says he heard it”. A witness may therefore say what he himself heard someone say, but a statement offered to prove that what was said is true is, in the ordinary way, hearsay and kept out.
Res gestae is the main way such a statement gets in. In Gentela the Supreme Court said: “This rule is, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible.” In Dhal Singh Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2016) it put it more fully: “The general rule of evidence is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, Section 6 of the Evidence Act embodies a principle, usually known as the rule of res gestae in English Law, as an exception to hearsay rule. The rationale behind this Section is the spontaneity and immediacy of the statement in question which rules out any time for concoction.” The witness who heard the words still has to come to court and say so; what the section does is make the words themselves relevant.
Leading Supreme Court cases
Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996). A bus was set on fire and 23 passengers died. A Magistrate recorded the statements of two badly injured passengers, expecting that they might die and that the statements would then be dying declarations. They survived, and the prosecution tried to use the statements under Section 6. The Supreme Court refused: “there was some appreciable interval between the acts of incendiarism indulged in by the miscreants and the Judicial Magistrate recording statements of the victims. That interval, therefore, blocks the statements from acquiring legitimacy under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.” The case is the source of the “interval, however slight” test quoted above.
Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (decided 11 December 1996). The family was sleeping in the courtyard at night when the mother-in-law sensed an intruder; the victim cried out that the appellant was standing there with a gun, a shot followed and she died of her injuries. The Supreme Court held her words admissible both as a statement about the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in her death (Section 32(1), now Section 26(a) BSA) and, “Even apart from section 32(1)”, under Section 6 “on account of its proximity of time to the act of murder”. It added that “whether it is admissible under section 32(1) or under section 6 of the Evidence Act, it is substantive evidence which can be acted upon with or without corroboration in finding guilt of the accused.” The conviction for murder was confirmed.
Sukhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (decided 1 October 1999). A witness heard a shot, went to the spot and found the injured man lying on the ground; when he asked, the injured man told him that his nephew had shot him. Applying Gentela and Rattan Singh, the Court held that the statement “would become admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.” Yet it acquitted the accused, because the witness was “inimical to the accused”, so that “his evidence requires corroboration before being accepted”, and there was none. Sukhar is a useful reminder that admissibility and proof are different questions: res gestae gets a statement in; it does not make the person reporting it believable.
Bishna v. State of West Bengal (decided 28 October 2005). Two witnesses reached the place of occurrence immediately after the incident, found one victim dead and another unconscious, and heard from a person present there the whole incident, including the role of each accused. The Court held that “Their evidence is admissible in terms Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act” and that it corroborated the other prosecution witnesses and the FIR.
Dhal Singh Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh (decided 23 September 2016). The accused had been sentenced to death for killing his wife and five daughters. Two witnesses said that the accused’s mother had told them, at Gandhi Chowk, which the record placed about 100 yards from the house, that he had done it; she herself denied making any such statement. The majority held that “Both in terms of distance and time, the elements of spontaneity and continuity were lost” and that the statements “cannot be said to have been made so shortly after the incident as to form part of the transaction.” The appeals were allowed and the conviction set aside; one of the three judges would have admitted the evidence. The case shows how quickly a statement stops being res gestae once there is a gap in time or place.
Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011), as quoted in Dhal Singh, adds that “The purpose of incorporating Section 6 in the Act is to complete the missing links in the chain of evidence of the solitary witness”, and observed that, in that case, the victim’s mother and sister “could have been the best res gestae witnesses”.
Res gestae and dying declarations compared
The two are often confused because both let a court hear what the victim said. They work differently. Section 26 BSA (formerly Section 32) makes statements of a person “who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence” relevant in listed cases, the most familiar being clause (a): a statement “as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death”, whether or not the person expected to die. Section 4 has no such condition. It does not matter whether the person who spoke is alive, dead or available; what matters is that the words were part of the transaction.
So a statement can fall under one, both or neither. In Rattan Singh the victim’s words qualified under both. In Gentela the injured passengers survived, so their statements could not be dying declarations, and the gap in time stopped them from being res gestae. A statement made by a dying victim to a doctor an hour after the attack may be a dying declaration but not res gestae; a bystander’s shout at the moment of the attack may be res gestae though the bystander is alive and well.
Related sections in the BSA
Section 4 is the first of a group of sections in Chapter II of the BSA on the relevancy of facts connected with the facts in issue. Section 5 (formerly Section 7) makes relevant the facts that are “the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise” of relevant facts or facts in issue, or that “constitute the state of things under which they happened”; one of its illustrations is that “Marks on the ground, produced by a struggle at or near the place where the murder was committed, are relevant facts.” Section 6 BSA (formerly Section 8) deals with “Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct”. Students searching for “Section 6 BSA” in connection with res gestae should note that the res gestae section is now Section 4, not Section 6.
Practical points
For the prosecution, the timing has to be proved, not assumed. The witness should say when and where the words were heard and what was happening at that moment, because the whole question under Section 4 is whether there was time for reflection. A statement recorded later, like the Magistrate’s record in Gentela, fails if there was time for reflection in between.
For the defence, the first question is the gap: how long after the incident, how far from the spot, and whether the speaker had a chance to talk to others first. Dhal Singh shows that a distance of about a hundred yards and the time that had passed were enough to break the chain. The second question is the reporter’s reliability, because, as Sukhar shows, a statement admitted under Section 4 can still be rejected if the only witness to it is interested or hostile and there is nothing to support him.
For students, the safest way to answer a question on res gestae is to quote the section, use illustration (a) to explain it, state the Gentela test, and contrast it with the dying declaration under Section 26.
रेस जेस्टे (Res gestae) – हिंदी में
रेस जेस्टे (res gestae) का शाब्दिक अर्थ है “किए गए काम”। साक्ष्य कानून में इसका मतलब है कि जो तथ्य स्वयं विवाद्यक तथ्य (fact in issue) नहीं हैं, लेकिन उससे इस तरह जुड़े हैं कि वे उसी संव्यवहार (same transaction) का हिस्सा बन जाते हैं, वे सुसंगत (relevant) हैं – चाहे वे एक ही समय और स्थान पर हुए हों या अलग-अलग समय और स्थानों पर। 1 जुलाई 2024 से यह नियम भारतीय साक्ष्य अधिनियम, 2023 (BSA) की धारा 4 में है; पहले यह भारतीय साक्ष्य अधिनियम, 1872 की धारा 6 में था। नई धारा में “या किसी सुसंगत तथ्य” (or a relevant fact) शब्द जोड़े गए हैं।
धारा का पहला दृष्टांत सबसे आसान उदाहरण है: यदि A पर B को पीटकर हत्या करने का आरोप है, तो पिटाई के समय, या उसके इतने ठीक पहले या बाद में कि वह उसी संव्यवहार का हिस्सा हो, A, B या आसपास खड़े लोगों ने जो कहा या किया, वह सुसंगत तथ्य है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने गेंटेला विजयवर्धन राव (1996) में कहा कि ऐसा कथन अपराध के समय या उसके तुरंत बाद होना चाहिए; यदि बीच में थोड़ा-सा भी ऐसा अंतराल था जिसमें कहानी गढ़ी जा सकती थी, तो वह रेस जेस्टे का हिस्सा नहीं रहता। कोर्ट ने इसे सुनी-सुनाई (hearsay) बात को साक्ष्य में न लेने के सामान्य नियम का अपवाद बताया है।
रतन सिंह (1996) में मृतका का यह चिल्लाना कि आरोपी बंदूक लेकर खड़ा है, धारा 6 और मृत्युकालिक कथन (धारा 32(1), अब BSA धारा 26(a)) दोनों के तहत स्वीकार हुआ और कोर्ट ने कहा कि यह सारवान साक्ष्य है। सुखर (1999) में बयान स्वीकार्य माना गया, पर गवाह के आरोपी से वैर के कारण पुष्टि के अभाव में आरोपी बरी हुआ। ढाल सिंह देवांगन (2016) में घर से लगभग 100 गज दूर चौक पर दिया गया बयान समय और दूरी के कारण रेस जेस्टे नहीं माना गया। ध्यान रहे, BSA की धारा 6 हेतु, तैयारी और आचरण (motive, preparation and conduct) से संबंधित है; रेस जेस्टे अब धारा 4 है।
Frequently asked questions
Res gestae is the rule that facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. It lets a court hear what was said or done during an incident, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of it.
Section 4 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, in force from 1 July 2024. It replaced Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 6 of the BSA is a different provision, on motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct (formerly Section 8 of the Evidence Act).
The rule is the same. Section 4 BSA adds the words “or a relevant fact”, so facts forming part of the same transaction as a relevant fact are also covered, not only those connected with a fact in issue. The four illustrations were carried over, with “jails” in place of “gaols”.
The Latin words mean “things done”. In evidence law they refer to the whole transaction: the act being tried and the words and acts that accompanied it.
The statute’s own example: A is accused of murdering B by beating him, and whatever was said or done by A, B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is relevant. In Rattan Singh (1996), the victim’s cry that the accused was standing there with a gun, moments before she was shot, was admitted as part of the transaction.
Yes, in substance. The Supreme Court has described the rule as, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible, justified by the spontaneity and immediacy of the statement, which rules out time for concoction. The witness who heard the words must still give evidence of them.
At the time of the act or immediately after it. The Supreme Court held in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao (1996) that if there was an interval, however slight, which was sufficient for fabrication, the statement is not part of res gestae. Statements recorded hours later by a Magistrate failed this test in that case.
Not as a rule of law. In Rattan Singh (1996) the Supreme Court said such a statement is substantive evidence that can be acted on with or without corroboration. But the court must believe the witness who reports it; in Sukhar (1999) the statement was admissible, yet the accused was acquitted because the only witness to it was inimical to him and nothing corroborated him.
Not for Section 4, which has no condition about the maker’s availability; the statement is relevant because it is part of the transaction and is proved by whoever heard it. Availability matters for Section 26 BSA (formerly Section 32), which deals with statements of persons who are dead, cannot be found or cannot give evidence.
A dying declaration under Section 26(a) BSA is a statement by a person who has died about the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction that resulted in it, and it can be made at any time before death. Res gestae under Section 4 covers statements by anyone, alive or dead, but only if they were made as part of the transaction itself. A statement can qualify under both, as in Rattan Singh.
Yes. Section 4 is not limited to criminal trials. Two of its illustrations are civil: letters forming part of a correspondence in a libel suit, and each successive delivery in a dispute over whether goods were delivered.
The fact or statement must be connected with the fact in issue (or a relevant fact); it must be part of the same transaction, judged by closeness in time and place and continuity of events; and, for a statement, it must have been made at the time or so soon after that there was no opportunity for fabrication.
Conclusion
Res gestae is a narrow door, and the Supreme Court keeps it narrow. Section 4 of the BSA, like Section 6 of the Evidence Act before it, lets in what was said and done as part of the transaction because such words carry their own guarantee of truth: there was no time to invent them. Once there is time, the guarantee is gone and the statement is only a narrative. For anyone preparing a case or an exam answer, the text of the section, illustration (a), the Gentela test and the contrast with the dying declaration will cover almost every question that arises.
Sources used for this post: the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 6 (India Code); the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, Sections 4, 5, 6, 26 and 55 (the firm’s section-by-section data checked against the Gazette text); and the Supreme Court of India’s own copies of Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (11 December 1996), Sukhar v. State of U.P. (1 October 1999), Bishna v. State of West Bengal (28 October 2005) and Dhal Singh Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh (23 September 2016), the last two of which also reproduce Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P. (1996) and Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011).


