A live-in relationship between two adults is not an offence in India, and Parliament has given a woman in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” the protection of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. There is, however, no national law that defines live-in relationships or sets out the partners’ rights as a whole, so most of the rules come from Supreme Court judgments, and the details matter. This guide explains them in the words of the law and the judgments, including Uttarakhand’s registration system, with a Hindi summary and answers to common questions.
Live-in relationships at a glance
- Is it legal? Yes. “Live-in or marriage like relationship is neither a crime nor a sin though socially unacceptable in this country” (Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, 2013; see also S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, 2010).
- Is there a live-in law? No Act of Parliament deals with live-in relationships as such. The Domestic Violence Act, 2005 protects a woman in a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, and Uttarakhand’s Uniform Civil Code (in force since 27 January 2025) provides for registration in that State.
- When does the Domestic Violence Act apply? When the couple hold themselves out as spouses, are of legal age and otherwise qualified to marry (including being unmarried), have lived together voluntarily for a significant period, and shared a household (D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, 2010).
- Woman’s remedies: if she has been subjected to domestic violence, protection, residence, monetary relief including maintenance, temporary custody and compensation orders under Sections 17 to 22 of that Act.
- Maintenance under Section 144 BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC): “wife” is not defined to include a live-in partner; in Chanmuniya (2010) the Supreme Court asked for the question of long cohabitation to be referred to a larger bench, and the firm could not find an official record of the outcome.
- Children: courts may presume a marriage, and so legitimacy, where a couple have lived together as husband and wife for a long time (Badri Prasad, 1978); the presumption can be rebutted and does not arise where one partner is already married (Bharatha Matha, 2010; Indra Sarma, 2013). A father’s duty of maintenance under Section 144 BNSS extends to a “legitimate or illegitimate child”.
- Married partner: a woman who knew the man was married is not in a relationship “in the nature of marriage” under the Act (Indra Sarma, 2013).
- Agreements: no statute or Supreme Court ruling that the firm could verify makes a “live-in agreement” enforceable.
Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date; the Uttarakhand rules are described as first published in 2025, because the firm could not read their later amendments.
Is a live-in relationship legal in India?
Yes. When two adults choose to live together without marrying, neither of them commits an offence. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (28 April 2010), a bench of three judges of the Supreme Court said that “there is no statutory offence that takes place when adults willingly engage in sexual relations outside the marital setting, with the exception of ‘adultery’ as defined under Section 497 IPC.” The Court noted that in its earlier decision in Lata Singh v. State of U.P. “it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterogenic sex does not amount to any offence (with the obvious exception of ‘adultery’), even though it may be perceived as immoral”. Later in the same judgment, which quashed the criminal cases against the actress Khushboo over her remarks, it said that “the criminal law cannot be used as a means to unduly interfere with the domain of personal autonomy.”
The exception for adultery no longer exists as a crime. In Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 September 2018), a Constitution Bench held Section 497 IPC unconstitutional, saying that adultery “is better to be left as a ground for divorce”; the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 has no corresponding section.
In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (26 November 2013), the Court summed up the position in one sentence: “Live-in or marriage like relationship is neither a crime nor a sin though socially unacceptable in this country.” In Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal (16 August 2022), a case about leave for a working mother, it also observed that “Familial relationships may take the form of domestic, unmarried partnerships or queer relationships”.
Adults also have the right to choose a partner without interference from their families. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (7 July 2006, Justices Ashok Bhan and Markandey Katju), the Court said of the petitioner, an adult woman, “Hence she is free to marry anyone she likes or live with anyone she likes.” Dealing with families who disapprove of an inter-caste or inter-religious marriage, it said that they “cannot give threats”, and it directed the administration and police throughout the country to see that, where an adult undergoes such a marriage, “the couple are not harassed by any one nor subjected to threats or acts of violence”.
Is there a law on live-in relationships in India?
There is no Act of Parliament that defines or regulates live-in relationships as such. The law that comes closest is the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Act No. 43 of 2005), which came into force on 26 October 2006. Section 2(f) defines a “domestic relationship” as “a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family”. In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (21 October 2010), the Supreme Court read those words as a deliberate choice: “It seems to us that in the aforesaid Act of 2005 Parliament has taken notice of a new social phenomenon which has emerged in our country known as live-in relationship.”
The only State law regulating live-in relationships that the firm could verify on an official site is Uttarakhand’s. The Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand, 2024 (Act No. 3 of 2024) was passed by the State Assembly on 7 February 2024, notified on 12 March 2024 and brought into force on 27 January 2025, and it provides for the registration of live-in relationships, as explained below. The Supreme Court itself has pointed to a gap in national law. In Indra Sarma, speaking of a woman whose relationship with a married man fell outside the Domestic Violence Act (it described her status as “that of a mistress”), it said that “Children born out of such relationship also suffer most which calls for bringing in remedial measures by the Parliament, through proper legislation.”
When is a live-in relationship a “relationship in the nature of marriage”?
This is the question on which most rights depend. In Velusamy, Justices Markandey Katju and T.S. Thakur said: “In our opinion a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ is akin to a common law marriage.” They listed four requirements of such a relationship: “(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses. (b) They must be of legal age to marry. (c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried. (d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time.” To these the Court added that “the parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act”, and that “Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a ‘domestic relationship’.”
The Court was clear that the label “live-in” is not enough: “In our opinion not all live in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence.”
Three years later, in Indra Sarma, Justices K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose set out “some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ under Section 2(f) of the DV Act.” The eight guidelines are headed: duration of the relationship; shared household; pooling of resources and financial arrangements; domestic arrangements; sexual relationship; children; socialisation in public; and the intention and conduct of the parties. The Court said that “The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive”, and concluded: “All live-in relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage.”
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the Supreme Court judgments discussed on this page.
Rights of a woman in a live-in relationship under the Domestic Violence Act
If the relationship qualifies and she alleges domestic violence, the woman is an “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a), which covers “any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent”. Domestic violence under Section 3 is wide: it includes “physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse”. She can proceed against her male partner and, under the proviso to Section 2(q), against his relatives as well: “Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner”.
The application is made to a Magistrate under Section 12, either by the woman herself or by a Protection Officer or any other person on her behalf, and the Magistrate is to endeavour to dispose of it “within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.” Section 23 allows the Magistrate to pass such interim orders as he deems just and proper.
The reliefs are substantial. Section 17 gives “every woman in a domestic relationship” “the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.” Section 18 allows protection orders, and Section 19 allows residence orders, including one restraining the partner from dispossessing her from the shared household “whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household”. Section 20 allows monetary relief, which under Section 20(1)(d) includes “the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”. Section 21 allows temporary custody of children, and Section 22 allows “compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence”. A breach of a protection order is punishable under Section 31 with imprisonment up to one year, or fine up to twenty thousand rupees, or both.
In Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (7 October 2010), Justices G.S. Singhvi and Asok Kumar Ganguly drew the conclusion directly: “Therefore, women in live-in relationships are also entitled to all the reliefs given in the said Act.” Read with Velusamy and Indra Sarma, that means women in live-in relationships that meet the conditions described above.
Can a live-in partner claim maintenance?
There are two routes, and they work differently. The first is Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), under which a Magistrate can order a person “having sufficient means” to pay a monthly allowance to “his wife, unable to maintain herself” or to “his legitimate or illegitimate child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself”. The Explanation to sub-section (1) says only that “wife” includes a woman who has been divorced and has not remarried. It does not mention a live-in partner.
The Supreme Court’s decisions on this point pull in two directions. In Velusamy, the Court recorded the earlier holding in Savitaben’s case (AIR 2005 SC 1809) that “there is no scope to include a woman not lawfully married within the expression of ‘wife'”. In Chanmuniya (7 October 2010), decided two weeks before Velusamy by a different bench, the Court favoured a wider reading: “a broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term ‘wife’ to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for a reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not be a pre-condition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C”. That bench asked the Chief Justice to refer three questions to a larger bench, the first of which was: “Whether the living together of a man and woman as husband and wife for a considerable period of time would raise the presumption of a valid marriage between them and whether such a presumption would entitle the woman to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C?” Chanmuniya also noted that the Malimath Committee had in 2003 recommended amending the word “wife” to include a woman living with a man like his wife for a reasonably long period. That was only a recommendation: the Explanation to Section 144 BNSS, like that to Section 125 CrPC before it, extends “wife” only to a divorced wife who has not remarried.
The firm could not find an official record of what became of that request; in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (18 October 2013), the Court still described the questions as “formulated for determination by a larger bench”. On the material the firm could verify, whether an unmarried live-in partner can claim maintenance as a “wife” under Section 144 BNSS is therefore best treated as an open question.
Badshah settles a different situation. There the man went through a Hindu marriage ceremony with the woman while hiding his subsisting first marriage, and the Court held that “at least for the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C., respondent No.1 would be treated as the wife of the petitioner”, because the earlier judgments denying maintenance “would apply only in those circumstances where a woman married a man with full knowledge of the first subsisting marriage”.
The second route is the Domestic Violence Act. Where the relationship is “in the nature of marriage”, maintenance can be ordered under Section 20(1)(d) of that Act, “under or in addition to” an order under the criminal procedure code, and Chanmuniya took the view that the monetary relief available to women in live-in relationships under that Act “should also be allowed in a proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.” For more on the procedure, see the firm’s maintenance case FAQs.
Long cohabitation and the presumption of marriage
Where a man and a woman have lived together as husband and wife for a long time, the law presumes that they are married unless the contrary is proved. The presumption does not arise where one of them is already married to someone else, as Bharatha Matha and Indra Sarma, discussed below, show. In Badri Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1 August 1978, 1978 AIR 1557, Justices V.R. Krishna Iyer, D.A. Desai and O. Chinnappa Reddy), a case of a couple who had lived together for around 50 years, the Court said: “A strong presumption arises in favour of wed-lock where the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife”, adding that “Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin.”
In Tulsa v. Durghatiya (15 January 2008, Justices Arijit Pasayat and P. Sathasivam), the Court relied on the Privy Council’s statement in Mohabhat Ali v. Md. Ibrahim Khan (1929) that “The law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage when a man and woman have cohabited continuously for number of years”, noted that it had been held that “such a presumption could be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act”, and recalled its own warning in Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari (1952) that “the presumption which maybe drawn from long co-habitation is rebuttable and if there are circumstances which weaken and destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them.” Section 114 of the Evidence Act is now Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, under which “The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened”, having regard to the common course of natural events and human conduct.
The same presumption decided Dhannulal v. Ganeshram (8 April 2015, Justices M.Y. Eqbal and Amitava Roy). There a woman had lived with a man as his wife, and the Court, stating that “the law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a man and woman have cohabited continuously for a long time”, upheld the finding that she “was the legally married wife”. The case is sometimes cited as holding that live-in partners inherit from each other, but that is not what it decided.
Children born in a live-in relationship
A child’s position starts with the same presumption. In Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (17 May 2010, Justices B.S. Chauhan and Swatanter Kumar), the Court recorded its earlier ruling in S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan, AIR 1992 SC 756, “that if man and woman are living under the same roof and cohabiting for a number of years, there will be a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that they live as husband and wife and the children born to them will not be illegitimate.” Like every presumption of this kind it can be rebutted, as Tulsa explains.
Maintenance of a child does not depend on legitimacy at all. Section 144(1)(b) BNSS applies to a father’s “legitimate or illegitimate child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself”. Under the Domestic Violence Act, a qualifying woman can also seek maintenance for “her children” under Section 20 and temporary custody under Section 21.
Property is more complicated. In Bharatha Matha, the Court said that “a child born of void or voidable marriage is not entitled to claim inheritance in ancestral coparcenery property but is entitled only to claim share in self acquired properties, if any.” In Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (1 September 2023), a bench of three judges led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud revisited that line of cases under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It held that such a child “does not ipso facto become a coparcener”, but that “his heirs including the children who have been conferred with legitimacy under Section 16 of the HMA 1955, will be entitled to their share in the property which would have been allotted to the deceased upon the notional partition”. Bharatha Matha itself arose from a claimed live-in relationship in which the woman was still married to another man: the Court refused to presume a marriage and, applying the rule for children of void or voidable marriages, held that the children could not claim the ancestral coparcenary property. Revanasiddappa concerns Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act and does not deal with live-in relationships. For a child of a long live-in relationship, the first question will usually be whether the court presumes a marriage between the parents.
Live-in relationship with a married person
Readers often ask about a live-in relationship with a man who is still married, or a relationship “without divorce”. The leading case is Indra Sarma. The woman had lived with a man “knowing that he was married person, with wife and two children”. The Court held that, “having been fully aware of the fact that the respondent was a married person”, she could not claim that the relationship was in the nature of marriage, and that her “status is lower than the status of a wife and that relationship would not fall within the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act.” It explained: “If we hold that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is a relationship in the nature of a marriage, we will be doing an injustice to the legally wedded wife and children who opposed that relationship.” This follows from the third Velusamy condition, which requires the partners to be qualified to marry, “including being unmarried.”
The position is different for a woman who did not know. Indra Sarma said that where an unmarried woman “unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male”, the relationship “may, in a given situation, fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act”. Badshah (2013), explained above, concerned a woman who married a man who had hidden his existing marriage; it does not decide the position of an unmarried live-in partner.
As to the criminal law, adultery is no longer an offence after Joseph Shine, though it remains a ground for divorce. Bigamy is a different matter: Section 82(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (formerly Section 494 IPC) punishes a person who, “having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife”, with imprisonment up to seven years and fine. The offence is about going through a second marriage. In Uttarakhand, the registration rules list as a ground of rejection that “One or both registrant(s) is/are already married”.
Promise of marriage in a live-in relationship
A live-in relationship that began on a promise of marriage can raise a criminal question. Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, a new provision with no equivalent in the IPC, says: “Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.” The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by a Court of Session.
The Supreme Court has drawn the line between a false promise and a promise that simply could not be kept. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (20 May 2013, Justices B.S. Chauhan and Dipak Misra), decided under the old law, it said: “There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise.” It held that “there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim”. The words of Section 69, “without any intention of fulfilling the same”, turn on the same question: what the man intended when he made the promise.
Registration of live-in relationships in Uttarakhand
Uttarakhand’s Uniform Civil Code is the one law the firm could verify that requires live-in relationships to be registered. Under the Uniform Civil Code Rules, Uttarakhand, 2025, as first published, the partners submit a “statement of live-in relationship” to the Registrar with the prescribed fee. The official portal lists the service “Registration of Live-in Relationship” with a fee of ₹500 and a service timeline of 30 days for the Registrar, and asks for documents such as proof of age, proof of the shared household, a no-objection certificate from the landlord where the home is rented, and a divorce decree or the death certificate of a former spouse where that applies. Termination of a registered relationship is a separate service.
The statement is shared “with the officer incharge of the local Police Station”, and if either partner is below twenty-one years of age the Registrar informs the parents or guardians. The Rules list the grounds on which the Registrar rejects a statement, among them that the partners “fall within the degrees of prohibited relationship and marriage is not permitted between them”, that one or both are already married or already in a live-in relationship with a third person, that one or both are minors, or that consent “was obtained by force, coercion, undue influence”. Where partners have not submitted their statement, the Registrar issues a notice under Section 386 of the Code, and a complaint can be filed before the competent magistrate for an offence under Section 387. The Rules also apply to residents of Uttarakhand who live outside the State, but not to members of the Scheduled Tribes.
Both the Code and the Rules have been amended since they came into force: the official portal lists the Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025, an Amendment Ordinance of 2026, the Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand (Amendment) Act, 2026 and four amendments to the Rules. The firm could not read the amended texts, so the rules described above are those first published in 2025, and it could not confirm the time limit for submitting a statement or the penalties; so anyone affected should check the current provisions on the official portal, ucc.uk.gov.in.
Live-in relationship agreements
Many people search for a “live-in relationship agreement”, a “relationship deed” or a “live-in contract”. No statute that the firm could find provides for such an agreement, and it could not find any judgment of the Supreme Court or a High Court deciding whether one can be enforced. The Supreme Court has expressly left open whether there can be a valid claim for palimony on the basis of a contract. In Velusamy it said: “In the case before us we are not called upon to decide whether in our country there can be a valid claim for palimony on the basis of a contract, express or implied, written or oral, since no such case was set up by the respondent in her petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C.” Anyone who signs such a document should therefore not assume that a court will enforce its terms as a contract.
A written record can still be useful in a more modest way. The questions a court asks about a live-in relationship are factual ones: how long the couple lived together, whether they shared a household, how they pooled resources and arranged their finances, how they ran the home, whether they had children, how they presented themselves in public, and what they intended (the Indra Sarma guidelines). A document made at the time that records those facts can serve as a record of them. It is not a substitute for registration where the Uttarakhand Code applies, and it is different from a prenuptial agreement, which is made by a couple who intend to marry.
Practical points
Because almost every right depends on proving the nature of the relationship, partners should keep ordinary evidence of their life together: a common address, joint documents and accounts, and anything showing that they presented themselves as a couple. A woman facing violence can apply to the Magistrate under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, with the help of a Protection Officer if she wishes; the firm’s guide to the Domestic Violence Act explains the procedure. Couples who want the full status of marriage can marry; the firm’s guides to court marriage in Delhi and marriage registration explain the steps. Partners living in Uttarakhand, or residents of Uttarakhand living elsewhere, should check whether they must register under the Code.
लिव-इन रिलेशनशिप (Live-in relationship) – हिंदी में
भारत में दो वयस्कों का बिना विवाह के साथ रहना अपराध नहीं है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने एस. खुशबू बनाम कन्नियम्मल (2010) में कहा कि सहमति से साथ रहने वाले दो वयस्कों का लिव-इन संबंध कोई अपराध नहीं है, और इंद्रा सरमा बनाम वी.के.वी. सरमा (2013) में कहा कि विवाह जैसा ऐसा संबंध न अपराध है न पाप, भले ही समाज इसे स्वीकार न करता हो। जोसेफ शाइन (2018) के बाद व्यभिचार (adultery) अपराध नहीं रहा, हालाँकि यह तलाक का आधार है।
“लिव-इन रिलेशनशिप कानून कब बना?” – संसद ने लिव-इन संबंधों पर अलग से कोई कानून नहीं बनाया है। घरेलू हिंसा से जुड़ा कानून, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (26 अक्टूबर 2006 से लागू), “विवाह की प्रकृति के संबंध” (relationship in the nature of marriage) में रहने वाली महिला को संरक्षण देता है, और उत्तराखंड की समान नागरिक संहिता (27 जनवरी 2025 से लागू) लिव-इन संबंधों के पंजीकरण की व्यवस्था करती है।
डी. वेलुसामी (2010) के अनुसार ऐसा संबंध तभी माना जाएगा जब दोनों समाज के सामने पति-पत्नी की तरह रहें, विवाह की कानूनी आयु के हों, विवाह के लिए अन्यथा योग्य हों (जिसमें अविवाहित होना भी शामिल है), काफी समय तक स्वेच्छा से साथ रहे हों और साझा घर (shared household) में रहे हों; केवल सप्ताहांत साथ बिताना पर्याप्त नहीं है। ऐसे संबंध में घरेलू हिंसा की शिकार महिला संरक्षण आदेश, साझा घर में रहने का अधिकार, भरण-पोषण सहित आर्थिक राहत, बच्चों की अस्थायी अभिरक्षा और मुआवज़ा माँग सकती है।
भारतीय नागरिक सुरक्षा संहिता की धारा 144 (पहले CrPC धारा 125) में “पत्नी” की परिभाषा में लिव-इन साथी शामिल नहीं है; चनमुनिया (2010) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने यह प्रश्न बड़ी पीठ को भेजने का अनुरोध किया था, और उसके परिणाम का आधिकारिक रिकॉर्ड फर्म को नहीं मिला। लंबे समय तक पति-पत्नी की तरह साथ रहने पर अदालत विवाह की उपधारणा कर सकती है (बद्री प्रसाद, 1978) और तब बच्चे अवैध नहीं माने जाते; यह उपधारणा खंडित की जा सकती है और जहाँ एक साथी पहले से विवाहित हो वहाँ यह लागू नहीं होती (भरत माता, 2010; इंद्रा सरमा, 2013)। धारा 144 के तहत पिता का भरण-पोषण का दायित्व वैध और अवैध, दोनों तरह के बच्चों पर लागू होता है।
“बिना तलाक के लिव-इन रिलेशनशिप” के बारे में इंद्रा सरमा (2013) में कोर्ट ने कहा कि जो महिला जानती थी कि पुरुष पहले से विवाहित है, उसका संबंध “विवाह की प्रकृति का संबंध” नहीं है और उस पर घरेलू हिंसा अधिनियम लागू नहीं होता। शादी का वादा, उसे पूरा करने के किसी इरादे के बिना, करके किसी महिला से शारीरिक संबंध बनाना (जो बलात्संग की श्रेणी में न आए) भारतीय न्याय संहिता की धारा 69 के तहत दस वर्ष तक के कारावास और जुर्माने से दंडनीय है। “लिव-इन एग्रीमेंट” को लागू कराने के बारे में फर्म को कोई कानून या सुप्रीम कोर्ट का निर्णय नहीं मिला।
Frequently asked questions
Yes. Two adults who live together without marrying commit no offence (S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, 2010). In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) the Supreme Court said such a relationship is “neither a crime nor a sin though socially unacceptable in this country”. It is not, however, a marriage.
There is no Act of Parliament on live-in relationships as such. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, in force from 26 October 2006, protects a woman in a “relationship in the nature of marriage”. In Uttarakhand, the Uniform Civil Code, in force from 27 January 2025, provides for registration of live-in relationships.
According to D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), the couple must hold themselves out to society as spouses, be of legal age to marry, be otherwise qualified to marry (including being unmarried), and have lived together voluntarily for a significant period in a shared household. “Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand” is not enough.
If the relationship is in the nature of marriage, she can apply to a Magistrate under the Domestic Violence Act for protection, residence, monetary relief including maintenance, temporary custody of children and compensation (Sections 17 to 22), and she has the right to reside in the shared household.
Under the Domestic Violence Act, yes, if the relationship qualifies and she has been subjected to domestic violence, which includes economic abuse (Section 20(1)(d)). Under Section 144 BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC), “wife” does not include a live-in partner by definition; Chanmuniya (2010) asked for the question to be referred to a larger bench, and the firm could not find an official record of the outcome. In Badshah (2013), a woman who married a man who had hidden his existing marriage was treated as his wife for Section 125 CrPC; that case involved a marriage ceremony, not a live-in relationship.
Where a man and woman have been living under the same roof and cohabiting for a number of years, the law presumes that they live as husband and wife and that their children are not illegitimate (as recorded in Bharatha Matha, 2010). The presumption can be rebutted (Tulsa v. Durghatiya, 2008), and it does not arise where one partner is already married to someone else (Bharatha Matha; Indra Sarma, 2013). A father’s duty to maintain under Section 144 BNSS covers a legitimate or illegitimate child.
If a marriage between the parents is presumed, the child is treated as legitimate. For children of void or voidable marriages, Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act gives rights in the parents’ property only; in Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023) the Supreme Court held that they are not coparceners but take a share in what the deceased parent would have received on a notional partition. Section 16 applies only where the parents went through a marriage that is void or voidable; neither Section 16 nor Revanasiddappa deals with a live-in relationship as such.
Adultery is no longer a crime after Joseph Shine (2018), but it remains a ground for divorce. A woman who knew the man was married is not in a relationship “in the nature of marriage” and cannot use the Domestic Violence Act against him (Indra Sarma, 2013). In Uttarakhand, registration is refused if either partner is already married.
No statute that the firm could find provides for one, and it could not find any Supreme Court or High Court judgment deciding whether such an agreement can be enforced; in Velusamy (2010) the Supreme Court left open whether there can be a valid claim for palimony on the basis of a contract. A written document can record facts about the relationship, but its terms should not be assumed to be enforceable.
Among the laws the firm could verify, only the Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand requires it. Its Rules, as first published, require partners to submit a statement of live-in relationship to the Registrar; the official portal shows a fee of ₹500 and a 30-day service timeline for the Registrar. The current time limits and penalties should be checked on ucc.uk.gov.in, because the Code and the Rules have since been amended.
Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita punishes sexual intercourse obtained by a promise to marry made “without any intention of fulfilling the same”, with imprisonment up to ten years and fine. Under Deepak Gulati (2013), the question is whether there was no intention to marry at the initial stage; a promise that later could not be kept is different.
No. In Lata Singh (2006) the Supreme Court said an adult woman “is free to marry anyone she likes or live with anyone she likes”, and, speaking of families who disapprove of an inter-caste or inter-religious marriage, that they “cannot give threats”. S. Khushboo (2010), citing Lata Singh, said that a live-in relationship between consenting adults is not an offence.
If the relationship is in the nature of marriage, the woman has the right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act and cannot be evicted from it except in accordance with the procedure established by law; and if the Magistrate is satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, he can restrain her partner from dispossessing her under Section 19, whether or not he has an interest in the house.
The Supreme Court judgments discussed here do not give a live-in partner, as such, a right to inherit. In Dhannulal v. Ganeshram (2015), the courts presumed from long cohabitation that the woman was the legally married wife, and the Supreme Court upheld that finding.
Badri Prasad (1978) on the presumption of marriage; Lata Singh (2006) on adults’ freedom to marry or live with anyone; S. Khushboo (2010) on live-in not being an offence; D. Velusamy (2010) on “relationship in the nature of marriage”; Chanmuniya (2010) on maintenance; and Indra Sarma (2013) on guidelines and relationships with married men.
There is no Act of Parliament on live-in relationships as such. Protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 depends on proving a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, which, under D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), requires that the couple held themselves out as spouses, were of legal age and otherwise qualified to marry, and lived together voluntarily for a significant period in a shared household. The definition of “wife” in Section 144 BNSS (formerly Section 125 CrPC) does not include a live-in partner, and the firm could not find the outcome of the reference sought in Chanmuniya (2010). The Supreme Court judgments discussed here do not give a live-in partner, as such, a right to inherit; in Dhannulal v. Ganeshram (2015) the courts presumed from long cohabitation that the woman was the legally married wife, and the Supreme Court upheld that finding. The enforceability of a live-in agreement has not been decided by the Supreme Court or a High Court in any judgment the firm could find, and in Uttarakhand the Uniform Civil Code Rules, as first published, require the partners to submit a statement of live-in relationship to the Registrar; the current requirements should be checked on ucc.uk.gov.in.
Yes. Nothing in the laws discussed here prevents two adults from buying property jointly, and Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 governs the result: where immovable property is transferred for consideration to two or more persons who pay out of separate funds, each is entitled, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, to a share in proportion to the consideration he or she advanced; where they pay out of a fund belonging to them in common, their interests follow their interests in that fund; and where there is no evidence of the shares, the buyers “shall be presumed to be equally interested in the property”. The Supreme Court judgments discussed here give neither partner, as such, a right to inherit the other’s share, so a partner who wants the other to receive it should make a will; under Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, “Every person of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by will.” For Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jainas that Part of the Act applies through Section 57 and Schedule III; it does not apply to a Muslim’s will (Section 58(1)), and the rules on a Muslim’s will are not covered here.
A written agreement can record the facts of the relationship, such as when it began, where the couple live and how expenses are shared, but its terms should not be assumed to be enforceable: no statute the firm could find provides for such an agreement, and in Velusamy (2010) the Supreme Court left open whether a claim for palimony can be based on a contract. In Uttarakhand, partners should register the relationship under the Uniform Civil Code; its Rules, as first published, require a statement of live-in relationship to be submitted to the Registrar, and the current requirements should be checked on ucc.uk.gov.in. Because relief under the Domestic Violence Act depends on showing a relationship in the nature of marriage, evidence that the couple lived together in a shared household over a significant period matters. Since the judgments discussed here give a partner no right to inherit as such, a will in the partner’s favour is the way to leave property to him or her (Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which does not apply to a Muslim’s will: Section 58(1)).
Conclusion
A live-in relationship between adults is lawful, and the courts protect the couple’s choice to live together. The law’s protection, however, follows the nature of the relationship rather than its label. A woman in a relationship “in the nature of marriage” has the Domestic Violence Act’s remedies, including residence and maintenance; on the material the firm could verify, maintenance as a “wife” under Section 144 BNSS remains unsettled for an unmarried partner; children are protected by the father’s duty to maintain them and, where a marriage is presumed from long cohabitation as husband and wife, by the presumption of legitimacy; and a woman who knowingly lives with a married man cannot claim the Act’s protection against him. Because so much turns on evidence, partners should keep proof of their shared life.
Sources used for this post: the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Sections 2, 3, 12, 17 to 23, 26, 31 and 36 (Supreme Court Legal Services Committee copy); the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 144, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 69 and 82 and the omission of Section 497 IPC, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, Section 119 (the firm’s section-by-section data checked against the Gazette text); the Uniform Civil Code Rules, Uttarakhand, 2025 as first published (with the Governor’s notification bringing the Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand, 2024 into force), and the about-us, service and government-orders pages of the official portal ucc.uk.gov.in; and the Supreme Court of India’s own copies of Badri Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1 August 1978), Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (7 July 2006), Tulsa v. Durghatiya (15 January 2008, recording Mohabhat Ali v. Md. Ibrahim Khan and Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari), S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (28 April 2010, referring to Lata Singh), Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (17 May 2010, referring to S.P.S. Balasubramanyam), Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (7 October 2010), D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (21 October 2010, referring to Savitaben), Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (20 May 2013), Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (18 October 2013), Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (26 November 2013), Dhannulal v. Ganeshram (8 April 2015), Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 September 2018), Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal (16 August 2022) and Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (1 September 2023).
