Difference Between Murder and Culpable Homicide under the BNS (Sections 100 and 101, formerly 299 and 300 IPC)

Culpable homicide is causing a person’s death by an act done with one of three states of mind: an intention to cause death, an intention to cause a bodily injury that is likely to cause death, or the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. It is defined in Section 100 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 299 IPC). Murder is not a separate kind of killing. It is culpable homicide with something more: Section 101 BNS (formerly Section 300 IPC) says that culpable homicide “is murder” if the act falls under one of four clauses – an intention to kill (the same words as the first limb of Section 100), or one of three higher degrees of intention or knowledge in clauses (b) to (d) – and none of the five Exceptions applies.

So every murder is culpable homicide, but not every culpable homicide is murder. The difference matters most at sentencing. Murder is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and fine (Section 103 BNS, formerly Section 302 IPC). Culpable homicide not amounting to murder is punishable under Section 105 BNS (formerly Section 304 IPC) with imprisonment for life, or for five to ten years, and fine, where there was an intention to kill or to cause a likely-fatal injury; or with up to ten years and fine where there was only knowledge that death was likely.

Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 are cited from their India Code texts (as on 6 October 2025, with no later amendment to these sections found on 23 October 2026), the Hindi wording from the official Hindi text of the BNS on India Code, the old Sections 299 to 304A from the India Code text of the Indian Penal Code, and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.

Originally written by Urvi Malhotra and Nipun Kalra.

What is culpable homicide? Meaning in plain English (Section 100 BNS)

In ordinary English, “homicide” is the killing of a human being and “culpable” means blameworthy. The law gives the phrase an exact meaning. Section 100 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita reads:

“Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.”

The wording is the same as the old Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code; the firm’s comparison data records “No change”. Two things are needed. First, an act of the accused must cause the death (“death” means “the death of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context”, Section 2(6)). Second, the act must be done with one of three states of mind:

• an intention to cause death;
• an intention to cause a bodily injury that is likely to cause death; or
• knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

These three limbs are often labelled (a), (b) and (c), as the Supreme Court did in its comparative table in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976), although the section itself does not number them. If none of the three is present, the death is not culpable homicide at all. It may then be causing death by negligence (Section 106), or no offence if it was a pure accident in doing a lawful act with proper care (Section 18).

The illustrations to Section 100

The Sanhita gives three examples. In the first, “A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z, believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.” In the second, A, knowing that Z is behind a bush, induces B (who does not know it) to fire at the bush, and Z is killed: “B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.” In the third, A shoots at a fowl to kill and steal it and kills B, who was hidden behind a bush. A was doing an unlawful act, but “he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.”

The third illustration is a useful reminder: doing something unlawful is not enough. What turns a death into culpable homicide is the intention or knowledge described in the section.

The three Explanations: weak victims, medical treatment and unborn children

Explanation 1 covers a victim who is already ill: “A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.” Explanation 2 covers treatment: a person who causes a bodily injury from which death results is deemed to have caused the death “although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been prevented.”

Explanation 3 deals with the unborn child: “The causing of the death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.”

Death of a person other than the one intended (Section 102)

If a person, by doing something he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, kills someone whose death he neither intended nor knew he was likely to cause, Section 102 BNS (formerly Section 301 IPC) says that the culpable homicide “is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.” In other words, if killing the intended victim would have been murder, killing the other person is murder too.

Culpable homicide meaning in Hindi and other Indian languages

The official Hindi text of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (भारतीय न्याय संहिता, 2023), published on India Code, gives Section 100 the heading “आपराधिक मानव वध” – that is the official Hindi term for culpable homicide. Murder is “हत्या”, and Section 105 is headed “हत्या की कोटि में न आने वाले आपराधिक मानव वध के लिए दण्ड” (punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder). The phrases “गैर इरादतन हत्या” and “इरादतन हत्या”, which many people search for, are everyday expressions; they do not appear in the official text of these sections. A full summary in Hindi is given further below.

The India Code record of the BNS carries only the English and Hindi texts (checked 23 October 2026), so this page gives no official term in Kannada, Telugu, Malayalam, Urdu, Tamil, Bengali, Punjabi or Marathi. Whatever word is used, the legal meaning is the one in Section 100 above: a death caused with an intention to kill, an intention to cause a likely-fatal injury, or knowledge that death is likely.

What is murder? The four clauses of Section 101 BNS

Section 101 begins: “Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,—”. It then lists four situations:

• “(a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or
• (b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or
• (c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
• (d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”

The old Section 300 IPC said the same thing, with the first clause unnumbered and the others headed “2ndly”, “3rdly” and “4thly” (often written “secondly”, “thirdly” and “fourthly”). The firm’s comparison data records only “Formal changes, but essence is the same”: the clauses became (a) to (d), and the word “it” became “the act by which the death is caused”. Judgments decided under the IPC that speak of “Section 300, thirdly” are therefore about what is now Section 101(c).

The illustrations to Section 101

Clause (a): “A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.”

Clause (b): A, “knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death”, strikes him intending to cause bodily injury, and Z dies. “A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health.” But if A did not know of the disease and gave a blow that would not kill a healthy person in the ordinary course of nature, A “is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.” What makes clause (b) murder is the offender’s knowledge about this particular victim.

Clause (c): “A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.”

Clause (d): “A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.”

Clauses (c) and (d) show that murder does not always need an intention to kill. An intended injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or a deliberately and inexcusably dangerous act done with the knowledge described in clause (d), is enough.

Difference between murder and culpable homicide: clause-by-clause table

The clearest way to see the difference is to put the words of the two sections side by side. The table below uses only the statutory words; the column on the left follows the order of Section 100, and each limb is matched with the murder clause that corresponds to it.

Element	Culpable homicide – Section 100 BNS (formerly 299 IPC)	Murder – Section 101 BNS (formerly 300 IPC)
Intention to kill	Limb (a): “with the intention of causing death”	Clause (a) (old first clause): “with the intention of causing death”
Intention to cause an injury	Limb (b): “with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death”	Clause (b) (old “2ndly”): “with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused” Clause (c) (old “3rdly”): “with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”
Knowledge	Limb (c): “with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death”	Clause (d) (old “4thly”): “knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid”
Exceptions	None	Five Exceptions: if one applies, the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Punishment	If it is not murder: Section 105 BNS (formerly 304 IPC)	Section 103 BNS (formerly 302 IPC)

Apart from the first row, where the words are the same, the difference is one of degree. Limb (b) of Section 100 is satisfied by an intended injury that is “likely” to cause death; clause (c) of Section 101 needs an intended injury that is “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” to cause death; and clause (b) needs the offender’s knowledge that this particular victim is likely to die from the harm. Limb (c) of Section 100 needs knowledge that death is “likely”; clause (d) of Section 101 needs knowledge that the act “must, in all probability” cause death, done “without any excuse” for running that risk.

The Supreme Court explained the same point in Rayavarapu Punnayya: “The difference between cl. (b) of s. 299 and cl. (3) of s. 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree.” The Court added that “likely” means “probable” as distinguished from a mere possibility, while “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” means that death will be the “most probable” result.

Point	Culpable homicide not amounting to murder	Murder
Where defined	Section 100 BNS, read with the Exceptions in Section 101 (formerly 299 and 300 IPC)	Section 101 BNS (formerly 300 IPC)
Relationship	The wider offence	A form of culpable homicide with the “special characteristics” of Section 101
Mental element	Intention or knowledge of a lower degree, or a murder clause plus an Exception	One of clauses (a) to (d), and no Exception
Punishment	Section 105: life, or 5 to 10 years, and fine; or up to 10 years and fine (knowledge only)	Section 103(1): death or life imprisonment, and fine
Cognizable / bailable / court	Cognizable; non-bailable; Court of Session	Cognizable; non-bailable; Court of Session
Old IPC sections	299, 300 (Exceptions), 304	300, 302

“All murder is culpable homicide, but not all culpable homicide is murder”

This well-known line follows from the words of the statute. Section 101 does not define murder from scratch; it says that “culpable homicide is murder” in the listed cases. So before a court can find murder, the act must first be culpable homicide under Section 100. Every murder therefore satisfies Section 100. The reverse is not true, for two reasons: many culpable homicides done without an intention to kill do not reach the higher degree of clauses (b) to (d), and even those that do are taken out of murder if one of the five Exceptions applies.

In Rayavarapu Punnayya the Supreme Court put it this way: “In the scheme of the Penal Code, ‘culpable homicide’ is genus and ‘murder’ its specie. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not viceversa.” The Court added that the Code “practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide”: murder is the gravest; the first part of the old Section 304 (now the first part of Section 105) punishes the second degree; and the second part punishes the lowest degree.

How a court decides: the three stages

The same judgment suggested an order of questions. At the first stage the court asks “whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another”. If so, at the second stage it asks whether the act amounts to culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 (now Section 100). If it does, at the third stage it asks whether the facts bring the case within any of the four clauses of the definition of murder. If not, the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304 (now Section 105), “depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of s. 299 is applicable”. If a clause applies but the case falls within an Exception, the offence is still culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the first part. (Section 105 itself turns on whether the act was done with intention or only with knowledge.) The Court called these “only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives”.

The five Exceptions: when culpable homicide is not murder

Even if the act falls under a clause of Section 101, it is not murder if one of the five Exceptions in that section applies. The offence is then culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The accused has to prove the Exception: under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 105 of the Evidence Act), the burden of proving circumstances that bring the case “within any special exception or proviso” of the Sanhita is on the accused, “and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances”. Its Illustration (b) is exactly this case: “A, accused of murder, alleges that, by grave and sudden provocation, he was deprived of the power of self-control. The burden of proof is on A.”

Exception 1: grave and sudden provocation

“Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident”. The provocation must not be (a) “sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person”; (b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant lawfully exercising his powers; or (c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. “Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.”

The illustrations show the limits. Killing a child because its parent provoked you is murder, because the provocation was not given by the child. Killing a bailiff who lawfully arrests you, or a Magistrate who says he does not believe your evidence, is murder. But if Y gives A grave and sudden provocation and A fires at Y and accidentally kills Z, who was near but out of sight, A “has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.”

In K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (judgment of 24 November 1961) the Supreme Court stated the test: “The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control.” It added that in India words and gestures may also, in some circumstances, amount to such provocation, and that “The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.” On the facts, three hours had passed, “sufficient time for him to regain his self-control”, and the conviction for murder was upheld.

Exception 2: private defence exceeded in good faith

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, “in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.” In the illustration, Z tries to horsewhip A, not in a way that would cause grievous hurt; A, believing in good faith that he cannot otherwise prevent the whipping, shoots Z dead. “A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.”

This Exception is for a person who goes too far. Where the right of private defence itself extends to causing death – for example against an assault that may reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt (Section 38) – the act is no offence at all: “Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence” (Section 34). The right “in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence” (Section 37(2)).

Exception 3: public servant exceeding his powers

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, “being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.” Good faith has a technical meaning: nothing is done in “good faith” if it is done “without due care and attention” (Section 2(11)).

Exception 4: sudden fight

Culpable homicide is not murder “if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” Its Explanation adds: “It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.” All the conditions must be met: no premeditation, a sudden fight, heat of passion on a sudden quarrel, no undue advantage, and no cruel or unusual conduct.

Exception 5: consent of a person above eighteen

Culpable homicide is not murder “when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.” The illustration in the BNS: “A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.” (The IPC version spoke of “a person under eighteen years of age”; the BNS defines a “child” as “any person below the age of eighteen years”, Section 2(3).)

What the Supreme Court has said: Virsa Singh and Rayavarapu Punnayya

These judgments were given under the IPC, but the wording of Sections 299 and 300 carried over into Sections 100 and 101 BNS, so they still explain the law. The quotations below are from the Supreme Court’s own copies.

Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958): the test for clause (c)

Virsa Singh had thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased; the doctor said the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The trial court did not think he intended to cause death, but convicted him of murder under the third clause of Section 300. On appeal, it was argued that the prosecution also had to prove an intention to inflict an injury sufficient to cause death. The Supreme Court (judgment of Bose J., 11 March 1958) rejected that argument and laid down four things the prosecution must prove under “s. 300, 3rdly” (now Section 101(c)):

• “First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
• Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.
• Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.”
• “Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.”

The fourth part, the Court said, “is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.” The question about intention “is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present.” And: “No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder.” The appeal was dismissed and the murder conviction stood.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976): degrees of culpable homicide

A 55-year-old man was beaten on his legs and arms with heavy sticks and died the next morning. The High Court reduced the conviction to the second part of Section 304, partly because the blows were not on vital parts of the body. The Supreme Court (judgment of Sarkaria J., 15 September 1976) allowed the State’s appeal and restored the conviction for murder with imprisonment for life.

Besides the genus-and-species passage and the three stages quoted above, the Court explained clause (b): its “distinguishing feature” is “the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal”, for example a blow given knowing that the victim has “an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart”. On clause (d), it said the clause applies where the offender’s knowledge of the probability of death of persons in general “approximates to a practical certainty”. On the facts, it held that “The expression “bodily injury” in Clause 3rdly includes also its plural”, so the clause covers several intentional injuries that are “cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency.”

To decide whether the injuries were intentional, the Court looked at “the formidable weapons used by the accused in the beating, the savage manner of its execution, the helpless state of the unarmed victim, the intensity of the violence caused”, the accused’s conduct and the previous animosity, and at the medical evidence on the cause of death.

Culpable homicide punishment: Section 105 BNS compared with murder

Section 105 BNS (formerly Section 304 IPC) has two parts. Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder “shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”

Under the old Section 304 IPC, the first part had no minimum (life, or up to ten years, and fine) and the second part allowed imprisonment up to ten years, “or with fine, or with both”. The BNS added the five-year minimum to the first part and made fine compulsory in the second; the firm’s comparison data records: “Minimum imprisonment for five years is added and fine is made mandatory.”

Offence	BNS section (formerly IPC)	Punishment	Cognizable / bailable	Triable by
Murder	103(1) (302)	Death or imprisonment for life, and fine	Cognizable; non-bailable	Court of Session
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – with intention	105, first part (304 Part I)	Imprisonment for life, or 5 to 10 years, and fine	Cognizable; non-bailable	Court of Session
Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – with knowledge only	105, second part (304 Part II)	Up to 10 years and fine	Cognizable; non-bailable	Court of Session
Causing death by negligence	106(1) (304A)	Up to 5 years and fine; up to 2 years and fine for a registered medical practitioner during a medical procedure	Cognizable; bailable	Magistrate of the first class

The classification columns are from the First Schedule of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. None of these offences appears in the compounding tables of Section 359 BNSS. Punishment for murder, the “rarest of rare” rule for the death sentence, bail and the stages of a murder trial are explained in the firm’s guide to Section 302 IPC (now Section 103 BNS), and bail in general in how to get bail in India.

The same line runs through attempts. Attempt to murder is Section 109 BNS (formerly Section 307 IPC). Doing an act with such intention or knowledge that, if it caused death, the offender “would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder” is Section 110 BNS (formerly Section 308 IPC): up to three years, or fine, or both, and up to seven years, or fine, or both, if hurt is caused.

Culpable homicide or causing death by negligence (Section 106 BNS)?

Section 106(1) BNS (formerly Section 304A IPC) applies to “Whoever causes death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide”. The words “not amounting to culpable homicide” mark the boundary: if the person acted with any of the three states of mind in Section 100, the case is culpable homicide (or murder), not negligence. The punishment is imprisonment of up to five years and fine, or up to two years and fine “if such act is done by a registered medical practitioner while performing medical procedure”. Under the IPC the maximum was two years, “or with fine, or with both”. The offence is cognizable and bailable, and is tried by a Magistrate of the first class.

Section 106(2), on causing death by rash and negligent driving and escaping without reporting it, was excluded when the BNS was brought into force: the commencement footnote on India Code reads “1st day of July, 2024, except the provision of sub-section (2) of section 106”.

Defences in a murder or culpable homicide case

Apart from the five Exceptions, which only reduce murder to culpable homicide, the “General Exceptions” in Chapter III of the BNS can make the act no offence at all. The main ones in killing cases are:

• Private defence (Sections 34 to 44): “Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence” (Section 34). The right extends to causing death only in the situations listed in Section 38 (body) and Section 41 (property).
• Unsoundness of mind (Section 22): “Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.”
• Accident (Section 18): “Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.”
• Intoxication (Sections 23 and 24): involuntary intoxication that makes a person incapable of knowing the nature of the act is a defence (Section 23). A person who is voluntarily intoxicated is treated “as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated” (Section 24).

For all of these, the burden of proving the circumstances is on the accused, and the court presumes they are absent (Section 108 BSA; its Illustration (a) is a murder accused who pleads unsoundness of mind). The prosecution, however, must still prove the offence itself; as the Supreme Court said in Virsa Singh, “the burden is on the prosecution throughout”.

A person charged with murder can be convicted of the lesser offence without a separate charge. Section 245(2) BNSS (formerly Section 222 CrPC) says: “When a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it.”

Old IPC sections and the new BNS sections

The Indian Penal Code was repealed by Section 358(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which came into force on 1 July 2024. The repeal does not affect “any penalty, or punishment incurred in respect of any offences committed against the Code so repealed”, and proceedings for them “may be instituted, continued or enforced” as if the IPC had not been repealed (Section 358(2)). A death caused before 1 July 2024 is therefore still charged under Sections 302 or 304 IPC; investigations, trials and appeals pending on that date continue under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 531(2)(a) BNSS). The firm’s IPC to BNS comparison tool shows every old and new number.

IPC (old)	BNS (new)	Subject
299	100	Culpable homicide (no change)
300	101	Murder and its five Exceptions (formal changes only)
301	102	Culpable homicide by causing death of a person other than the one intended (no change)
302	103(1)	Punishment for murder
304	105	Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder (5-year minimum added; fine made compulsory)
304A	106(1)	Causing death by negligence (maximum raised to 5 years)
307	109	Attempt to murder
308	110	Attempt to commit culpable homicide (no change)

हत्या और आपराधिक मानव वध में अंतर – हिंदी में सारांश (Summary in Hindi)

भारतीय न्याय संहिता, 2023 (2023 का अधिनियम संख्यांक 45) 1 जुलाई 2024 से लागू है और इसने भारतीय दंड संहिता, 1860 का स्थान लिया है। भारत संहिता (India Code) पर प्रकाशित इस संहिता के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में “culpable homicide” के लिए “आपराधिक मानव वध” और “murder” के लिए “हत्या” शब्द प्रयोग किए गए हैं। बोलचाल में प्रयुक्त “गैर इरादतन हत्या” शब्द इन धाराओं के आधिकारिक पाठ में नहीं है। नीचे का सारांश फर्म द्वारा तैयार किया गया है; उद्धरण चिह्नों में दिए गए अंश आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ से हैं।

आपराधिक मानव वध (धारा 100, पहले धारा 299 आईपीसी): आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ के अनुसार, “जो कोई, मृत्यु कारित करने के आशय से, या ऐसी शारीरिक क्षति कारित करने के आशय से, जिससे मृत्यु कारित हो जाना सम्भाव्य है, या यह ज्ञान रखते हुए कि यह सम्भाव्य है कि वह उस कार्य से मृत्यु कारित कर दे, कोई कार्य करके, मृत्यु कारित कर देता है, वह आपराधिक मानव वध का अपराध करता है ।” अर्थात् तीन में से कोई एक मानसिक स्थिति आवश्यक है – मृत्यु का आशय, ऐसी शारीरिक क्षति का आशय जिससे मृत्यु सम्भाव्य हो, या यह ज्ञान कि कार्य से मृत्यु सम्भाव्य है। स्पष्टीकरण 3 के अनुसार “मां के गर्भ में स्थित किसी शिशु की मृत्यु कारित करना मानव वध नहीं है”, किन्तु जीवित शिशु का कोई भाग बाहर आ जाने के बाद उसकी मृत्यु कारित करना आपराधिक मानव वध हो सकता है।

हत्या (धारा 101, पहले धारा 300 आईपीसी): धारा 101 कहती है: “इसमें इसके पश्चात्, अपवादित दशाओं को छोड़कर, आपराधिक मानव वध हत्या है”। इसके चार खंड हैं – (क) मृत्यु कारित करने का आशय; (ख) ऐसी शारीरिक क्षति का आशय जिसके बारे में अपराधी जानता है कि उस विशेष व्यक्ति की मृत्यु कारित करना सम्भाव्य है; (ग) ऐसी शारीरिक क्षति का आशय जो “प्रकृति के साधारण अनुक्रम में मृत्यु कारित करने के लिए पर्याप्त है”; (घ) यह ज्ञान कि कार्य इतना आसन्नसंकट है कि पूरी अधिसंभाव्यता है कि वह मृत्यु कारित कर ही देगा, और ऐसा कार्य बिना किसी प्रतिहेतु के किया जाए।

मुख्य अंतर: हर हत्या आपराधिक मानव वध है, पर हर आपराधिक मानव वध हत्या नहीं है। मृत्यु कारित करने का आशय हो तो (अपवाद को छोड़कर) अपराध हत्या है, क्योंकि खंड (क) के शब्द धारा 100 के पहले भाग जैसे ही हैं; बाकी मामलों में अंतर आशय और ज्ञान की मात्रा का है। आपराधिक मानव वध में ऐसी क्षति पर्याप्त है जिससे मृत्यु “सम्भाव्य” हो; हत्या के खंड (ग) में क्षति “प्रकृति के साधारण अनुक्रम में” मृत्यु के लिए “पर्याप्त” होनी चाहिए। इसी प्रकार आपराधिक मानव वध में यह ज्ञान काफी है कि मृत्यु सम्भाव्य है, जबकि हत्या के खंड (घ) में “पूरी अधिसंभाव्यता” का ज्ञान चाहिए। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने आंध्र प्रदेश राज्य बनाम रायवरपु पुन्नय्या (1976) में कहा कि आपराधिक मानव वध व्यापक वर्ग (genus) है और हत्या उसका एक प्रकार (species); मृत्यु की सम्भाव्यता की मात्रा ही तय करती है कि अपराध किस श्रेणी का है।

पांच अपवाद: यदि धारा 101 का कोई खंड लागू हो, फिर भी इन दशाओं में अपराध हत्या नहीं, बल्कि हत्या की कोटि में न आने वाला आपराधिक मानव वध होगा – (1) “गम्भीर और अचानक प्रकोपन” से आत्मसंयम की शक्ति खो देना (प्रकोपन स्वयं मांगा हुआ न हो, विधि के पालन में या लोक सेवक द्वारा शक्तियों के विधिपूर्ण प्रयोग में दिया गया न हो, और प्राइवेट प्रतिरक्षा के विधिपूर्ण प्रयोग में दिया गया न हो); (2) प्राइवेट प्रतिरक्षा के अधिकार का सद्भावपूर्वक प्रयोग करते हुए सीमा का अतिक्रमण, बिना पूर्वचिन्तन के; (3) लोक सेवक या उसकी मदद करने वाले व्यक्ति द्वारा सद्भावपूर्वक, बिना वैमनस्य के, शक्ति से आगे बढ़ जाना; (4) अचानक झगड़े में, आवेश की तीव्रता में, बिना पूर्वचिन्तन, बिना अनुचित लाभ और बिना क्रूरता के हुई अचानक लड़ाई; (5) अठारह वर्ष से अधिक आयु के व्यक्ति की अपनी सम्मति से मृत्यु या मृत्यु की जोखिम। Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 की धारा 108 के अनुसार अपवाद साबित करने का भार अभियुक्त पर है।

दण्ड: हत्या के लिए धारा 103(1) (“हत्या के लिए दण्ड”) में मृत्यु या आजीवन कारावास और जुर्माना है। धारा 105 (“हत्या की कोटि में न आने वाले आपराधिक मानव वध के लिए दण्ड”) में, यदि कार्य मृत्यु या मृत्यु सम्भाव्य करने वाली शारीरिक क्षति के आशय से किया गया हो, तो आजीवन कारावास या कम से कम पांच वर्ष और अधिक से अधिक दस वर्ष का कारावास और जुर्माना है; यदि केवल ज्ञान हो, आशय न हो, तो दस वर्ष तक का कारावास और जुर्माना। ये सभी अपराध संज्ञेय और अजमानतीय हैं और सेशन न्यायालय द्वारा विचारणीय हैं। धारा 106(1) (“उपेक्षा द्वारा मृत्यु कारित करना”) उतावलेपन या उपेक्षा से हुई ऐसी मृत्यु के लिए है जो आपराधिक मानव वध की कोटि में नहीं आती – पांच वर्ष तक का कारावास और जुर्माना; यह अपराध जमानतीय है।

पुराने मामले: 1 जुलाई 2024 से पहले किए गए अपराधों पर भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 299, 300, 302 और 304 ही लागू रहती हैं (भारतीय न्याय संहिता की धारा 358)। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने विरसा सिंह बनाम पंजाब राज्य (1958) में कहा कि खंड (ग) में अभियोजन को यह साबित करना होता है कि चोट मौजूद है, उसका स्वरूप क्या है, अभियुक्त का आशय वही चोट पहुंचाने का था, और वह चोट प्रकृति के साधारण अनुक्रम में मृत्यु के लिए पर्याप्त थी; मृत्यु का आशय साबित करना आवश्यक नहीं।

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

Culpable homicide and murder are two levels of the same offence. Section 100 BNS sets the base: a death caused with an intention to kill, an intention to cause a likely-fatal injury, or knowledge that death is likely. Section 101 makes it murder when there was an intention to kill, or when the intention or knowledge reaches the higher degree in clauses (b) to (d), unless one of the five Exceptions applies. The words that decide most cases are “likely to cause death” against “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”, and “likely” against “in all probability”.

The consequence is in the sentence: death or life imprisonment for murder under Section 103, against life or five to ten years, or up to ten years, under Section 105. A death caused by a rash or negligent act without that intention or knowledge falls outside both, under Section 106. For the punishment, bail and trial of a murder case, see the guide to Section 302 IPC and Section 103 BNS.

Sources used for this post: the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act No. 45 of 2023), Sections 2(1), 2(3), 2(6), 2(11), 18, 22 to 24, 34 to 38, 41, 100 to 103, 105, 106, 109, 110 and 358, and its commencement footnote, from the India Code text a2023-45.pdf (as on 6 October 2025; India Code record checked 23 October 2026) and the official Hindi text Hh202345.pdf on India Code (Sections 100 to 106, Gazette pages 51 to 56, read from the page images); the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Sections 245, 359 and 531 and the First Schedule, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, Section 108, from their India Code texts (as on 6 October 2025); the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 299 to 304A, from India Code (A1860-45.pdf, record “Rep., Act 45 of 2023”); the firm’s section-by-section comparison data checked against the Gazette texts; and the Supreme Court’s official copies of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, judgment of 11 March 1958 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/552.pdf), K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, judgment of 24 November 1961 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/4062.pdf), and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, judgment of 15 September 1976 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/5531.pdf).