Volenti Non Fit Injuria: Meaning, Essentials, Exceptions, Case Law, BNS Sections 25–30 and Meaning in Hindi

Volenti non fit injuria is a Latin legal maxim that literally means “to a willing person, no injury is done”. In plain words: if you knowingly and freely accept a risk, you cannot later sue the person who exposed you to that risk for the harm it causes. The Delhi High Court has described it as a principle of tort law under which, “where the plaintiff is aware of the risk(s) of an act and assents to it regardless, any damage arising from such act, cannot give rise to a successful plea for violation of a civil right and consequently, a valid claim for compensation” (Sanjeet Singh Kaila v. Union of India, 2017). The Supreme Court, quoting Winfield on Tort, listed it as the first of seven common-law defences to strict liability: “Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria” (Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance, 2001).

The defence is narrow: it “comes down to a correct assessment of what risk the plaintiff assents to” and does not cover the other side’s negligence. In criminal law, consent is a defence only within Sections 25 to 30 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), formerly Sections 87 to 92 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is quoted from India Code (as on 6 October 2025) and its official Hindi text, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 from India Code (as on 15 August 2026) and the Code on Social Security, 2020 from India Code (as on 21 November 2025; Sections 74 and 164 in force from 21 November 2025 by S.O. 5319(E)); the judgments are quoted from the official copies of the Supreme Court (api.sci.gov.in) and the Delhi High Court (delhihighcourt.nic.in).

Volenti non fit injuria meaning

Word for word, volenti means “to one who is willing”, non fit means “is not done” and injuria means a legal injury or wrong. Put together: to a willing person, no legal wrong is done.

The Delhi High Court’s Division Bench explained it most fully in Sanjeet Singh Kaila v. Union of India (W.P.(C) 3414/2013, 2 May 2017). It quoted the classic English statement from Smith v. Charles Baker and Sons (1891): “The maxim of volenti non fit injuria is based on good sense and justice. One who has invited or assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong.”

The maxim is a defence raised by the person being sued. If it succeeds, the claim for that harm fails, even though the harm was real. For other Latin phrases used in Indian courts, see the firm’s guide to legal maxims explained.

Volenti non fit injuria in simple words, with examples

The Delhi High Court gave the everyday example: “In a game of cricket, for instance, an injury caused to a spectator by a stray ball slammed for a boundary will not give rise to an actionable cause as such a risk is inherent and indivisible from the essential nature of the game.” The spectator chose to watch and accepted that risk.

The BNS uses a similar sporting example for crime. Section 25’s illustration says: “A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.” Consent covers the fair risks of the game, not foul play.

Essentials of volenti non fit injuria

Reading the Delhi High Court’s explanation in Kaila (paras 30, 36 and 38), three things must be shown before the defence works.

• Knowledge of the risk. The plaintiff must be “aware of the risk(s) of an act”.
• Agreement to run it. The plaintiff must accept the risk – in the Court’s words, “assents to it regardless”.
• Harm within the accepted risk. The harm must come from the risk actually accepted: the “incidental and necessary and forseeable risks that are a natural function of or related to the act in question” (spelling as in the judgment). A different, avoidable risk is not covered.

Knowledge is not the same as consent (scienti non fit injuria)

“Scienti non fit injuria” (mere knowledge bars a claim) is not a phrase used in the official judgments opened for this post, and the Delhi High Court rejected the idea: in Kaila it adopted the distinction drawn in the English case White v. Blackmore (1972): “Thus a spectator’s knowledge that a particular sporting event involves an element of risk does not mean that he is aware of, and thereby consented to, negligence by the organisers in respect of the safety arrangements.”

How Indian courts apply the defence: case law

Workplace risk: Sanjeet Singh Kaila v. Union of India (Delhi High Court, 2017)

An Indian Air Force Wing Commander had to eject from a MiG-21 that caught fire after take-off in January 2005. The Court recorded that investigations found “a fatigue crack in the welded portion of the after burner manifold leading to a fire”; RTI replies had attributed it to “poor workmanship” by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which HAL disputed. The Union and HAL argued that “fighter pilots assent to the inherent risks of flying”, so they were not liable. The Division Bench (S. Ravindra Bhat and Deepa Sharma JJ.) said this argument “resembles closely, the concept of Volenti Non Fit Injuria”, and rejected it.

A pilot accepts “mere general wear and tear” of an airworthy aircraft: “This would rightly fall under the risk a pilot assents to.” But “A manufacturing defect or a defect attributable to less than standard maintenance, which is avoidable and compromises the strength of an aircraft however, is altogether different”. That, the Court held, “is a risk that no pilot consents to implicitly as a function of her or his job description.”

The case was a writ petition – the Court said its discussion was “one for the violation of a fundamental right and not a civil action for tort” – and this post relies on it only for its explanation of the maxim.

Strict liability and motor accidents: Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance (Supreme Court, 2001)

A jeep’s tyre burst and the capsizing jeep killed a pedestrian; the Tribunal found no negligence and dismissed the main claim. The Supreme Court (K.T. Thomas and R.P. Sethi JJ., 3 January 2001) held that “Negligence is only one of the species of the causes of action” in motor accident claims, and adopted the rule of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher for such claims.

Quoting Winfield on Tort, the Court listed “seven defences recognised in common law” against strict liability: “(1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria”, then common benefit, act of stranger, statutory authority, act of God, default of the plaintiff and remoteness of consequences. It held that a victim “is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply.”

Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which the judgment discussed, was omitted with effect from 1 April 2022; the present rule is Section 164. See the firm’s guide to Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACT).

Rescue cases: Urmila Devi v. MCD (Delhi High Court, 2016)

Lalu Chauhan, aged 25, saw two children drowning in an uncovered drain (ganda nala) in Mangolpuri after their rickshaw overturned. He jumped in, saved one child, and died with the other. His widow’s counsel argued that “a rescue case even otherwise has to be treated differently” and that a person who “voluntarily rescues somebody from an imminent danger created by the wrongful act of the opposite party … cannot be met with the defence of volenti non fit injuria.”

The High Court (Indermeet Kaur J., 3 November 2016) found the drain had no barricading, held the Government of NCT of Delhi (Irrigation and Flood Control Department) “liable for this unfortunate incident”, and awarded the widow ₹5,64,120. It did not separately rule on the volenti argument, so the case is not a ruling that rescuers can never face the defence.

Limits and exceptions to volenti non fit injuria

In the sources opened for this post, the defence does not cover negligence outside the risk accepted (Kaila, quoting White v. Blackmore) or an avoidable defect in equipment the injured person does not control (Kaila, paras 36 and 38). Statutory no-fault schemes (Section 164, Motor Vehicles Act; Section 74, Code on Social Security) do not require proof of fault, and in criminal law Section 28 BNS decides when consent is not valid – all explained below.

Volenti non fit injuria in the BNS (formerly IPC): Sections 25 to 30

Neither the IPC nor the BNS names the maxim. The rules on consent as a defence to a crime are in Chapter III (General Exceptions) of the BNS, Sections 25 to 30, which correspond to Sections 87 to 92 of the IPC. The firm’s Gazette-checked comparison records “No change” for each pair, except that Section 27 replaces the words “insane person” with “person of unsound mind”. The BNS came into force on 1 July 2024 (notification S.O. 850(E)); under Section 358 BNS, the repeal of the IPC does not affect any penalty or punishment incurred, or proceedings, for offences committed against the IPC. To compare any other section, use the IPC to BNS section comparison tool.

BNS (old IPC)	Rule in short	Main limit
Section 25 (formerly 87 IPC)	Harm to a person above eighteen who consented, express or implied, to suffer it or to take its risk is not an offence.	Only for acts not intended, and not known to be likely, to cause death or grievous hurt.
Section 26 (formerly 88 IPC)	Harm done in good faith for a person’s benefit, with consent, is not an offence – even if death is a known risk.	The act must not be intended to cause death.
Section 27 (formerly 89 IPC)	A guardian (or person in lawful charge) may consent for a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind, for that person’s benefit.	Never covers intentional death; limited cover for acts likely to cause death or grievous hurt.
Section 28 (formerly 90 IPC)	Defines when consent is not consent.	Fear of injury or misconception of fact (if known to the doer); unsoundness of mind or intoxication (if unable to understand); child under twelve (unless context shows otherwise).
Section 29 (formerly 91 IPC)	Sections 25–27 do not apply to acts that are offences independently of harm.	Example in the Act: causing miscarriage.
Section 30 (formerly 92 IPC)	Harm done in good faith for a person’s benefit without consent, where consent cannot be obtained in time, is not an offence.	Never covers intentional death; hurt only to prevent death or hurt; “Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit”.

Section 25 BNS: consent to harm short of death or grievous hurt

Section 25 is the closest statutory equivalent of the maxim. It says: “Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.”

Sections 26, 27 and 30 BNS: good faith and benefit (medical cases)

Section 26 goes further: an act done in good faith for the person’s benefit, with consent, is no offence even if death is a known risk, provided death is not intended. The illustration is the surgeon who knows “that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z” but, intending Z’s benefit, operates with Z’s consent: “A has committed no offence.”

Section 27 lets a guardian consent for a child under twelve or a person of unsound mind, and Section 30 covers emergencies – its illustrations include a surgeon operating on an injured child when “There is no time to apply to the child’s guardian”. Neither covers the intentional causing of death or the attempt to cause it (proviso (a) to each section).

Section 28 BNS: when consent is not consent

Under Section 28, a consent is not valid “(a) if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or (b) if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or (c) unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.”

Consent and death: Exception 5 to Section 101 BNS

Consent never makes intentional killing lawful. Sections 25 and 26 exclude acts intended to cause death. The only effect of an adult’s consent is in Exception 5 to Section 101 BNS (formerly Section 300 IPC): “Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.” The offence is then culpable homicide not amounting to murder – still punishable – and the exception applies only where the person who dies is above eighteen – the illustration says a child, on account of his youth, was “incapable of giving consent to his own death”. See the firm’s explainer on murder and culpable homicide.

Volenti non fit injuria and contributory negligence: the difference

Volenti is about agreement. If it succeeds, the harm “cannot give rise to … a valid claim for compensation” (Kaila, para 30). Contributory negligence is about carelessness. The Supreme Court explained in Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak (5 August 2002): “The question of contributory negligence arises when there has been some act or omission on the claimant’s part, which has materially contributed to the damage caused, and is of such a nature that it may properly be described as ‘negligence.’ … It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes blameworthy in part as an ‘author of his own wrong.’” In that case the High Court had found 30% contributory negligence and made a “proportionate deduction” from the compensation; the Supreme Court set that finding aside and restored the full amount.

Winfield’s list adopted in Kaushnuma Begum treats “Consent of the plaintiff” and “Default of the plaintiff” (damage caused “solely” by the plaintiff) as separate defences.

Volenti in motor accident and workplace claims today

Motor accident claims: Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act

Since 1 April 2022 the Motor Vehicles Act’s no-fault rule is Section 164 (in Chapter XI as substituted by the 2019 amendment). Section 164(1) makes the owner or the authorised insurer liable to pay, for death or grievous hurt in an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, “a sum of five lakh rupees in case of death or of two and a half lakh rupees in case of grievous hurt”. Section 164(2) says the claimant “shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or grievous hurt … was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or of the vehicle concerned or of any other person.” A sub-section (4) added with effect from 15 August 2026 says ex gratia payments are not to be deducted from this compensation.

In a claim based on fault, the Tribunal decides negligence and any contributory negligence on the evidence (Pramodkumar), or strict liability unless an exception such as consent applies (Kaushnuma Begum).

Workers: the Code on Social Security, 2020

For employees, compensation for injury at work is statutory. Section 74 of the Code on Social Security, 2020 came into force on 21 November 2025 (notification S.O. 5319(E)). On the same date the Code repealed the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (Section 164(1), item 1), and India Code now records that Act as “Rep., Act 36 of 2020”. The Employers’ Liability Act, 1938 is recorded as repealed by Act 23 of 2016. Section 74(1) of the Code makes the employer liable where personal injury is caused to an employee “by accident or an occupational disease listed in the Third Schedule arising out of and in the course of his employment”.

The proviso to Section 74(1) lists when the employer is not liable: injury not disabling the employee for more than three days, and injury “not resulting in death or permanent total disablement” caused by an accident directly attributable to the employee being under the influence of drink or drugs, wilful disobedience of an express safety order or rule, or wilful removal or disregard of a safety guard. Section 74 does not mention consent or the volenti maxim, and under Section 74(7) an employee who claims compensation before the competent authority cannot also sue for damages.

वॉलेंटी नॉन फिट इंजुरिया का अर्थ – हिंदी में सारांश (Summary in Hindi)

अर्थ: Volenti non fit injuria (वॉलेंटी नॉन फिट इंजुरिया) एक लैटिन विधिक सूत्र है, जिसका शाब्दिक अर्थ है – “इच्छुक व्यक्ति के प्रति कोई क्षति नहीं होती”; सरल शब्दों में (फर्म का अपना अनुवाद) – जो व्यक्ति स्वेच्छा से जोखिम स्वीकार करता है, उसके साथ कोई विधिक क्षति नहीं होती। यदि कोई व्यक्ति किसी जोखिम को जानते हुए अपनी इच्छा से स्वीकार करता है, तो उसी जोखिम से हुई हानि के लिए वह बाद में प्रतिकर (मुआवजे) का दावा नहीं कर सकता। यह खंड फर्म का अपना सारांश है; इस लैटिन सूत्र का कोई आधिकारिक हिंदी अनुवाद हमें किसी सरकारी स्रोत में नहीं मिला। उद्धरण-चिह्नों में दिए गए भारतीय न्याय संहिता, 2023 के शब्द उसके आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ (भारत का राजपत्र) से हैं।

आवश्यक तत्व: दिल्ली उच्च न्यायालय ने संजीत सिंह कैला बनाम भारत संघ (2 मई 2017) में समझाया कि यह बचाव तभी चलता है जब पीड़ित को जोखिम की जानकारी थी, उसने उस जोखिम को स्वीकार किया था, और हानि उसी जोखिम से हुई। केवल जोखिम की जानकारी, दूसरे पक्ष की लापरवाही के लिए सहमति नहीं है। क्रिकेट के दर्शक को बाउंड्री की गेंद से चोट लगे तो दावा नहीं बनता, पर आयोजकों की सुरक्षा-व्यवस्था में लापरवाही के लिए उसने सहमति नहीं दी है।

न्यायालय और प्रतिकर: कौशनुमा बेगम (2001) में सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने विनफील्ड की पुस्तक से उद्धृत सात बचावों में पहला बचाव वादी की सहमति (Consent of the plaintiff) बताया, जो कठोर दायित्व के विरुद्ध उपलब्ध हैं। अंशदायी उपेक्षा (contributory negligence) अलग सिद्धांत है – प्रमोदकुमार झवेरी (2002) में उच्च न्यायालय ने पीड़ित की असावधानी मानकर प्रतिकर में 30% की आनुपातिक कटौती की थी, जिसे सर्वोच्च न्यायालय ने तथ्यों पर अंशदायी उपेक्षा न पाते हुए हटा दिया।

भारतीय न्याय संहिता: संहिता में इस सूत्र के नाम से कोई धारा नहीं है। सहमति (आधिकारिक शब्द “सम्मति”) से जुड़े अपवाद धारा 25 से 30 में हैं (पहले भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 87 से 92)। धारा 25 का पार्श्व शीर्षक है – “सम्मति से किया गया कार्य जिससे मृत्यु या घोर उपहति कारित करने का आशय न हो और न उसकी संभाव्यता का ज्ञान हो ।” यह छूट “अठारह वर्ष से अधिक आयु के किसी व्यक्ति” के लिए है, “जिसने वह अपहानि सहन करने की चाहे अभिव्यक्त या विवक्षित सम्मति दे दी हो”। धारा 26 में किसी के फायदे के लिए सद्भावपूर्वक, सम्मति से किया गया कार्य (जैसे शल्यक्रिया) अपराध नहीं है, यदि मृत्यु का आशय न हो; धारा 27 में संरक्षक बारह वर्ष से कम आयु के शिशु या विकृतचित्त व्यक्ति के लिए सम्मति दे सकता है; धारा 30 आपात स्थिति में बिना सम्मति के सद्भावपूर्वक किए गए कार्य को बचाती है।

कब सम्मति, सम्मति नहीं है: धारा 28 के अनुसार “कोई सम्मति ऐसी सम्मति नहीं है, जैसी इस संहिता की किसी धारा से आशयित है” – यदि वह “क्षति के भय के अधीन, या तथ्य के किसी भ्रम के अधीन” दी गई हो और कार्य करने वाला यह जानता हो, या चित्त-विकृति या मत्तता के कारण व्यक्ति परिणाम समझने में असमर्थ हो, या बारह वर्ष से कम आयु का बच्चा सम्मति दे (जब तक कि संदर्भ से प्रतिकूल प्रतीत न हो)। सहमति से जानबूझकर हत्या वैध नहीं होती; धारा 101 के अपवाद 5 के अनुसार “आपराधिक मानव वध हत्या नहीं है, यदि वह व्यक्ति जिसकी मृत्यु कारित की जाती है, अठारह वर्ष से अधिक आयु का होते हुए, अपनी सम्मति से मृत्यु होना सहन करे, या मृत्यु की जोखिम उठाए ।” – अर्थात् अपराध फिर भी दंडनीय रहता है।

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

Volenti non fit injuria – “to a willing person, no injury is done” – means that a person who knowingly and freely accepts a risk cannot claim compensation for harm within that risk. Indian courts apply it narrowly: it is the defence of “Consent of the plaintiff” (Kaushnuma Begum), and it turns on “what risk the plaintiff assents to”, so knowledge of a risk is not consent to someone else’s negligence (Kaila). Statutes such as Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 74 of the Code on Social Security, 2020 pay compensation without proof of fault. Contributory negligence is a different doctrine: in Pramodkumar the High Court had reduced the award in proportion rather than rejecting the claim.

In criminal law, consent works only within Sections 25 to 30 BNS (formerly 87 to 92 IPC): never for intended death, only from adults under Section 25, and not when given under fear or misconception known to the doer, by a person who cannot understand it because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind, or by a child under twelve (Section 28). For a related maxim on liability for others’ acts, see respondeat superior.

Sources used for this post: the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 25 to 30, 101 (Exception 5) and 358 and the commencement footnote (S.O. 850(E)) (India Code, as on 6 October 2025; no later amendment shown on 23 October 2026), with the official Hindi text of Sections 25 to 30 and Exception 5 to Section 101 (India Code Hh202345.pdf, Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II Section 1A) and the firm’s Gazette-checked IPC to BNS mapping; the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Sections 140 (omitted) and 164 (India Code, as on 15 August 2026); the Code on Social Security, 2020, Sections 74 and 164(1) (India Code, as on 21 November 2025; Sections 74 and 164 in force from 21 November 2025 by S.O. 5319(E)), and India Code’s records of the repeal of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (by Act 36 of 2020) and the Employers’ Liability Act, 1938 (by Act 23 of 2016); and the official copies of Smt. Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2001, Supreme Court, 3 January 2001 (api.sci.gov.in); Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, Civil Appeal No. 5436 of 1994, Supreme Court, 5 August 2002 (api.sci.gov.in); Urmila Devi v. MCD, W.P.(C) 1170/2007 and connected petitions, Delhi High Court, 3 November 2016 (delhihighcourt.nic.in); and Sanjeet Singh Kaila v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 3414/2013, Delhi High Court, 2 May 2017 (delhihighcourt.nic.in). English cases and Winfield on Tort are cited only as quoted in these judgments.