The right to privacy is a fundamental right protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as part of the right to life and personal liberty, and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III, as a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously declared in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India on 24 August 2017. In the words of clause (iii) of the Order of the Court: “The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.” The right is not absolute, but a restriction must rest on a law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate. There is no separate “Right to Privacy Act”: the law on personal data is the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which is coming into force in stages up to 2027. This page is the firm’s privacy-specific guide; the general meaning of Article 21 is explained in the firm’s guide to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
The right to privacy in India at a glance
- Which article: Article 21 (life and personal liberty), read with the other freedoms in Part III (Fundamental Rights). There is no separate “privacy article”, and privacy is not a Directive Principle.
- The judgment: Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, 24 August 2017: nine judges, six opinions and one Order of the Court signed by all nine.
- Overruled: M.P. Sharma (eight judges, 1954) and Kharak Singh (six judges, 1962), so far as they held that the Constitution does not protect privacy.
- Not absolute: a restriction must meet the “three-fold requirement” of legality, need (a legitimate state aim) and proportionality, with procedural safeguards against abuse.
- Aadhaar (26 September 2018): the Act was upheld by majority, but Section 33(2), private use under contracts (Section 57), five-year archiving of authentication data and compulsory bank-account and mobile linking were struck down or held invalid; PAN–Aadhaar linking was upheld.
- “Right to Privacy Act”: there is none. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act No. 22 of 2023, assented to on 11 August 2023) and the DPDP Rules, 2025 apply in stages; consent, data rights and penalties begin in May 2027.
- Phone tracking: no law lets a private person track another’s phone. Interception needs a written, reasoned Government order (Section 20(2) Telecommunications Act, 2023; Section 69 IT Act); a lost phone can be blocked through Sanchar Saathi (CEIR).
- International law: Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 17 of the ICCPR, to which India acceded on 10 April 1979.
- Remedies: a writ petition against the State (Articles 32 and 226); complaints under Section 66E IT Act or Sections 77 and 78 BNS; compensation under Section 43A IT Act until it is omitted; later, a complaint to the Data Protection Board.
Originally written by Rakshita Raj; reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Constitution is quoted from the Legislative Department’s English edition of 2026 and its Hindi edition (as on 1 May 2024), the Acts and Rules from India Code and the Gazette copies published by the ministries, and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.
Right to privacy: which article, and what the Supreme Court held
Many readers search for “the right to privacy article”. The answer is Article 21, with one qualification: no article of the Constitution names privacy. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud said so in Puttaswamy: “The Constitution does not contain a separate article telling us that privacy has been declared to be a fundamental right.” What the nine judges held is that privacy is part of the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 and of the freedoms in Part III.
Article 21 is in Part III (Fundamental Rights), which begins with Article 12; the Directive Principles of State Policy are in Part IV, which begins with Article 36. The earlier version of this post said that the right to privacy was “covered under the Directive Principles of State Policy”. That was wrong: privacy is a fundamental right, which can be enforced in the Supreme Court under Article 32.
The lead opinion explains where the right is contained: privacy “emerges primarily from the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21”, and “Elements of privacy also arise in varying contexts from the other facets of freedom and dignity” guaranteed by the fundamental rights in Part III (Conclusion 3(C)). Justice R.F. Nariman grounded privacy of the body in Articles 19(1)(d) and (e) read with Article 21, and telephone tapping has been held to affect freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a).
Article 21 in English and in the official Hindi text
Article 21 reads: “21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The official Hindi text published by the Legislative Department reads: “21. प्राण और दैहिक स्वतंत्रता का संरक्षण–किसी व्यक्ति को उसके प्राण या दैहिक स्वतंत्रता से विधि द्वारा स्थापित प्रक्रिया के अनुसार ही वंचित किया जाएगा, अन्यथा नहीं ।”
“Personal liberty” is दैहिक स्वतंत्रता and “procedure established by law” is विधि द्वारा स्थापित प्रक्रिया. The word “privacy” appears in neither text; the Supreme Court read the right into Article 21, which protects every “person”, not only citizens.
“Intrinsic to life and personal liberty”: the exact words
Many readers search for the sentence “right to privacy is intrinsic to life and personal liberty and is inherently…”. That sentence does not occur in the judgment; it is a paraphrase of these passages:
- Order of the Court, clause (iii) (quoted in full above): privacy is protected “as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21”.
- Justice Chandrachud, for four judges: “privacy is an intrinsic part of life, personal liberty and of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III”.
- Justice S.K. Kaul: “Let the right of privacy, an inherent right, be unequivocally a fundamental right embedded in part-III of the Constitution of India” (paragraph 83).
The Puttaswamy judgment (2017): the right to privacy case explained
The petitioner, and how the case reached nine judges
The case is Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, heard with several transferred cases and writ petitions. The judgment’s title page names the petitioners as “JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.), AND ANR.” The petitions challenged the Aadhaar card scheme, and the collection of demographic and biometric data “was questioned on the ground that it violates the right to privacy”.
The Attorney General for India argued that a fundamental right of privacy was doubtful because of two old decisions: M.P. Sharma, decided by eight judges, and Kharak Singh, decided by six. Later judgments recognising privacy, such as Gobind, R. Rajagopal and PUCL, had been given by smaller Benches. A Bench of three judges therefore referred the question to a larger Bench on 11 August 2015, and on 18 July 2017 a Constitution Bench presided over by the Chief Justice sent it to nine judges.
The Bench and the six opinions
The nine judges were Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justices J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, R.F. Nariman, A.M. Sapre, D.Y. Chandrachud, S.K. Kaul and S. Abdul Nazeer. Justice Chandrachud delivered the lead opinion for the Chief Justice, Justice Agrawal, Justice Nazeer and himself; the other five judges delivered separate judgments.
| Opinion | Main point on privacy | In the judge’s words |
|---|---|---|
| Justice Chandrachud (for four judges) | Privacy emerges primarily from Article 21; spatial, decisional and informational privacy; the three-fold test | “Privacy is the constitutional core of human dignity.” |
| Justice Chelameswar | Three facets; compelling State interest only for claims deserving the strictest scrutiny | “repose, sanctuary and intimate decision” |
| Justice Bobde | “Life” in Article 21 means more than physical survival | “endorsed the view that ‘life’ must mean ‘something more than mere animal existence'” (Justice Field’s words, as cited in Kharak Singh) |
| Justice Nariman | Privacy of the person, informational privacy and privacy of choice | “the inalienable fundamental right to privacy resides in Article 21” |
| Justice Sapre | A Part III right, subject to reasonable restrictions | “it is not an absolute right” |
| Justice Kaul | Informational privacy, including control over one’s existence on the internet; procedural safeguards | “an inherent right” |
The Order of the Court (24 August 2017)
The Order of the Court, signed by all nine judges, disposed of the reference in four terms:
- M.P. Sharma, “which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands over-ruled”;
- Kharak Singh, “to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution”, stands over-ruled;
- the right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III; and
- “Decisions subsequent to Kharak Singh which have enunciated the position in (iii) above lay down the correct position in law.”
The nine judges did not decide whether Aadhaar was valid: the cases were “sent back for adjudication on merits to the original Bench of 3 honourable Judges” (Justice Nariman) and were decided on 26 September 2018 by a Bench of five judges. The earlier version of this post suggested that the 2017 judgment itself led to stricter rules on Aadhaar data; it was the 2018 judgment and the 2019 amendment of the Aadhaar Act that did so.
What privacy covers
Conclusion 3(F) of the lead opinion says: “Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation.” It “also connotes a right to be left alone”, and it “is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place.” Justice Chandrachud described its connotations as spatial control, decisional autonomy (intimate choices such as reproduction, and public ones such as faith or modes of dress) and informational control; Justice Nariman’s three aspects were privacy of the person, informational privacy and the privacy of choice.
The lead opinion deliberately gave no closed list (Conclusion 3(G)), because technology raises concerns “which were not present seven decades ago”. Privacy also has a positive side: it “imposes an obligation on the state to take all necessary measures to protect the privacy of the individual” (Conclusion 3(I)).
Informational privacy
Conclusion 5 says that “Informational privacy is a facet of the right to privacy” and that the dangers “can originate not only from the state but from non-state actors as well”. The lead opinion commended to the Union Government “the need to examine and put into place a robust regime for data protection”, noting the committee chaired by Justice B.N. Srikrishna, a former judge of the Supreme Court, constituted by an Office Memorandum of 31 July 2017. Justice Kaul added that control over personal data “would also encompass his right to control his existence on the internet”, though “this would not be an absolute right”. Parliament later enacted the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, explained below.
Privacy is not absolute: the three-fold test
Conclusion 3(H) says that “privacy is not an absolute right”, and that in the context of Article 21 “an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable.” It then states the “three-fold requirement”:
- (i) legality, “which postulates the existence of law”;
- (ii) need, “defined in terms of a legitimate state aim”; and
- (iii) proportionality, “which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them”.
Paragraph 180 explains the sources: the need for a law “is an express requirement of Article 21”; the legitimate aim keeps the law within “the zone of reasonableness mandated by Article 14”; and proportionality ensures the encroachment “is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law”. These requirements “apply to all restraints on privacy (not just informational privacy)”. Legitimate aims mentioned in the lead opinion include “protecting national security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the spread of knowledge, and preventing the dissipation of social welfare benefits”. Justice Kaul added a fourth limb: “There must be procedural guarantees against abuse of such interference.” Justice Chelameswar would reserve the stricter compelling State interest standard for “privacy claims which deserve the strictest scrutiny”.
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Supreme Court’s judgments in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India of 24 August 2017 and 26 September 2018.
Landmark cases on the right to privacy before 2017
The summaries below follow the 2017 judgment’s own description of these cases, with the citations as printed in it.
A.K. Gopalan (1950) and M.P. Sharma (1954)
In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27), Chief Justice Kania, speaking for five of the six judges, “construed the relationship between Articles 19 and 21 to be one of mutual exclusion”; Justice Fazl Ali dissented. (The earlier version of this post named “Justice Kania” and “Justice Hiralal J. (Cj)” as if they were two judges; the majority view was Chief Justice Kania’s.) That approach was discarded when eleven judges in Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India ((1970) 1 SCC 248) rejected the theory “that the fundamental rights are water-tight compartments”.
In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi ((1954) SCR 1077), eight judges held that searches and seizures of a company’s records did not infringe Article 20(3): since the Constitution makers had not recognised “a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to the Fourth Amendment”, the Court had “no justification to import it”. When the police need a warrant to search today is explained in the firm’s post on search warrants under the BNSS. In 2017 the lead opinion explained that M.P. Sharma decided only that privacy could not be read into Article 20(3), and the Order of the Court, signed by all nine judges, declared that M.P. Sharma, “which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands over-ruled”.
Kharak Singh (1962): police surveillance and Justice Subba Rao’s dissent
In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1964) 1 SCR 332), decided in 1962, six judges examined police regulations under which a suspect was kept under watch. The majority, through Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, struck down clause (b) of Regulation 236, which allowed domiciliary visits at night, as violating Article 21, but upheld the rest, saying that “the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution”. Justice Subba Rao dissented: personal liberty, he said, includes freedom “from encroachments on his private life”. In 2017 the lead opinion called the first part of the decision “an implicit recognition of the right to privacy”, and the Order of the Court overruled the second; Maneka Gandhi had already treated Justice Subba Rao’s dissent as the correct principle. The words “something more than mere animal existence”, which the earlier version of this post attributed to Kharak Singh, are Justice Field’s in the American case Munn v. Illinois, as quoted in Kharak Singh.
Gobind (1975), Maneka Gandhi (1978) and Francis Coralie Mullin (1981)
In Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((1975) 2 SCC 148), three judges considered police regulations under which a history sheet had been opened against the petitioner and he had been placed under surveillance. Justice Mathew said that a law infringing a fundamental privacy right “must satisfy the compelling State interest test”, although, as the 2017 judgment notes, the Court “did not enter a specific finding on the existence of a right to privacy”.
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248), seven judges carried forward Cooper. As Puttaswamy summarises it, a law depriving a person of life or personal liberty “must lay down not just any procedure but a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable”. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi ((1981) 1 SCC 608), Justice P.N. Bhagwati said that the right to life “cannot be restricted to mere animal existence” and includes “the faculties of thinking and feeling”. The quotations the earlier version of this post gave for these two cases could not be verified and have been replaced.
R. Rajagopal (1994): the right to be let alone
R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1994) 6 SCC 632) arose from the proposed publication in a magazine of a condemned prisoner’s autobiography. Speaking for two judges, Justice Jeevan Reddy held that the right to privacy “is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21”, and called it a “right to be let alone”. Publishing anything about a person’s home, family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing or education without consent, true or not, can make the publisher liable in damages, except where the publication is based on public records (though a victim of sexual assault should not be named), where the person voluntarily “thrusts himself into controversy”, or where it concerns a public official’s official conduct.
PUCL ((1997) 1 SCC 301) and Selvi ((2010) 7 SCC 263): telephone tapping and narco-analysis
In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India ((1997) 1 SCC 301), two judges heard a challenge to Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Justice Kuldip Singh held that telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office is protected, and that “Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.” Tapping also infringes Article 19(1)(a) unless authorised by Article 19(2).
In Selvi v. State of Karnataka ((2010) 7 SCC 263), three judges led by Chief Justice Balakrishnan examined narco-analysis, the polygraph (lie-detector) test and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile. The Court linked privacy with the right in Article 20(3) that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”, recognised “the importance of personal autonomy in aspects such as the choice between remaining silent and speaking”, and concluded that “subjecting a person to the impugned techniques in an involuntary manner violates the prescribed boundaries of privacy”.
Puttaswamy II: the Aadhaar judgment (26 September 2018)
The Aadhaar challenge was decided on 26 September 2018, in the same case, by five judges. Justice A.K. Sikri wrote the majority judgment for Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and himself; Justice Ashok Bhushan concurred separately (though, unlike the majority, he would have upheld Sections 33 and 47 and the bank-linking rule); Justice D.Y. Chandrachud dissented. The majority held that “The architecture of Aadhaar as well as the provisions of the Aadhaar Act do not tend to create a surveillance state”, noting that only “minimal biometric data in the form of iris and fingerprints” is collected, and upheld the Act, including its passage as a Money Bill, with these qualifications:
| Provision or measure | What the majority held |
|---|---|
| Section 7 (subsidies, benefits and services) | Only welfare schemes funded from the Consolidated Fund of India (the 2019 amendment added schemes funded from the Consolidated Fund of a State); “CBSE, NEET, JEE, UGC etc. cannot make the requirement of Aadhaar mandatory” |
| Children | Parental consent for enrolment; option to exit at majority; not compulsory for school admission |
| Regulation 26(c) (metadata) and Regulation 27 (five-year archiving) | Struck down: “Retention of data beyond the period of six months is impermissible.” |
| Section 33(1) and (2) (disclosure) | Section 33(1) read down to require a hearing; Section 33(2) (national security) struck down in its form at the time |
| Section 47 (complaints) | Needs amendment so that an individual or victim can complain |
| Section 57 (use by others) | Read down to purposes backed by law; use under “any contract” and by “any body corporate or person” unconstitutional |
| Section 139AA, Income-tax Act (PAN linking) | Upheld: law, legitimate State interest and proportionality satisfied |
| Rule 9, PML (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005 (bank linking) | Disproportionate; violates privacy, “which extends to banking details” |
| DoT circular of 23 March 2017 (mobile linking) | “illegal and unconstitutional as it is not backed by any law” – quashed |
The majority also restated proportionality in four parts: a proper purpose, a rational connection, “no alternative less invasive measures”, and a proper relation between the importance of the aim and of limiting the right. Justice Chandrachud would have struck down the whole Act “for failing to meet the necessary requirements to have been certified as a Money Bill under Article 110(1)”.
The Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019
Parliament then amended the Aadhaar Act by Act No. 14 of 2019 (assented to on 23 July 2019):
- Voluntary use: a holder “may voluntarily use his Aadhaar number”, and voluntary use means use “only with the informed consent of the Aadhaar number holder” (Section 4(3)). An entity to which a holder offers authentication under Section 4(3) must tell the holder of “alternate and viable means of identification” and “shall not deny any service to him for refusing to, or being unable to, undergo authentication” (Section 4(6)). Mandatory authentication for a service is allowed only “if such authentication is required by a law made by Parliament” (Section 4(7)). Section 7, which the Court upheld, still allows Aadhaar to be required for subsidies, benefits and services, now including those funded from “the Consolidated Fund of State”.
- Section 57 omitted (with effect from 25 July 2019, as India Code records).
- Section 33: disclosure now needs the order of a court not inferior to a “Judge of a High Court” (instead of a District Judge), with a hearing to the holder, and “core biometric information shall not be disclosed”; for national-security disclosure, “Joint Secretary” became “Secretary”.
- Section 47: a court may take cognizance of certain offences “on a complaint made by an Aadhaar number holder or individual”.
Privacy after 2017: later landmark judgments
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (6 September 2018). Puttaswamy placed sexual orientation at the core of privacy. Five judges (Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra, in four opinions) allowed the petitions and overruled Suresh Koushal. In Chief Justice Misra’s words (for himself and Justice Khanwilkar), Section 377 IPC, “so far as it penalizes any consensual sexual relationship between two adults”, “cannot be regarded as constitutional”; acts without consent and acts with animals remained offences. The firm’s guide to rights and laws related to the LGBTQ+ community covers the wider law.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 September 2018). The same five judges struck down Section 497 IPC, holding that “adultery should not be treated as an offence”, together with Section 198 CrPC so far as it applied to adultery. Justice Chandrachud called Section 497 “a denial of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, liberty, privacy and sexual autonomy which are intrinsic to Article 21”.
Common Cause v. Union of India (9 March 2018). A Constitution Bench, as the Supreme Court’s later order describes it, “went on to dwell on the right of a person to die with dignity” and recognised advance medical directives, with safeguards that apply “till Parliament makes legislation on this subject”. By an order of 24 January 2023, five judges modified those directions, for example allowing attestation before a notary or Gazetted Officer instead of a magistrate.
How the right to privacy developed in India: a timeline
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Supreme Court’s own copies of the judgments of 2017 and 2018 (earlier cases as described and cited in the 2017 judgment), the Court’s order of 24 January 2023 in Common Cause, the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 and the DPDP Act, 2023 on India Code, and notifications G.S.R. 843(E) and G.S.R. 846(E) of 13 November 2025.
Is there a “Right to Privacy Act”? Privacy laws in India today
There is no Act called the “Right to Privacy Act”. The right comes from the Constitution and binds “the State”, which Article 12 defines to include the Governments and legislatures of the Union and the States “and all local or other authorities”. Parliament’s general law on personal data is the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act No. 22 of 2023), which received assent on 11 August 2023 and provides for processing digital personal data in a manner that recognises “both the right of individuals to protect their personal data and the need to process such personal data for lawful purposes”. Other privacy rules are spread across older laws:
| Situation | Law that applies |
|---|---|
| Surveillance or data collection by the Government or a public authority | Article 21 and the Puttaswamy test; writ petition under Article 32 or 226 |
| Personal data held by companies, apps and other organisations | DPDP Act, 2023 and DPDP Rules, 2025 (main duties from May 2027); meanwhile Sections 43A and 72A of the IT Act, 2000 |
| Interception of calls and messages | Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and the Interception Rules, 2024; Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (not yet repealed) |
| Interception or monitoring of computer data | Sections 69 and 69B of the IT Act and the Interception Rules, 2009 |
| Production of phones and records in a criminal case | Section 94 BNSS (formerly Section 91 CrPC) |
| Intimate images, voyeurism and stalking | Section 66E IT Act; Sections 77, 78 and 79 BNS |
| Hacking or unauthorised access to a device | Sections 43 and 66 of the IT Act |
| RTI requests for personal information | Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, 2005, as substituted by the DPDP Act |
| Aadhaar | The Aadhaar Act, 2016 as amended in 2019, read with the 2018 judgment |
The earlier version of this post described the “Personal Data Protection Bill” as pending legislation that classified data as “critical, sensitive and personal” and would create a “Data Protection Authority”. That is out of date. The 2023 Act defines only “personal data” (“any data about an individual who is identifiable by or in relation to such data”, Section 2(t)) and provides for a “Data Protection Board of India” (Section 18).
The DPDP Act: what is in force, and when the rest begins
The stages are fixed by notification G.S.R. 843(E) of 13 November 2025; the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 were notified the same day as G.S.R. 846(E) (the Government’s press backgrounder gives their publication date as 14 November 2025).
| Stage | Provisions of the Act | Provisions of the Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 13 November 2025 (in force) | Section 1(2), Section 2 (definitions), Sections 18 to 26 (the Board), Sections 35 and 38 to 43 (including rule-making), Section 44(1) and (3) (including the RTI amendment) | Rules 1, 2 and 17 to 21 (the Board) |
| One year from 13 November 2025 (November 2026) | Section 6(9) (Consent Managers) and Section 27(1)(d) | Rule 4 (Consent Managers) |
| Eighteen months from 13 November 2025 (May 2027) | Sections 3 to 17 (except Section 6(9)), the rest of Section 27, Sections 28 to 34, Sections 36 and 37 (the Government’s powers to call for information and to issue directions) and Section 44(2) (omission of Section 43A IT Act) | Rules 3, 5 to 16, 22 and 23 (notice, safeguards, breach intimation, children, rights, appeals and others) |
On the date of this update, therefore, the definitions and the provisions establishing the Board are in force and the RTI amendment applies, but the duties of Data Fiduciaries, the rights of Data Principals, the complaint procedure and the penalties have not begun. The months in brackets are worked out from the periods in the notifications, which do not state calendar dates. (The India Code footnote to Section 1(2) prints “35 to 43” for the first stage; the notification itself lists Sections 35 and 38 to 43, and places Sections 36 and 37 in the eighteen-month stage.)
How the Act will work
A “Data Principal” is “the individual to whom the personal data relates”, and a “Data Fiduciary” is any person who “determines the purpose and means of processing of personal data”; “person” includes “the State”. The Act does not apply to data processed by an individual “for any personal or domestic purpose” or made public by the person herself. Data may be processed only with consent or for “certain legitimate uses” (Sections 4 and 7), such as State benefits and licences, court orders, medical emergencies and employment. Consent must be “free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous with a clear affirmative action” (Section 6(1)), must follow a notice (Section 5) and can be withdrawn as easily as it was given (Section 6(4)).
Data Principals will have the right to a summary of their personal data and the identities of others with whom it was shared (Section 11), to correction, completion, updating and erasure (Section 12), to “readily available means of grievance redressal” (Section 13), and to nominate someone to act on death or incapacity (Section 14). They also have duties, such as not impersonating anyone and not filing “a false or frivolous grievance or complaint” (Section 15), breach of which can attract a penalty of up to ₹10,000.
Data Fiduciaries must take “reasonable security safeguards to prevent personal data breach” (Section 8(5)), report breaches to the Board and each affected person (Section 8(6); under Rule 7, to the person “without delay” and to the Board in detail “within seventy-two hours of becoming aware of the breach”), and erase data once the purpose is served unless the law requires retention (Section 8(7)). For a child, meaning an individual “who has not completed the age of eighteen years”, they need verifiable parental consent and “shall not undertake tracking or behavioural monitoring of children or targeted advertising directed at children” (Section 9), subject to the exemptions allowed by Section 9(4) and (5) and Rule 12. Significant Data Fiduciaries have extra duties, such as appointing a Data Protection Officer based in India (Section 10).
Penalties and the Data Protection Board
The Board may impose a penalty if, after an inquiry and a hearing, it finds a breach “significant” (Section 33(1)). The Schedule sets these maximums:
| Breach | Maximum penalty |
|---|---|
| Failure to take reasonable security safeguards (Section 8(5)) | ₹250 crore |
| Failure to give notice of a personal data breach (Section 8(6)) | ₹200 crore |
| Breach of the obligations relating to children (Section 9) | ₹200 crore |
| Breach of a Significant Data Fiduciary’s additional obligations (Section 10) | ₹150 crore |
| Breach of a Data Principal’s duties (Section 15) | ₹10,000 |
| Any other breach of the Act or the Rules | ₹50 crore |
Under notification G.S.R. 845(E) of 13 November 2025 the Board “shall consist of four members”, and the Government’s backgrounder says it will be fully digital. From the eighteen-month stage it will “function as an independent body” (Section 28(1)), inquire into breaches on a Data Principal’s complaint, a Government reference or a court’s direction (Section 27(1)(b)), and may impose costs on false or frivolous complaints (Section 28(12)). Appeals lie to the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) within sixty days (Section 29).
Exemptions for the State (Section 17)
Section 17 also begins at the eighteen-month stage. Section 17(1) switches off most duties and rights (but not the duty to take security safeguards) where processing is needed to enforce legal claims, is done by courts or tribunals, or is “in the interest of prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any offence”, among other cases. Under Section 17(2)(a) the Act “shall not apply” at all to processing by “such instrumentality of the State as the Central Government may notify, in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, maintenance of public order or preventing incitement to any cognizable offence relating to any of these”. An exemption from the Act does not displace the Constitution: Puttaswamy’s requirements apply, in the lead opinion’s words, “to all restraints on privacy”.
The RTI amendment and the end of Section 43A IT Act
Section 44(3), in force since 13 November 2025, substituted clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which now reads: “(j) information which relates to personal information;” (see the firm’s guide to the RTI Act). Section 44(2)(a) will omit Section 43A of the IT Act, under which a body corporate negligent in protecting “sensitive personal data or information” is “liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person so affected”; until the eighteen-month stage, Section 43A remains in force.
Surveillance and interception: who can lawfully tap a phone or read messages?
Calls and messages. Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, in force since 26 June 2024, allows the Central Government, a State Government or “any officer specially authorised in this behalf”, “On the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety”, to direct “by order” and “for reasons to be recorded in writing” that messages be intercepted, detained or “disclosed in intelligible format” to a named officer, or that a service be suspended. The Government must be satisfied that this is necessary or expedient in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence and security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order or preventing incitement to an offence, and the power is “subject to such procedure and safeguards as may be prescribed”. Press messages of accredited correspondents cannot be intercepted unless their transmission has been prohibited (Section 20(3)).
The 2024 Interception Rules. The prescribed safeguards are in the Telecommunications (Procedures and Safeguards for Lawful Interception of Messages) Rules, 2024 (G.S.R. 754(E), 6 December 2024), which replaced Rules 419 and 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. An interception order is issued by the “competent authority”, the Union Home Secretary or the State’s Home Secretary; in unavoidable circumstances an authorised Joint Secretary may issue it, and in remote areas or for operational reasons the head or second senior-most officer of the authorised agency may do so, but such an order must be confirmed within seven working days, failing which the interception stops and the messages “shall not be used for any purpose, including as evidence in a court of law”. An order may be made only if the information cannot be obtained “by any other reasonable means”; it lasts for up to sixty days at a time and never beyond one hundred and eighty days; and every order goes to a review committee (chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, or by the Chief Secretary in a State), which meets every two months and may set the order aside and direct destruction of the copies.
The 1885 Act. Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, the provision challenged in PUCL, is in similar terms; the new Act’s repeal section (Section 60) has not yet been brought into force (India Code, as on 24 August 2026), and rules and orders made under the 1885 Act are deemed to have been made under the new Act so far as consistent with it (Section 61), although for interception the 2024 Rules now apply.
Computer and phone data. Section 69 of the IT Act allows the Central or a State Government, or a specially authorised officer, “for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order”, to direct an agency to “intercept, monitor or decrypt” information “generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource”, on similar grounds and “for investigation of any offence”. Under the Interception Rules, 2009 (G.S.R. 780(E)), the order is normally issued by the “competent authority” – the Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, or the Secretary in charge of a State’s Home Department – and a direction cannot be renewed beyond a total of one hundred and eighty days. Refusing to assist the agency is punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years and fine (Section 69(4)). Under Section 69B the Central Government may separately authorise a government agency, for cyber security, “to monitor and collect traffic data or information”, which includes data identifying the “location to or from which the communication is or may be transmitted”.
Production in a criminal case. A court may issue a summons, and the officer in charge of a police station “a written order, either in physical form or in electronic form”, requiring a person to produce “any document, electronic communication, including communication devices, which is likely to contain digital evidence” (Section 94(1) BNSS, formerly Section 91 CrPC). Searches by the police must be recorded “through any audio-video electronic means preferably mobile phone” (Section 105 BNSS). The firm’s guide to electronic evidence under Section 63 BSA explains how such material is proved.
Can my phone be tracked? Tracking a phone number in India
Who can lawfully obtain location and call records
Only the authorities, through the routes just described: an interception order under Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act or Section 69 of the IT Act, or a summons or written order under Section 94 BNSS. (Section 69B is a separate cyber-security power, used by Gazette notification, “to enhance cyber security and for identification, analysis and prevention of intrusion or spread of computer contaminant”.) The earlier version of this post said this is done by “warrants and court’s order”; in fact interception rests on a written, reasoned executive order, and production of phones and records on a court’s summons or a police written order. Each step must also satisfy the Puttaswamy test.
Tracking someone else’s phone is not permitted
No law gives a private person, whether a spouse, a partner, a relative or a private detective, the right to track another person’s phone or read their messages. The IT Act defines a “computer” broadly, as any electronic “high-speed data processing device or system which performs logical, arithmetic, and memory functions”, and a “computer resource” includes data and software. Whoever, without the owner’s permission, “accesses or secures access” to another person’s computer resource is liable to pay compensation (Section 43), and doing so “dishonestly or fraudulently” is punishable with imprisonment of up to three years, or a fine of up to ₹5 lakh, or both (Section 66). A man who “monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication” commits stalking under Section 78 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 354D IPC). This page therefore describes no method of tracking another person; if someone is missing or in danger, go to the police.
If your phone is lost or stolen: Sanchar Saathi and CEIR
The Department of Telecommunications’ Sanchar Saathi portal (sancharsaathi.gov.in, also an app) offers “Block Your Lost / Stolen Mobile Handset”, “Know Mobile Connections In Your Name”, “Know Genuineness Of Your Mobile Handset” and “Chakshu – Report Suspected Fraud Communication”. Blocking works through CEIR (ceir.gov.in), where a citizen can check the status of a request and “Unblock found mobile handset” once it is recovered; CEIR has a separate login “for Police and Department of Telecommunications (DoT) officials”. On 22 October 2026 the portal showed “Mobiles Blocked 62.22 lakh” and “Mobiles Traced 38.53 lakh”. The portal does not explain how tracing is done; the owner’s part is to block the handset and report the loss or theft to the police (see the firm’s guide to making a police complaint and FIR).
If you think someone is tracking you
Check “Know Mobile Connections In Your Name” for SIM cards taken in your name, report suspected fraud calls through Chakshu, and report spyware, hacking, stalking or misuse of your images to the police or on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in), which takes complaints about “mobile crimes, online and social media crimes” among others; “Any victim of financial cyber fraud can dial helpline number 1930”. Keep screenshots, URLs and chat records. The firm’s guide to cyber crimes and cyber laws explains the offences.
The right to privacy in international law
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, resolution 217 A): “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” The earlier version of this post quoted only its first half.
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 16 December 1966; in force from 23 March 1976): “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” According to the UN Treaty Collection, India acceded to the Covenant on 10 April 1979.
Is the right to privacy absolute? The test in practice
No, but it is not true, as the earlier version of this post said, that “Where there is threat to national interest, privacy is not taken into consideration”. Even then a restriction must rest on a law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate, with safeguards against abuse. The decided cases show the test at work:
| Measure | What the Court looked at | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Police domiciliary visits at night (Kharak Singh) | Personal liberty under Article 21 | Struck down |
| Telephone tapping (PUCL) | Procedure established by law | Allowed only under such a procedure |
| Mobile–Aadhaar linking circular (2018) | Legality: no law behind it | Quashed |
| Aadhaar use under “any contract” (Section 57) | Legality: a “contractual provision is not backed by a law” | Unconstitutional |
| Compulsory bank-account linking | Proportionality | Violates privacy |
| PAN–Aadhaar linking (Section 139AA, Income-tax Act) | Law, legitimate interest, proportionality | Upheld |
| Section 377 IPC for consenting adults (Navtej Singh Johar) | Fundamental rights, including Article 19(1)(a) | Unconstitutional to that extent |
The points the earlier version listed as “criticisms” of the judgment (necessity, a clear legal framework, oversight and accountability) are in substance the Court’s own requirements: a clear law, a genuine need, no more intrusion than necessary and safeguards against abuse. In the Aadhaar case, for example, the majority said that a judicial officer should be associated with decisions on disclosure in the interest of national security.
Remedies if your right to privacy is violated
Against the Government or a public authority. Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights, and Article 226 allows every High Court to issue writs “to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government”, for the enforcement of Part III rights “and for any other purpose”. Puttaswamy itself was a writ petition filed directly in the Supreme Court. See the firm’s guide to writ petitions.
Against a company that misuses your data. Raise it with the company first and keep a record. Today, Section 43A of the IT Act allows compensation for a body corporate’s negligence with sensitive personal data, and Section 72A provides a penalty of up to ₹25 lakh where a person providing services under a lawful contract discloses someone’s personal information without consent, or in breach of the contract, intending or knowing it likely to cause wrongful loss or gain. Once the eighteen-month stage of the DPDP Act begins, a Data Principal must first use the company’s grievance redressal (Section 13(3)) and may then complain to the Data Protection Board. Claims for compensation or penalty under Sections 43, 43A, 72 (disclosure of material obtained under powers given by the IT Act, a penalty of up to ₹5 lakh) and 72A are decided by the adjudicating officer appointed under Section 46 where the claim does not exceed ₹5 crore, and above that by the competent court.
Criminal offences.
- Section 66E IT Act: capturing, publishing or transmitting “the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent”: up to three years’ imprisonment, or a fine of up to ₹2 lakh, or both.
- Section 77 BNS (formerly Section 354C IPC), voyeurism: watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a private act, or disseminating it: one to three years and fine on first conviction, three to seven years on a later one; sharing images she agreed to have captured but not shared is also covered (Explanation 2).
- Section 78 BNS (formerly Section 354D IPC), stalking: including monitoring a woman’s internet, e-mail or electronic communication: up to three years and fine, up to five years on a later conviction.
- Section 79 BNS (formerly Section 509 IPC): among other acts, intruding “upon the privacy of such woman” with intent to insult her modesty: simple imprisonment of up to three years and fine.
- Section 66 IT Act: doing any of the acts in Section 43, such as unauthorised access to a device, “dishonestly or fraudulently”: up to three years’ imprisonment, or a fine of up to ₹5 lakh, or both.
A complaint can be made at the police station, where information about a cognizable offence is recorded under Section 173 BNSS (formerly Section 154 CrPC), or on cybercrime.gov.in. The firm’s article on deepfakes and Indian law covers image-based abuse in detail.
A civil claim for damages. As the 2017 judgment describes R. Rajagopal, the right to privacy affords “an action in tort for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy”. A person who publishes private matters without consent can therefore be sued for damages, subject to the exceptions in that case; if the publication also harms reputation, a suit for defamation, or a complaint for the offence of defamation under Section 356 BNS (formerly Sections 499 and 500 IPC), may also lie.
निजता का अधिकार (Right to Privacy) और अनुच्छेद 21 – हिंदी में
निजता का अधिकार (right to privacy) संविधान के अनुच्छेद 21 के अंतर्गत, प्राण और दैहिक स्वतंत्रता के अधिकार के अभिन्न अंग के रूप में, और भाग 3 (मूल अधिकार) की स्वतंत्रताओं के अंग के रूप में संरक्षित मूल अधिकार है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट की नौ न्यायाधीशों की पीठ ने 24 अगस्त 2017 को जस्टिस के.एस. पुट्टस्वामी (सेवानिवृत्त) बनाम भारत संघ (रिट याचिका (सिविल) संख्या 494/2012) में एकमत से यह घोषित किया। संविधान में निजता का कोई अलग अनुच्छेद नहीं है, और यह भाग 4 (Directive Principles of State Policy) में नहीं, बल्कि भाग 3 के मूल अधिकारों में आता है।
अनुच्छेद 21 का आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ है: “21. प्राण और दैहिक स्वतंत्रता का संरक्षण–किसी व्यक्ति को उसके प्राण या दैहिक स्वतंत्रता से विधि द्वारा स्थापित प्रक्रिया के अनुसार ही वंचित किया जाएगा, अन्यथा नहीं ।” इस निर्णय ने एम.पी. शर्मा (1954, आठ न्यायाधीश) और खड़क सिंह (1962, छह न्यायाधीश) के उन अंशों को उलट दिया जिनमें कहा गया था कि संविधान निजता की रक्षा नहीं करता। निजता के मूल में व्यक्तिगत अंतरंगता, पारिवारिक जीवन, विवाह, प्रजनन, घर और यौन अभिविन्यास आते हैं, साथ ही अपनी व्यक्तिगत जानकारी पर नियंत्रण और निजी निर्णय लेने की स्वतंत्रता भी।
निजता पूर्ण (absolute) अधिकार नहीं है। राज्य इस पर तभी रोक लगा सकता है जब तीन शर्तें पूरी हों: वैधता (कोई कानून हो), आवश्यकता (वैध राज्य उद्देश्य हो) और आनुपातिकता (उद्देश्य और साधनों के बीच तर्कसंगत संबंध हो); न्यायमूर्ति कौल ने दुरुपयोग के विरुद्ध प्रक्रियात्मक सुरक्षा की शर्त भी जोड़ी। 26 सितंबर 2018 के आधार निर्णय में बहुमत ने आधार अधिनियम को वैध माना, पर धारा 33(2), अनुबंध के आधार पर निजी संस्थाओं को उपयोग की अनुमति देने वाला धारा 57 का भाग, पाँच वर्ष तक प्रमाणीकरण डेटा रखने का नियम, बैंक खाते को आधार से अनिवार्य रूप से जोड़ना और मोबाइल नंबर जोड़ने वाला परिपत्र रद्द किया; पैन-आधार लिंक वैध माना गया।
“राइट टू प्राइवेसी एक्ट” नाम का कोई कानून नहीं है। व्यक्तिगत डेटा के लिए डिजिटल वैयक्तिक डेटा संरक्षण (DPDP) अधिनियम, 2023 (11 अगस्त 2023 को राष्ट्रपति की अनुमति) और DPDP नियम, 2025 (13 नवंबर 2025) हैं। परिभाषाएँ और भारतीय डेटा संरक्षण बोर्ड से जुड़े प्रावधान 13 नवंबर 2025 से लागू हैं; सहमति, सूचना, अपने डेटा की जानकारी, सुधार और मिटाने तथा शिकायत निवारण के अधिकार और ₹250 करोड़ तक के दंड अठारह महीने बाद, मई 2027 में लागू होंगे।
फ़ोन ट्रैकिंग: किसी निजी व्यक्ति को किसी और का फ़ोन ट्रैक करने या उसके संदेश पढ़ने का कोई कानूनी अधिकार नहीं है। मालिक की अनुमति के बिना किसी के कंप्यूटर संसाधन तक पहुँच पर IT अधिनियम की धारा 43 के अंतर्गत क्षतिपूर्ति और धारा 66 के अंतर्गत दंड हो सकता है, और किसी महिला के इंटरनेट या इलेक्ट्रॉनिक संचार की निगरानी BNS की धारा 78 (stalking) के अंतर्गत अपराध है। कॉल या संदेशों का इंटरसेप्शन (interception) केवल सरकार या विशेष रूप से प्राधिकृत अधिकारी के लिखित और कारण सहित आदेश से हो सकता है (दूरसंचार अधिनियम, 2023 की धारा 20(2); IT अधिनियम की धारा 69)। 2024 के इंटरसेप्शन नियमों के अनुसार ऐसा आदेश सामान्यतः केंद्रीय गृह सचिव या राज्य के गृह सचिव देते हैं, वह एक बार में अधिकतम साठ दिन और कुल मिलाकर एक सौ अस्सी दिन से अधिक लागू नहीं रह सकता, और हर आदेश समीक्षा समिति के सामने रखा जाता है। खोया या चोरी हुआ फ़ोन संचार साथी (sancharsaathi.gov.in) / CEIR पर ब्लॉक करें और पुलिस को सूचना दें।
उपाय: सरकार या किसी प्राधिकारी द्वारा उल्लंघन पर अनुच्छेद 226 (हाई कोर्ट) या अनुच्छेद 32 (सुप्रीम कोर्ट) के अंतर्गत रिट याचिका; निजी तस्वीरों के दुरुपयोग पर IT अधिनियम की धारा 66E और BNS की धारा 77 (voyeurism); ऑनलाइन अपराध की शिकायत cybercrime.gov.in पर, और वित्तीय साइबर धोखाधड़ी के लिए हेल्पलाइन 1930। अंतरराष्ट्रीय स्तर पर मानव अधिकारों की सार्वभौम घोषणा का अनुच्छेद 12 और ICCPR का अनुच्छेद 17 निजता की रक्षा करते हैं; भारत 10 अप्रैल 1979 को ICCPR में शामिल हुआ।
Frequently asked questions
The right to privacy is a fundamental right. On 24 August 2017 nine judges of the Supreme Court held in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India that it “is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution”. It covers personal intimacies, family life, the home, sexual orientation, personal information and personal choices. It is not absolute: a restriction must satisfy legality, a legitimate state aim and proportionality.
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012) is the Supreme Court judgment of 24 August 2017 in which nine judges unanimously declared privacy a fundamental right. The case began as a challenge by Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and others to the Aadhaar scheme. Because earlier Benches of eight and six judges (M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh) had said the Constitution does not protect privacy, the question went to nine judges, who overruled those decisions on this point. Aadhaar itself was decided on 26 September 2018.
The 2017 judgment decided only the privacy question. On 26 September 2018 a five-judge Bench, by majority (Justice Chandrachud dissenting), upheld the Aadhaar Act but struck down Section 33(2) in its form at the time, declared unconstitutional the part of Section 57 allowing use by “any body corporate or person” under a contract, struck down five-year archiving of authentication data, held compulsory bank-account linking disproportionate and quashed the mobile-linking circular; PAN–Aadhaar linking was upheld. The 2019 Amendment Act then made other authentication voluntary with informed consent, kept Section 7 for subsidies and benefits, and omitted Section 57.
The lead opinion gave no closed list, but the judges described three broad parts: privacy of the body and of private spaces (spatial control), informational privacy (control over information about oneself) and decisional autonomy or privacy of choice (intimate choices such as reproduction, and public choices such as faith or dress). At the core are personal intimacies, family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation, and a “right to be left alone”. Privacy is not lost in a public place, and the State must also take measures to protect it.
No. The lead opinion in Puttaswamy says that “privacy is not an absolute right”. A restriction is valid only if it meets the “three-fold requirement” of legality (“the existence of law”), need (“a legitimate state aim”) and proportionality (“a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them”); Justice Kaul added “procedural guarantees against abuse”. In the Aadhaar case, PAN–Aadhaar linking passed the test, while compulsory bank-account linking failed proportionality and the mobile-linking circular failed because no law backed it.
In order: A.K. Gopalan (1950); M.P. Sharma (1954, eight judges) and Kharak Singh (1962, six judges), both overruled on privacy in 2017, with Justice Subba Rao’s dissent in Kharak Singh approved; Gobind (1975); Maneka Gandhi (1978); Francis Coralie Mullin (1981); R. Rajagopal (1994, “right to be let alone”); PUCL ((1997) 1 SCC 301, telephone tapping); Selvi ((2010) 7 SCC 263, narco-analysis); Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (24 August 2017, nine judges); Common Cause (9 March 2018, advance medical directives); Navtej Singh Johar (6 September 2018); the Aadhaar judgment (26 September 2018); and Joseph Shine (27 September 2018).
The earlier version of this post described the Personal Data Protection Bill as pending legislation; that is out of date. India’s data protection law is now the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act No. 22 of 2023), which received assent on 11 August 2023, with the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 notified on 13 November 2025. The Act does not divide data into “critical, sensitive and personal”; it protects “personal data”, meaning any data about an identifiable individual, and provides for a Data Protection Board of India, not a “Data Protection Authority”. Consent, rights, duties and penalties begin in May 2027.
The lead opinion in Puttaswamy recognised informational privacy as “a facet of the right to privacy” and warned that dangers “can originate not only from the state but from non-state actors as well”. Protection now comes from the Constitution (against the State); the DPDP Act, 2023 (consent or a legitimate use, security safeguards, breach notices and erasure); the IT Act, 2000 (Section 66E on private images and Section 43A compensation until it is omitted); and interception laws that require written, reasoned Government orders.
Data breaches, surveillance, misuse of personal data by companies and the handling of children’s data. The law’s answers include the DPDP Act’s duty to take “reasonable security safeguards” and report breaches (Rule 7: detailed information to the Board within seventy-two hours), the ban on “tracking or behavioural monitoring of children or targeted advertising directed at children” (subject to notified exemptions), and written interception orders. Two points to note: most DPDP duties begin only in May 2027, and Section 17(2)(a), from May 2027, will let the Government exempt notified State agencies on security and public order grounds.
Share personal data only where needed. Use Sanchar Saathi to check the mobile connections taken in your name, block a lost or stolen handset and report suspected fraud calls through Chakshu. Keep evidence (screenshots, URLs and chat records) of any misuse and report cyber offences on cybercrime.gov.in or to the police. Once the DPDP Act’s rights commence in May 2027, you can ask for a summary of your data, correction or erasure, withdraw consent as easily as you gave it, and complain to the Data Protection Board after using the company’s grievance process.
Two roles. As a possible intruder, the State is bound by Article 21: any restriction needs a law, a legitimate aim and proportionality. And privacy has a positive side that “imposes an obligation on the state to take all necessary measures to protect the privacy of the individual”. Parliament has enacted the DPDP Act, 2023, and the Government has notified the DPDP Rules, 2025 and brought into force the provisions establishing the Data Protection Board of India. From May 2027, however, the Act will let the Government exempt notified State agencies (Section 17(2)(a)).
In M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) the Supreme Court said privacy was not a guaranteed right, though Justice Subba Rao dissented. Cooper (1970) rejected the view that fundamental rights are water-tight compartments, and Maneka Gandhi (1978) required a fair, just and reasonable procedure. Meanwhile smaller Benches recognised privacy in Gobind (1975), R. Rajagopal (1994) and PUCL ((1997) 1 SCC 301). Nine judges settled the question in Puttaswamy on 24 August 2017; later judgments applied it to Aadhaar, sexual orientation and adultery (2018). Parliament then enacted the DPDP Act, 2023, coming into force in stages up to May 2027.
Article 21: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The word “privacy” does not appear in it, but the Supreme Court held in Puttaswamy (24 August 2017) that privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 “and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III”. Elements of privacy also arise from other fundamental rights, such as Article 19(1)(a) (telephone tapping). It is a fundamental right, not a Directive Principle.
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, decided on 24 August 2017 by nine judges: Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justices Chelameswar, Bobde, Agrawal, Nariman, Sapre, Chandrachud, Kaul and Nazeer. The Order of the Court, signed by all nine, overruled M.P. Sharma and, to the extent relevant, Kharak Singh, and declared that the right to privacy is protected under Article 21 and Part III. This is the “right to privacy case” of 2017.
The searched phrase is a paraphrase. The Order of the Court says: “The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.” The word “inherent” comes from Justice Kaul: “Let the right of privacy, an inherent right, be unequivocally a fundamental right embedded in part-III of the Constitution of India”.
The petitioners were “Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), and Anr.”, as named on the title page of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012; the respondents were the Union of India and others. The petition, heard with several other cases, challenged the Aadhaar scheme, and the privacy question arose because the collection of demographic and biometric data was said to violate the right to privacy. The same title appears on the 2017 privacy judgment and the 2018 Aadhaar judgment, often called Puttaswamy I and II.
No statute is called the “Right to Privacy Act”. The right comes from Article 21 as interpreted in Puttaswamy (2017). The main statute on personal data is the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (Act No. 22 of 2023, assented to on 11 August 2023), with the DPDP Rules, 2025 (G.S.R. 846(E), 13 November 2025). Other laws also protect privacy: the IT Act, 2000 (Sections 43, 43A, 66, 66E, 69 and 72A), the Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Section 20 on interception) and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 77 and 78).
In three stages under notification G.S.R. 843(E) of 13 November 2025. Since 13 November 2025: definitions, the provisions on the Data Protection Board, Sections 35 and 38 to 43 and Section 44(1) and (3) (including the RTI amendment), with Rules 1, 2 and 17 to 21. One year later (November 2026): Consent Managers. Eighteen months later (May 2027): consent and notice, the duties of Data Fiduciaries, the rights of Data Principals, complaints, penalties, the Government’s powers under Sections 36 and 37, and the omission of Section 43A of the IT Act. The notifications state periods, not calendar dates.
As a “Data Principal” you will have the right to obtain a summary of your personal data and its processing, and the identities of others with whom it was shared (Section 11); to correction, completion, updating and erasure (Section 12); to readily available grievance redressal (Section 13); and to nominate someone to act on your death or incapacity (Section 14). You can withdraw consent as easily as you gave it (Section 6(4)). These provisions begin in May 2027, eighteen months from 13 November 2025.
Only through the procedures the law provides. Interception or disclosure of calls and messages needs a written, reasoned order of the Central or a State Government or a specially authorised officer, on grounds such as public safety or security of the State (Section 20(2), Telecommunications Act, 2023). Under the 2024 Interception Rules the order is normally made by the Union or State Home Secretary and cannot last beyond 180 days. Monitoring data on a computer resource needs an order under Section 69 of the IT Act, normally by the Union or State Home Secretary. In a criminal case, a court or the officer in charge of a police station can require production of communication devices (Section 94 BNSS, formerly Section 91 CrPC).
No law gives a private person the right to track another person’s phone, read their messages or install monitoring software. Accessing another person’s computer resource without the owner’s permission makes a person liable to pay compensation (Section 43, IT Act), and doing it dishonestly or fraudulently is punishable with up to three years’ imprisonment, or a fine of up to ₹5 lakh, or both (Section 66). A man who monitors a woman’s use of the internet, e-mail or other electronic communication commits stalking under Section 78 BNS. If someone is missing, go to the police.
Use the Department of Telecommunications’ Sanchar Saathi portal (sancharsaathi.gov.in) or its app. Its service “Block Your Lost / Stolen Mobile Handset” works through CEIR (ceir.gov.in), where you can also check the status of your request and “Unblock found mobile handset” once it is recovered. CEIR has a separate login for police and DoT officials; on 22 October 2026 the portal showed 62.22 lakh mobiles blocked and 38.53 lakh traced. The portal does not explain how tracing is done; your part is to block the handset and report the loss or theft to the police.
Only under a law and its procedure. In PUCL v. Union of India ((1997) 1 SCC 301) the Supreme Court held that “Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.” Today the power lies in Section 20(2) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 (and Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, not yet repealed): a written, reasoned order of the Government or an authorised officer. Under the 2024 Interception Rules an order lasts up to sixty days at a time, never beyond 180 days, and goes to a review committee. No law authorises a private person to tap another’s phone.
It depends on who violated it. Against the Government or a public authority, file a writ petition in the High Court (Article 226) or the Supreme Court (Article 32). For intimate images, voyeurism, stalking or hacking, complain to the police or on cybercrime.gov.in (Sections 66E and 66 IT Act, Sections 77 to 79 BNS). For unauthorised access to a device, or a company’s negligence with sensitive personal data, compensation under Section 43 or 43A IT Act is claimed before the adjudicating officer (claims up to ₹5 crore). From May 2027, after using the company’s grievance process, a complaint can go to the Data Protection Board. A civil suit for damages is also possible.
Yes. Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, in force since 13 November 2025, substituted clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which now reads: “(j) information which relates to personal information;”. Anyone seeking information about another person should read Section 8(1) in this amended form. The firm’s guide to the Right to Information Act explains how applications are made and decided.
निजता का अधिकार (right to privacy) संविधान के अनुच्छेद 21 के अंतर्गत संरक्षित मूल अधिकार है। अनुच्छेद 21 का आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ है: “किसी व्यक्ति को उसके प्राण या दैहिक स्वतंत्रता से विधि द्वारा स्थापित प्रक्रिया के अनुसार ही वंचित किया जाएगा, अन्यथा नहीं ।” नौ न्यायाधीशों की पीठ ने 24 अगस्त 2017 को पुट्टस्वामी मामले में घोषित किया कि यह अधिकार अनुच्छेद 21 के अंतर्गत प्राण और दैहिक स्वतंत्रता के अधिकार के अभिन्न अंग के रूप में और भाग 3 की स्वतंत्रताओं के अंग के रूप में संरक्षित है।
Conclusion
The right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21 and Part III of the Constitution, settled by nine judges in Puttaswamy on 24 August 2017. They overruled the contrary statements in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh and approved the later decisions, such as Rajagopal and PUCL, that had recognised privacy. Privacy protects the body and private spaces, personal information and intimate choices, including sexual orientation, and it does not end in a public place. It is not absolute, but every restriction must rest on a law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate, with safeguards against abuse; the Aadhaar judgment of 26 September 2018 showed the test at work.
Outside the courts, privacy increasingly depends on statute. The DPDP Act, 2023 and its Rules will give Data Principals enforceable rights and expose Data Fiduciaries to penalties of up to ₹250 crore, but most of those provisions, including the power to exempt notified State agencies, begin only in May 2027. Until then the IT Act, the BNS and the telecom laws carry most of the load, and no law permits private tracking of another person’s phone.
Sources used for this post: the Constitution of India, Articles 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 32 and 226 (Legislative Department, English edition of 2026, and Hindi edition as on 1 May 2024 for Article 21); the Supreme Court’s own copies of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 (24 August 2017, nine judges, including its descriptions of the earlier cases cited above, among them Selvi, (2010) 7 SCC 263, and 26 September 2018, five judges), Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (6 September 2018), Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 September 2018) and the order of 24 January 2023 in M.A. No. 1699 of 2019 in Common Cause v. Union of India; the Aadhaar and Other Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (as on 19 November 2025), the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as on 27 June 2025), the Telecommunications Act, 2023 (as on 24 August 2026), the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (as on 6 October 2025), all on India Code; notifications G.S.R. 843(E) and G.S.R. 845(E) of 13 November 2025 as published in the Gazette of India, the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 (G.S.R. 846(E), MeitY’s copy of the Gazette, with the corrigendum G.S.R. 892(E) of 10 December 2025) and the PIB backgrounder of 17 November 2025; the IT Interception Rules, 2009 (G.S.R. 780(E)) and the Telecommunications (Procedures and Safeguards for Lawful Interception of Messages) Rules, 2024 (G.S.R. 754(E), as amended by G.S.R. 625(E)) on India Code; the Sanchar Saathi, CEIR and National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal websites (22 October 2026); and the UN texts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, with the UN Treaty Collection’s status page.


