Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lists the grounds on which a court can dissolve a Hindu marriage by a decree of divorce when one spouse asks for it and the other does not agree. Under Section 13(1), either the husband or the wife can seek divorce if the other spouse has, after the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with someone else (clause (i)), treated the petitioner with cruelty (clause (ia)), deserted the petitioner for at least two continuous years just before the petition (clause (ib)), ceased to be a Hindu by conversion (clause (ii)), been incurably of unsound mind or suffered from mental disorder of a serious degree (clause (iii)), suffered from venereal disease in a communicable form (clause (v)), renounced the world by entering a religious order (clause (vi)), or not been heard of as alive for seven years or more (clause (vii)). Clause (iv), leprosy, was omitted in 2019.
Section 13(1A) adds a ground for either spouse when, for one year or more after a decree for judicial separation or for restitution of conjugal rights, the couple have not resumed living together. Section 13(2) gives a wife four further grounds of her own. Section 13A lets the court grant judicial separation instead of divorce, and Section 13B (divorce by mutual consent) is a separate route. The grounds must be proved in court, a petition cannot normally be filed within one year of the marriage (Section 14), and Section 23 tells the court when it must refuse relief even if a ground is proved.
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act at a glance
- Who can file: “either the husband or the wife”, for a marriage solemnized before or after the Act came into force (Section 13(1)).
- Grounds for either spouse: clauses (i), (ia), (ib), (ii), (iii), (v), (vi) and (vii) of Section 13(1). Leprosy, clause (iv), was omitted by Act 6 of 2019 with effect from 1 March 2019.
- Section 13(1A): no resumption of cohabitation for one year or more after a judicial separation decree, or no restitution of conjugal rights for one year or more after a restitution decree. Either spouse may use it.
- Section 13(2), wife only: a second marriage of the husband before the Act came into force (1955), the other wife being alive; the husband’s guilt of rape, sodomy or bestiality; a maintenance decree or order followed by one year without cohabitation; or a marriage before she turned 15, repudiated before 18.
- Time bar: no divorce petition until one year has passed since the marriage, unless the court gives leave for “exceptional hardship” or “exceptional depravity” (Section 14). The Limitation Act does not apply (Section 29(3), Limitation Act, 1963).
- Bars to relief: the court decrees divorce only if the petitioner is not taking advantage of his or her own wrong, has not condoned the adultery or cruelty, is not in collusion, and has not caused unnecessary or improper delay (Section 23(1)).
- Alternative relief: the court may pass a decree for judicial separation instead of divorce, except on clauses (ii), (vi) and (vii) (Section 13A).
- Where to file in Delhi: the Family Court for the place of marriage, the respondent’s residence, the last joint residence, the wife’s residence where she is the petitioner, or the petitioner’s residence where the respondent lives outside the territories to which the Act extends or has not been heard of for seven years (Section 19; Sections 7 and 8, Family Courts Act, 1984).
- Irretrievable breakdown: not a ground in Section 13, but the Supreme Court can dissolve such a marriage under Article 142(1) of the Constitution (Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, Constitution Bench, 1 May 2023).
Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Hindu Marriage Act is quoted from its English text on India Code (as on 15 April 2026) and its official Hindi text on India Code; the Family Courts Act, 1984 from India Code; the Limitation Act, 1963 (as on 30 August 2026), the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (as on 6 October 2025) from India Code; and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.
What Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act says
Section 13 is the main divorce provision of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act 25 of 1955). It begins: “Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party—” and then lists the grounds. A divorce under Section 13 is therefore a contested case in which one spouse (the petitioner) asks the court for a decree and must prove a ground against the other (the respondent).
Sub-section (1) lists the grounds open to either spouse, sub-section (1A) a ground based on an earlier decree, and sub-section (2) the wife’s extra grounds; an Explanation defines “desertion”. Sections 13A and 13B, inserted in 1976, deal with alternative relief and mutual-consent divorce.
The grounds are a closed list. Section 23(1) says the court shall decree relief only if satisfied that a ground exists and the other conditions are met, “but not otherwise”. Simple incompatibility is not a ground, though the same facts may sometimes amount to cruelty, as explained below. (Section 29(2) separately saves any right to divorce “recognised by custom or conferred by any special enactment”.)
The same grounds support a petition for judicial separation (Section 10(1)).
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sections 13, 13A, 14 and 23 (India Code, as on 15 April 2026).
Section 13(1)(i): adultery – voluntary sexual intercourse outside the marriage
Clause (i) applies where the other spouse “has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse”. Three points follow from the words. The act must be after the marriage, so conduct before the wedding (including during an engagement) is not covered. It must be voluntary. And the text speaks of having “had voluntary sexual intercourse”; it sets no minimum number of acts or period. (Clauses (i), (ia) and (ib) in their present form were substituted by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 27 May 1976.)
Adultery is now only a civil ground: Section 497 IPC (adultery) has no corresponding section in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The petitioner must not have been “accessory to or connived at or condoned” the act (Section 23(1)(b)), and the respondent may counter-claim on the petitioner’s own adultery (Section 23A).
Section 13(1)(ia): cruelty
Clause (ia) allows divorce where the other spouse “has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty”. It is the ground most often searched for (“section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act”), and the Act does not define cruelty. Clause (ia) in its present form comes from the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. Dastane (1975) arose under the earlier law, where the husband’s claim on cruelty was for judicial separation under Section 10(1)(b), which (as quoted in Dastane) required cruelty such “as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party”; clause (ia) contains no such words.
In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (21 March 2006) the Supreme Court quoted Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi (1988): “The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of fact and degree.” It also quoted V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (1994): “mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together.”
Mental cruelty: the Samar Ghosh illustrations
In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (26 March 2007), a three-judge bench said that “No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance” and set out fourteen “instances of human behaviour which may be relevant”, stressing that they are “only illustrative and not exhaustive”. The couple in that case had married under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, but the illustrations describe mental cruelty in marriage in general terms. In summary:
| Samar Ghosh illustration | What it says (summary, with the Court’s words in quotes) |
|---|---|
| (i), (ii) | On the whole married life, acute mental pain, or a situation where the wronged party “cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct”. |
| (iii) to (vii) | “Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty”, but frequent rudeness, indifference and neglect may make married life “absolutely intolerable”; a sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment; sustained unjustifiable conduct affecting health; studied neglect. |
| (viii) to (x) | Jealousy, possessiveness and “trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life” are not enough; “a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty”. |
| (xi) to (xiii) | Sterilisation or abortion without medical reason and without the other’s consent or knowledge; “Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason”; “Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage”. |
| (xiv) | After long continuous separation the bond may be beyond repair: “The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie.” |
Repeated criminal cases and long separation
In Rakesh Raman v. Kavita (26 April 2023), a divorce petition that began in the court of the Additional District Judge (North), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, the husband and wife had lived apart for 25 years and the wife’s many criminal cases against him had ended in discharge or acquittal. The Supreme Court recorded that Naveen Kohli had “held that repeatedly filing of criminal cases by one party against the other in a matrimonial matter would amount to cruelty and the same was reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa”.
The Court said: “Irretrievable breakdown of a marriage may not be a ground for dissolution of marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act, but cruelty is”, and “A marriage which has broken down irretrievably, in our opinion spells cruelty to both the parties”. It granted divorce under Section 13(1)(ia), effective on the husband depositing Rs. 30 lakh as permanent alimony.
Cruelty that has been condoned
Under Section 23(1)(b) the petitioner must not have “in any manner condoned the cruelty”. In N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (19 March 1975) the Supreme Court said “Condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of offending spouse to the same position as he or she occupied before the offence was committed”; the court must consider it “even in undefended cases”, and condoned cruelty can revive on later misconduct. There the cruelty was proved but condoned, so relief was refused.
Section 13(1)(ib): desertion for two years
Clause (ib) applies where the other spouse “has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition”. The Explanation to sub-section (1) defines desertion as “the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage”.
The Supreme Court explained the elements in Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey (8 January 2002), following its earlier decisions in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati (1957) and Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena (1964). “Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct”. It “means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent, and without reasonable cause”.
- On the deserting spouse’s side: “(1) the factum of separation and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi)”.
- On the deserted spouse’s side: “(1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid”.
Leaving “in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation” is not desertion (Bipinchandra, as recorded in Savitri Pandey). The two years must be continuous and end immediately before the petition. The petitioner must prove the elements, and the inference is drawn from “conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation”. In Savitri Pandey the wife’s petition failed: there was no evidence that the husband intended to desert her, and she herself had left the matrimonial home.
Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) together
A petition “under section 13(1)(ia)(ib)” relies on both cruelty and desertion. Each ground must be pleaded with its facts (Section 20(1)) and proved; the court may decree divorce if “any of the grounds for granting relief exists” (Section 23(1)(a)), and the respondent may counter-claim on the petitioner’s own cruelty or desertion (Section 23A).
Section 13(1)(ii): conversion to another religion
Clause (ii) applies where the other spouse “has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion”. The test is that the spouse is no longer a Hindu because of conversion; merely showing interest in another faith is not the same. Conversion does not end the marriage automatically: the other spouse must petition, and only that spouse (not the one who converted) can rely on this clause, because the ground is about “the other party”. The reconciliation duty in Section 23(2) does not apply to this ground, and Section 13A does not allow judicial separation to be substituted for divorce on it.
Section 13(1)(iii): unsoundness of mind and mental disorder
Clause (iii) has two limbs. The other spouse either “has been incurably of unsound mind”, or “has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent”. Incurability is needed only for the first limb.
The Explanation says “mental disorder” means “mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia”, and “psychopathic disorder” means “a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment”.
A diagnosis alone is not enough. In Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta (12 September 1988) the Supreme Court said: “All mental abnormalities are not recognised as grounds for grant of Decree”; “The burden of proof of the existence of the requisite degree of mental disorder is on the spouse basing the claim on that state of facts”; and “the mere branding of a person as schizophrenic will not suffice. For purposes of Section 13(1)(iii) ‘schizophrenia’ is what Schizophrenia does.” The husband’s appeal was dismissed.
In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (21 March 2006), by contrast, the wife succeeded under clauses (i-a) and (iii): doctors had deposed and produced the husband’s medical record, and she “had proved beyond doubt that the respondent suffered from mental disorder and that the appellant suffered cruelty”. A Family Court may take a medical expert’s help (Section 12, Family Courts Act, 1984).
Section 13(1)(iv): leprosy – no longer a ground
Leprosy used to be a ground for divorce under clause (iv). India Code’s text of Section 13 records: “Cl. (iv) omitted by Act 6 of 2019, s. 5 (w.e.f. 1-3-2019)”. Act 6 of 2019 is the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019; India Code lists that amending Act as repealed by Act 37 of 2023, but the omission it made remains in the current text of Section 13. Since 1 March 2019 a spouse’s leprosy, whether contracted before or after the marriage, is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act.
Section 13(1)(v), (vi) and (vii): venereal disease, renunciation and seven years’ absence
Venereal disease (clause (v)). The other spouse “has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form”. The disease must be in a communicable form when relied on; the clause as it now stands sets no minimum period. India Code notes that “Certain words” were omitted from this clause by the 1976 amendment. Proof is normally medical, and the Family Court may obtain the help of a medical expert (Section 12, Family Courts Act).
Renunciation (clause (vi)). The other spouse “has renounced the world by entering any religious order”. The ground is formal entry into a religious order, not simply a religious lifestyle. Section 13A does not allow judicial separation in place of divorce on this ground.
Not heard of for seven years (clause (vii)). The other spouse “has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive”. In such a case the petition may be filed where the petitioner lives (Section 19(iv)). Clauses (viii) and (ix) of the original Act were omitted in 1964 by the same amending Act (Act 44 of 1964) that inserted sub-section (1A).
Section 13(1A): divorce after a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights
Sub-section (1A), inserted in 1964, lets either party seek divorce on the ground “(i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.” The period was reduced from two years to one year by the 1976 amendment.
Either spouse can use this ground. In Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar (19 August 1977), the wife had obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 and later sought divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii). The husband said she had ignored his letters. The Supreme Court held that to be a “wrong” under Section 23(1)(a) “the conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief”, and upheld the divorce. It also approved Delhi High Court decisions holding that the spouse against whom such a decree was passed is not, for that reason alone, barred from seeking divorce under Section 13(1A).
Section 23 still applies. In Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda (20 March 2001) a husband against whom judicial separation had been decreed for adultery never paid the ordered maintenance, kept living with the other woman, and sought divorce under Section 13(1A)(i). Relief was refused: “the petitioner does not have a vested right for getting the relief of a decree of divorce against the other party merely on showing that the ground … exists”, and “Living in adultery on the part of the husband in this case is a continuing matrimonial offence.”
Section 13(2): the wife’s additional grounds
Sub-section (2) says “A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce” on four further grounds. These are open only to the wife.
| Clause | Ground (words of the Act) | Condition |
|---|---|---|
| 13(2)(i) | In a marriage before the Act came into force, “the husband had married again before such commencement” or another wife married before then “was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner” | “the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition” |
| 13(2)(ii) | The husband “has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality” | After the marriage |
| 13(2)(iii) | A decree under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, or an order under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), “has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart” | “cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards” since the decree or order |
| 13(2)(iv) | “her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years” | Applies to marriages before or after the 1976 amendment (Explanation) |
Clause (iii) still names Section 125 CrPC; the corresponding provision now is Section 144 BNSS. See also the maintenance case FAQs.
Section 13A: judicial separation instead of divorce
Section 13A (“Alternate relief in divorce proceedings”) reads: “In any proceeding under this Act, on a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as the petition is founded on the grounds mentioned in clauses (ii), (vi) and (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 13, the court may, if it considers it just so to do having regard to the circumstances of the case, pass instead a decree for judicial separation.”
The court cannot substitute judicial separation where the ground is conversion, renunciation or seven years’ absence. After a judicial separation decree, “it shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent” (Section 10(2)); if cohabitation does not resume for a year, either spouse may seek divorce under Section 13(1A)(i).
Section 13B: divorce by mutual consent (in brief)
Section 13B is a different route, used when both spouses agree. A joint petition may be presented to the district court “on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved”. The second motion is made “not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition” and “not later than eighteen months after the said date”. As recorded by the Constitution Bench in Shilpa Sailesh (2023), the Supreme Court held in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) that the six-month cooling-off period can be waived in exceptional cases. For the full procedure, see the guide to mutual consent divorce.
Is irretrievable breakdown of marriage a ground under Section 13?
No. In Naveen Kohli (2006) the Supreme Court said: “Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955”, and recommended “the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce”. Section 13 has not been amended to add it.
Two later developments matter. First, a Constitution Bench in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (1 May 2023: Kaul, Khanna, Oka, Vikram Nath and Maheshwari JJ.) held that the Supreme Court, “in exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, has the discretion to dissolve the marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown”, even where the other spouse opposes. The Court stressed that this “is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with great care and caution”, and listed factors such as how long the parties lived together, when they last did so, the allegations and litigation between them, attempts at settlement, children and alimony; “anything above six years or more” of separation “will be a relevant factor”. It also held that parties cannot file a writ petition under Article 32 or Article 226 asking for divorce on this ground.
Second, Rakesh Raman (2023) treated a long-dead marriage with years of litigation as cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia). In the Family Court a petitioner must still prove a statutory ground; the Article 142 power is the Supreme Court’s own.
Bars and conditions: Sections 14 and 23
Even when a ground exists, the Act puts conditions on relief. The main ones:
| Provision | Rule |
|---|---|
| Section 14(1) | No court may entertain a divorce petition “unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage”. The court may allow earlier filing, on an application under High Court rules, for “exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent”; it must consider the children’s interests and the chance of reconciliation (Section 14(2)). |
| Section 23(1)(a) | The petitioner must not be “in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief”. |
| Section 23(1)(b) | For adultery: the petitioner has not been “accessory to or connived at or condoned” it. For cruelty: the petitioner “has not in any manner condoned the cruelty”. |
| Section 23(1)(c) | The petition “is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent”. |
| Section 23(1)(d) | “there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding”. |
| Section 23(1)(e) | “there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted”. |
| Section 23(2) and (3) | The court must first try to bring about reconciliation where possible (not for clauses (ii) to (vii) of Section 13(1)), and may adjourn for up to fifteen days and refer the matter to a person named by the parties or the court. |
There is no limitation period as such. Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 says: “Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.” Delay is therefore judged under Section 23(1)(d), not by a fixed number of years.
How a Section 13 divorce petition is filed in Delhi
Which court
Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act says every petition “shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction” (i) the marriage was solemnized, (ii) the respondent resides at the time of the petition, (iii) the parties last resided together, (iiia) the wife resides on the date of the petition, where she is the petitioner, or (iv) the petitioner resides, where the respondent lives outside the territories to which the Act extends or has not been heard of as alive for seven years or more.
Where a Family Court has been set up, it takes over this work. Under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, a Family Court exercises the district court’s jurisdiction in “a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage … or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage”, as well as maintenance, property of the spouses and custody; and under Section 8, once a Family Court is established for an area, the district court there no longer exercises that jurisdiction. Delhi has Family Courts in its district court complexes: for example, a Delhi High Court posting order of January 2023 refers to the “Principal Judge Family Courts, Central, Tis Hazari” and the “Principal Judge (HQs), Family Courts, South West, Dwarka”. The firm’s Find Your Court and District tool shows the Delhi district for a police station area.
What the petition must contain
The petition must “state as distinctly as the nature of the case permits the facts on which the claim to relief is founded”, state “that there is no collusion”, and be verified like a plaint (Section 20). The Code of Civil Procedure applies as far as may be (Section 21; Section 10, Family Courts Act).
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Sections 13A, 14, 15, 19 to 24, 26) and the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Sections 9 to 16, 19), official texts on India Code.
What has to be proved, and how
The petitioner must prove the ground. Dastane (1975) held that the word “satisfied” in Section 23 “must mean “satisfied on a preponderance of probabilities” and not “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt””. Section 2(1)(j) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (formerly Section 3 of the Evidence Act) treats a fact as proved when the court “either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought … to act upon the supposition that it exists”.
A Family Court may receive any material that “may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute”, even if not admissible under the Evidence Act (Section 14), take formal evidence on affidavit (Section 16) and use a medical or family-welfare expert (Section 12). No document is inadmissible for want of stamp or registration (Section 21C, Hindu Marriage Act). The marital-communications privilege does not apply “in suits between married persons” (Section 128 BSA, formerly Section 122 of the Evidence Act).
Lawyers, privacy and interim relief
No party “shall be entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner” in a Family Court, though the court may “seek the assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae” (Section 13, Family Courts Act). Proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act are “conducted in camera” (Section 22); in a Family Court they must also be held in camera if either party so desires (Section 11, Family Courts Act). A spouse without sufficient income may claim maintenance and costs during the case, to be decided “as far as possible” within sixty days of notice (Section 24); the court may also order custody and maintenance of children (Section 26) and permanent alimony (Section 25).
How long it takes, appeal and remarriage
The Act sets a target, not a deadline: under Section 21B, “endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of service of notice of the petition on the respondent”, with day-to-day hearing so far as practicable, and an appeal should be heard within three months. No official figure for actual disposal times in Delhi was found.
An appeal from a Family Court lies “to the High Court both on facts and on law” and, under Section 19(3) of the Family Courts Act, “shall be preferred within a period of thirty days”. Section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act gives “a period of ninety days” (substituted for thirty days in 2003, after Savitri Pandey (2002) called thirty days inadequate). The two provisions state different periods. The safe course for a party who wants to appeal is to file within thirty days, and for a party who wants to remarry, to wait until ninety days from the decree have passed and confirm that no appeal has been filed. No appeal lies from a Family Court decree passed “with the consent of the parties” (Section 19(2)).
Either party may marry again once “there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has been presented but has been dismissed” (Section 15). The court gives each party a free copy of the divorce decree (Section 23(4)).
Advantages and disadvantages of a Section 13 divorce (contested v. mutual consent)
People searching “धारा 13 के फायदे और नुकसान” usually want to know how a contested divorce under Section 13 compares with divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B. The differences in the Act are factual, and which route fits depends on the facts of each case:
| Point | Section 13 (contested) | Section 13B (mutual consent) |
|---|---|---|
| Consent of the other spouse | Not needed | Both must join and both must make the second motion |
| What must be shown | A statutory ground, proved by evidence; the bars in Section 23(1) must not apply | One year or more of living separately, inability to live together, mutual agreement; consent not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence (Section 23(1)(bb)) |
| Time conditions | One year from marriage (Section 14); two years for desertion; one year after a decree for Section 13(1A) | One year from marriage (Section 14) and one year of separation; second motion after six and before eighteen months (waivable in exceptional cases) |
| Allegations | Detailed facts of the ground must be pleaded and proved (Section 20) | No ground to prove |
| Outcome | Divorce, or judicial separation instead (Section 13A), or dismissal | Decree if the court is satisfied the averments are true |
| Appeal | Appeal to the High Court (Section 19, Family Courts Act) | No appeal from a consent decree of a Family Court (Section 19(2)) |
In short, Section 13 does not depend on the other spouse’s consent, but the petitioner must prove a ground, meet any defence or counter-claim, and clear Sections 14 and 23. This describes the law; it is not advice on which route to choose.
Section 13 judgments: Supreme Court cases at a glance
| Case | Ground or provision | What the Court held |
|---|---|---|
| N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, 19 March 1975 | Cruelty; Section 23 | Civil standard of proof (preponderance of probabilities); condonation means forgiveness and restoration; condoned cruelty can revive |
| Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, 19 August 1977 | Section 13(1A)(ii); Section 23(1)(a) | Mere refusal of reunion is not a “wrong” barring divorce |
| Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta, 12 September 1988 | Section 13(1)(iii) | The degree of mental disorder must be proved; “‘schizophrenia’ is what Schizophrenia does” |
| Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda, 20 March 2001 | Section 13(1A)(i); Section 23(1)(a) | Husband living in adultery and not paying maintenance refused divorce |
| Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, 8 January 2002 | Section 13(1)(ib) | Desertion needs separation plus intention to end cohabitation permanently, without consent or reasonable cause |
| Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, 21 March 2006 | Section 13(1)(ia) | Mental cruelty; marriage dissolved; recommendation to add irretrievable breakdown |
| Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, 21 March 2006 | Section 13(1)(ia) and (iii) | Wife granted divorce on proof of mental disorder and cruelty |
| Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, 26 March 2007 | Mental cruelty (Special Marriage Act case) | Fourteen illustrations of mental cruelty |
| Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, 26 April 2023 | Section 13(1)(ia) | Irretrievably broken marriage with 25 years’ separation and repeated cases is cruelty to both |
| Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 1 May 2023 (Constitution Bench) | Article 142(1); Section 13B | Supreme Court may dissolve a marriage for irretrievable breakdown and dispense with the second-motion procedure |
हिंदू विवाह अधिनियम की धारा 13 – तलाक के आधार हिंदी में (Summary in Hindi)
हिन्दू विवाह अधिनियम, 1955 के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में धारा 13 का शीर्षक “विवाह-विच्छेद” है। इसके अनुसार कोई भी विवाह, पति अथवा पत्नी द्वारा उपस्थापित अर्जी पर, विवाह-विच्छेद की डिक्री द्वारा विघटित किया जा सकता है। अर्जी देने वाले को अधिनियम “अर्जीदार” और दूसरे पक्ष को “प्रत्यर्थी” कहता है। धारा 13 के तलाक में दूसरे पक्ष की सहमति ज़रूरी नहीं है, पर अर्जीदार को अदालत में आधार साबित करना होता है।
धारा 13(1) – पति या पत्नी दोनों के लिए। आधार यह है कि: (i) दूसरे पक्षकार ने विवाह के पश्चात् पति या पत्नी से भिन्न किसी व्यक्ति के साथ “स्वेच्छया मैथुन” किया है; (iक) दूसरे पक्षकार ने अर्जीदार के साथ “क्रूरता का व्यवहार” किया है; (iख) दूसरे पक्षकार ने अर्जी से ठीक पहले कम से कम दो वर्ष की निरन्तर कालावधि तक अर्जीदार को “अभित्यक्त” रखा है; (ii) दूसरा पक्षकार “अन्य धर्म में संपरवर्तित” होकर हिन्दू नहीं रहा; (iii) दूसरा पक्षकार असाध्य रूप से “विकृत-चित्त” रहा है, या इस हद तक “मानसिक विकार” से पीड़ित है कि साथ रहने की युक्तियुक्त आशा नहीं की जा सकती; (v) दूसरा पक्षकार “संचारी रूप से रतिज रोग” से पीड़ित है; (vi) दूसरा पक्षकार धार्मिक पंथ के अनुसार “प्रव्रज्या” ग्रहण कर चुका है; (vii) सात वर्ष या अधिक से दूसरे पक्षकार के जीवित होने की कोई खबर नहीं है। खण्ड (iv) (कुष्ठ रोग) 2019 के अधिनियम सं० 6 द्वारा हटाया गया; 1 मार्च 2019 से यह आधार नहीं है।
क्रूरता और अभित्यजन। अधिनियम में क्रूरता की परिभाषा नहीं है। समर घोष (2007) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने मानसिक क्रूरता के उदाहरण दिए – लंबे समय तक अपमानजनक व्यवहार, बिना कारण लंबे समय तक शारीरिक संबंध से इनकार, विवाह के बाद एकतरफा संतान न करने का निर्णय – पर साधारण झगड़े या इक्की-दुक्की घटनाएँ क्रूरता नहीं हैं। राकेश रमन (2023) में, जो तीस हज़ारी कोर्ट, दिल्ली से शुरू हुआ मामला था, 25 वर्ष से अलग रह रहे दंपति के पूरी तरह टूटे विवाह को दोनों के प्रति क्रूरता माना गया। स्पष्टीकरण के अनुसार “अभित्यजन” का अर्थ है युक्तियुक्त कारण के बिना और अर्जीदार की सम्मति के बिना या उसकी इच्छा के विरुद्ध छोड़ देना, जिसमें जानबूझकर अर्जीदार की उपेक्षा भी शामिल है। सावित्री पांडे (2002) के अनुसार अलग रहना और साथ रहना हमेशा के लिए समाप्त करने का इरादा, दोनों साबित करने होते हैं।
धारा 13(1क) और 13(2)। न्यायिक पृथक्करण की डिक्री के बाद एक वर्ष या अधिक तक सहवास का पुनरारंभ न होना, या दाम्पत्याधिकारों के प्रत्यास्थापन की डिक्री के बाद एक वर्ष या अधिक तक प्रत्यास्थापन न होना – इस आधार पर कोई भी पक्ष अर्जी दे सकता है। धारा 13(2) केवल पत्नी को चार अतिरिक्त आधार देती है: अधिनियम के प्रारंभ (1955) से पहले पति का दूसरा विवाह, यदि दूसरी पत्नी अर्जी के समय जीवित हो; विवाह के बाद पति का “बलात्संग, गुदामैथुन या पशुगमन” का दोषी होना; भरण-पोषण की डिक्री या आदेश (दण्ड प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा 125, अब भारतीय नागरिक सुरक्षा संहिता की धारा 144) के बाद एक वर्ष तक सहवास न होना; और पन्द्रह वर्ष से पहले हुए विवाह का अठारह वर्ष से पहले “निराकरण”।
धारा 13क, 13ख और 14। धारा 13क के अनुसार अदालत तलाक के बजाय न्यायिक पृथक्करण की डिक्री दे सकती है (धर्म-परिवर्तन, प्रव्रज्या और सात वर्ष से लापता होने के आधारों को छोड़कर)। धारा 13ख “पारस्परिक सम्मति से विवाह-विच्छेद” का अलग रास्ता है। धारा 14 के अनुसार विवाह के एक वर्ष के भीतर अर्जी ग्रहण नहीं होगी, जब तक अदालत “असाधारण कष्ट” या “असाधारण दुराचारिता” के आधार पर अनुमति न दे।
अर्जी कहाँ और कैसे। धारा 19 के अनुसार अर्जी वहाँ दी जाती है जहाँ विवाह हुआ, जहाँ प्रत्यर्थी रहता है, जहाँ दोनों अंतिम बार साथ रहे, या पत्नी अर्जीदार हो तो जहाँ वह रहती है। दिल्ली में ये मामले कुटुंब न्यायालय (Family Court) सुनते हैं (कुटुंब न्यायालय अधिनियम, 1984 की धारा 7 और 8)। अदालत पहले सुलह का प्रयास करती है और धारा 23 के अनुसार तलाक तभी देती है जब आधार साबित हो, अर्जीदार अपनी गलती का लाभ न उठा रहा हो, क्रूरता या जारकर्म को माफ न किया गया हो, मिलीभगत न हो और अनुचित देरी न हुई हो। उद्धरण चिह्नों में दिए शब्द अधिनियम के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ से हैं; बाकी सारांश हमारी सरल हिंदी में है।
Frequently asked questions
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lets a court dissolve a Hindu marriage by decree on a petition by the husband or the wife, without the other’s consent. Section 13(1) grounds for either spouse: adultery, cruelty, desertion for two years, conversion, serious mental disorder, communicable venereal disease, renunciation, and seven years’ absence (leprosy was omitted in 2019). Section 13(1A) adds a decree-based ground and Section 13(2) four grounds for the wife. The ground must be proved and Section 23’s bars must not apply.
Section 13(1)(ia) allows divorce where the other spouse “has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty”. The Act does not define cruelty. As quoted in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006), it “may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional”, and mental cruelty must be such that the parties “cannot reasonably be expected to live together”. The petitioner must not have condoned it (Section 23(1)(b)).
Cruelty can be physical or mental. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) gave fourteen illustrations of mental cruelty, such as a sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment, prolonged refusal of intercourse without valid reason, and a unilateral decision not to have a child. It also said that “Mere coldness or lack of affection” and “trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life” are not enough. The whole married life is examined.
Yes. Cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) includes mental cruelty. Naveen Kohli (2006), quoting V. Bhagat (1994), described it as conduct inflicting “such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other”. Samar Ghosh (2007) added that “a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty”. The conduct and its effect must be proved.
Section 13(1)(ib) allows divorce where the other spouse “has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition”. Desertion means leaving “without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish” of the petitioner, and “includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner” (Explanation). The two years must be continuous and end just before filing.
The petitioner must prove the fact of separation and the other spouse’s intention to end cohabitation permanently (“animus deserendi”), and that the petitioner neither consented nor gave reasonable cause for the leaving (Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, 2002, following Bipinchandra, 1957). The court draws the inference from both spouses’ conduct and expressions of intention before and after the separation. Leaving in temporary anger is not desertion.
It is a petition relying on both cruelty (clause (ia)) and desertion (clause (ib)). The Act allows more than one ground; the facts for each must be stated (Section 20(1)) and proved, and the court may grant divorce if satisfied that “any of the grounds for granting relief exists” and no bar in Section 23 applies. The respondent may counter-claim on the petitioner’s own cruelty or desertion (Section 23A).
Section 13(1) grounds concern the other spouse’s conduct or condition. Section 13(1A) is based on an earlier decree: either spouse may seek divorce if, for one year or more after a judicial separation decree, cohabitation has not resumed, or after a restitution decree under Section 9, conjugal rights have not been restored. Section 13(1A) is open to “Either party”, including the spouse against whom the decree was passed; in Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar (1977) the Supreme Court held that mere refusal of reunion is not a “wrong” barring relief under Section 23(1)(a).
Section 13A (“Alternate relief in divorce proceedings”) lets the court, in a divorce case, “pass instead a decree for judicial separation” if it considers it just. It cannot do so where the petition is founded on conversion (clause (ii)), renunciation (clause (vi)) or seven years’ absence (clause (vii)). If cohabitation does not resume for a year after judicial separation, either spouse may seek divorce under Section 13(1A).
Yes, under Section 13B, not Section 13. Both spouses jointly petition on the ground that they have lived separately for one year or more, cannot live together and have agreed to end the marriage; the second motion comes after six and within eighteen months. The six-month period can be waived in exceptional cases (Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, 2017, as recorded in Shilpa Sailesh, 2023).
No. No ground in Section 13 needs the other spouse’s consent; one spouse files against the other and the case is decided on proof. Consent is the basis only of divorce under Section 13B, and there the court must be satisfied that consent was not obtained “by force, fraud or undue influence” (Section 23(1)(bb)).
No. Under Section 13(1)(ii), the fact that the other spouse “has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion” is only a ground on which the spouse who has not converted may petition. The marriage continues until a decree is passed, and conversion must be proved. Reconciliation under Section 23(2) and judicial separation under Section 13A do not apply to this ground.
Yes, if it meets Section 13(1)(iii): incurable unsoundness of mind, or mental disorder “of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent”. A diagnosis alone is not enough: the spouse relying on it must prove the “requisite degree” (Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta, 1988). It is separate from cruelty (Vinita Saxena, 2006).
The Explanation to Section 13(1)(iii) defines “mental disorder” as “mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia”, and also defines “psychopathic disorder”. Incurability is needed only for the “unsound mind” limb. “[T]he mere branding of a person as schizophrenic will not suffice” (Ram Narain Gupta, 1988).
The grounds do not depend on the length of the marriage, but timing matters: no petition within one year of marriage without leave (Section 14); desertion must last two continuous years (Section 13(1)(ib)); Section 13(1A) needs one year after the earlier decree. In Article 142 cases the Supreme Court weighs the periods of cohabitation and separation (Shilpa Sailesh, 2023).
There is no limitation period in years: Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act, 1963 excludes proceedings under marriage and divorce laws unless those laws provide otherwise. The Hindu Marriage Act’s own checks are the one-year bar after marriage (Section 14) and refusal of relief for “unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding” (Section 23(1)(d)).
The petitioner must prove that the other spouse “has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form” (Section 13(1)(v)), normally by medical evidence. A Family Court may take the help of a medical expert (Section 12, Family Courts Act, 1984), and proceedings are held in camera (Section 22, Hindu Marriage Act).
Section 13(1)(v) does not require the disease to have existed at the time of the marriage, and in its present form it sets no minimum period. What must be shown is that the spouse “has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form”. The other spouse may then petition for divorce, or the court may grant judicial separation instead (Section 13A).
No. Clause (iv) of Section 13(1), on leprosy, was omitted by Act 6 of 2019 (the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019) with effect from 1 March 2019, as India Code’s footnote records. Leprosy is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, whenever it began.
Yes. Divorce cases are civil; the court must be satisfied “on a preponderance of probabilities” (Dastane, 1975). A fact is “proved” when the court believes it exists or thinks it so probable that a prudent man would act on it (Section 2(1)(j), Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), so it may be inferred from proved circumstances. A Family Court may also receive helpful material even if not otherwise admissible (Section 14, Family Courts Act).
No. Section 13(1)(i) covers only intercourse “after the solemnization of the marriage”. If consent to the marriage was obtained “by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstances concerning the respondent”, the marriage may be voidable under Section 12(1)(c), but that petition must be filed within one year of discovering the fraud, and is barred if the petitioner willingly lived with the other spouse as husband or wife after discovering it (Section 12(2)(a)).
Not as such; neither is a ground in Section 13, and Section 23(1) allows a decree only where a ground exists, “but not otherwise”. Samar Ghosh (2007) said “trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life” are not cruelty. But long-continued conduct making life intolerable, or a completely broken marriage after long separation and litigation, may amount to cruelty (Rakesh Raman, 2023).
They are not a separate ground. Money disputes or economic control can be part of a cruelty case under Section 13(1)(ia) only if, on the whole married life, they amount to conduct of the kind described in Samar Ghosh (2007), such as “a sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment”. Ordinary disagreements about money are “normal wear and tear”. Need during the case is met by maintenance under Section 24.
Not a separate ground, but it can be cruelty. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) said: “Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty”, and also listed sterilisation or abortion without medical reason and without the other’s consent or knowledge. It depends on the facts proved.
No. Infertility is not a ground in Section 13. It is different from impotence: a marriage not consummated “owing to the impotence of the respondent” is voidable under Section 12(1)(a), which is a nullity remedy. A unilateral decision not to have children may be cruelty (Samar Ghosh, 2007), but a medical inability to have children, without more, is neither.
If non-consummation is “owing to the impotence of the respondent”, the marriage can be annulled under Section 12(1)(a). Apart from impotence, Samar Ghosh (2007) said that a “Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty”, which is a ground under Section 13(1)(ia).
It depends on its gravity. If cruelty “is physical, it is a question of fact and degree” (Shobha Rani, as quoted in Naveen Kohli, 2006). A serious act may be enough, while for mental cruelty “a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty” (Samar Ghosh, 2007). The court also asks whether the act was condoned (Section 23(1)(b)).
No. Imprisonment is not a ground in Section 13, and the court can decree divorce only on a statutory ground (Section 23(1)). The facts behind a conviction may support a listed ground, for example a husband’s guilt of rape (a ground for the wife under Section 13(2)(ii)) or conduct amounting to cruelty, but that ground must be pleaded and proved.
Under Section 13(1)(vii), when the other spouse “has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it”. The petition may then be filed where the petitioner lives (Section 19(iv)), and judicial separation cannot be substituted (Section 13A).
Not under Section 13 (Naveen Kohli, 2006, which recommended adding it; the Act has not been changed). In Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (Constitution Bench, 1 May 2023) the Supreme Court held that it may itself dissolve a marriage for irretrievable breakdown under Article 142(1), as a discretion, not a right; a writ petition cannot be filed for it. Rakesh Raman (2023) treated a long-dead marriage as cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia).
Under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the court may pass interim orders and provisions in the decree on the “custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible”, and vary them later. Family Courts also hear separate guardianship, custody and access cases (Section 7, Family Courts Act, 1984).
On evidence. The petition must state the facts and be verified (Section 20); the ground is proved on a preponderance of probabilities (Dastane, 1975); and the court must be satisfied that no bar in Section 23(1) applies, “whether defended or not”. A Family Court may use medical or welfare experts, receive helpful material and take formal evidence on affidavit (Sections 12, 14 and 16, Family Courts Act).
Yes. The respondent may deny the facts, rely on a bar in Section 23(1) (condonation, collusion, delay, the petitioner’s own wrong), and “make a counter-claim for any relief under this Act” on the petitioner’s adultery, cruelty or desertion (Section 23A). An appeal lies to the High Court from a Family Court’s judgment (Section 19, Family Courts Act).
After one year from the marriage (Section 14), the petition is filed where the marriage took place, the respondent lives, the couple last lived together, or the wife-petitioner lives (Section 19). In Delhi, Family Courts hear these cases (Sections 7 and 8, Family Courts Act); a Delhi High Court order of January 2023 refers to the “Principal Judge Family Courts, Central, Tis Hazari”. The petition states the facts and that there is no collusion, verified like a plaint (Section 20).
The Act fixes no period. Section 21B(2) says “endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of service of notice of the petition on the respondent”, with day-to-day hearing so far as practicable; an appeal should be heard within three months. No official average for Delhi was found.
Under Section 15, when there is no right of appeal, or the time for appealing has expired without an appeal, or an appeal has been dismissed. Section 19(3) of the Family Courts Act says an appeal “shall be preferred within a period of thirty days”, while Section 28(4) of the Hindu Marriage Act gives “a period of ninety days”. Because the texts differ, the safe course before remarrying is to wait until ninety days from the decree have passed and then confirm that no appeal has been filed in the High Court.
Yes. Section 13(2) gives only the wife four grounds: the husband’s second marriage before the Act came into force, with the other wife still alive; his guilt of rape, sodomy or bestiality; a maintenance decree or order for her (Section 18 HAMA, or Section 125 CrPC, now Section 144 BNSS) followed by a year without cohabitation; and a marriage before fifteen repudiated before eighteen. A wife may also file where she lives (Section 19(iiia)).
हिन्दू विवाह अधिनियम की धारा 13 तब लागू होती है जब पति या पत्नी में से कोई एक, दूसरे की सहमति के बिना, तलाक चाहता है और अधिनियम का कोई आधार साबित कर सकता है – जैसे क्रूरता (13(1)(iक)), दो वर्ष का अभित्यजन (13(1)(iख)), जारकर्म, धर्म-परिवर्तन या गंभीर मानसिक विकार; या डिक्री के बाद एक वर्ष तक साथ न रहना (13(1क))। विवाह के एक वर्ष के भीतर अर्जी सामान्यतः नहीं दी जा सकती (धारा 14)। यह अपराध की धारा नहीं, दीवानी कार्यवाही है।
धारा 13 में दूसरे पक्ष की सहमति ज़रूरी नहीं है। पर अर्जीदार को आधार सबूत से साबित करना होता है, दूसरा पक्ष विरोध और प्रति-दावा (धारा 23क) कर सकता है, और धारा 14 व 23 की शर्तें पूरी करनी होती हैं। आपसी सहमति (धारा 13ख) में आधार साबित नहीं करना पड़ता, पर दोनों की सहमति और एक वर्ष अलग रहना ज़रूरी है। कौन-सा रास्ता उपयुक्त है, यह मामले के तथ्यों पर निर्भर है।
हिंदू विवाह कायदा, 1955 चे कलम 13 पती किंवा पत्नीला दुसऱ्याच्या संमतीशिवाय घटस्फोट मागण्याची कारणे सांगते: विवाहानंतर व्यभिचार (1)(i), क्रूरता (1)(ia), सलग दोन वर्षे सोडून जाणे (1)(ib), धर्मांतर, गंभीर मानसिक विकार, संसर्गजन्य गुप्तरोग, संन्यास, सात वर्षे बेपत्ता; हुकुमानंतर एक वर्ष एकत्र न राहणे (1A); आणि पत्नीसाठी चार कारणे (2). हे सोपे मराठी स्पष्टीकरण आहे, अधिकृत भाषांतर नाही.
Conclusion
Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act sets out a closed list of grounds on which one spouse can obtain divorce without the other’s consent: the eight grounds in Section 13(1) (leprosy having been removed in 2019), the decree-based ground in Section 13(1A), and the wife’s four grounds in Section 13(2). Cruelty and desertion, the two grounds most often relied on, are explained by the Supreme Court’s judgments rather than by the Act, and each must be proved on evidence.
A proved ground is not always enough: the one-year bar in Section 14, the reconciliation duty and the bars in Section 23 also apply. In Delhi the case is heard by the Family Court, with an appeal to the High Court; Section 13B offers a separate mutual-consent route, and irretrievable breakdown remains a matter for the Supreme Court under Article 142.
Sources used for this post: the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Act No. 25 of 1955), Sections 9, 10, 12, 13 (with the footnotes to clauses (i) to (vii), sub-sections (1A) and (2)), 13A, 13B, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 21B, 21C, 22, 23, 23A, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29(2), English text on India Code (a1955-25.pdf, as on 15 April 2026) and official Hindi text on India Code (H1955-25Hi.pdf; Sections 13, 13A, 13B and 14 read from the printed pages); the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act 6 of 2019), India Code record; the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act 66 of 1984), Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 19 (India Code, a1984-66.pdf); the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 29(3) (India Code, as on 30 August 2026); the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, Sections 2(1)(j) and 128, and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 144 (India Code, as on 6 October 2025, with the firm’s section-by-section comparison data); Delhi High Court order No. G-I/Gaz.I/DHC/2023 of January 2023 (https://delhihighcourt.nic.in/files/announcements/80597013263b814a7c8cb8.pdf); and the Supreme Court’s own copies of N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (19 March 1975, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/6011.pdf), Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar (19 August 1977, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/5247.pdf), Ram Narain Gupta v. Rameshwari Gupta (12 September 1988, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/8195.pdf), Hirachand Srinivas Managaonkar v. Sunanda (20 March 2001, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/17672.pdf), Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey (8 January 2002, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/18201.pdf, recording Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati and Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena), Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (21 March 2006, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/27580.pdf, quoting Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi and V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat), Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit (21 March 2006, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/27578.pdf), Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (26 March 2007, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/28780.pdf), Rakesh Raman v. Kavita (26 April 2023, https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2011/23489/23489_2011_11_1501_43888_Judgement_26-Apr-2023.pdf, recording K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa) and Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (Constitution Bench, 1 May 2023, https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2014/26304/26304_2014_2_1501_44203_Judgement_01-May-2023.pdf, recording Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur).
