Respondeat superior is a Latin maxim, usually rendered in English as “let the master answer” (our rendering). It is the rule of vicarious liability: an employer (the “master”) is liable for a wrong done by an employee (the “servant”) while acting in the course of employment, even though the employer did nothing wrong personally. In the Supreme Court’s words, “the master’s liability is based on the ground that the act is done in the scope or course of his employment or authority”, and the act must be “a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act authorised by the master” (Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co., 1977).
In India the rule binds the government too: under Article 300 of the Constitution the State can be sued, and it “should be as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and functioning as such as any other employer” (State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati, 1962), subject to a narrow exception for acts done in exercise of sovereign powers (Kasturilal, 1964). It is also why a vehicle owner, and through the owner’s policy the insurer, pays for a driver’s negligence. Criminal law is different: “there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so” (Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, 2015), as Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act does for those in charge of a company in cheque bounce cases.
Respondeat superior at a glance
- Meaning: “let the master answer” (our rendering): the employer answers for the employee’s wrong done in the course of employment.
- Test: the act must be authorised by the master, or a wrongful and unauthorised way of doing an authorised act (Pushpabai, 1977).
- Disobeyed instructions: an order that only limits how the work is done does not free the master; an act of a kind the servant was not employed to do at all does.
- The State: suable under Article 300 and liable like any employer for non-sovereign acts (Vidhyawati, 1962); the sovereign-powers exception of Kasturilal (1964) is no defence to compensation for violation of fundamental rights (Nilabati Behera, 1993).
- Motor accidents: the owner is liable for a driver acting in the course of employment or driving with consent on the owner’s business (Pushpabai, 1977); the insurer must indemnify and pay the award (Sections 147(6) and 150, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988).
- Agents and partners: Sections 226, 237 and 238 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; Section 26 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
- Criminal law: no vicarious liability unless a statute provides it, for example Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Sunil Bharti Mittal, 2015).
- In Hindi: “मालिक उत्तर दे” (our rendering); the Contract Act’s official Hindi text calls the agent “अभिकर्ता” and the principal “मालिक”.
Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Constitution of India is quoted from its India Code text (as on 1 May 2026) and the Legislative Department’s Hindi–English edition, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 from India Code (as on 15 August 2026), the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 from India Code (as on 7 July 2025), and the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 from their India Code texts and official Hindi texts; the judgments are quoted from the Supreme Court’s official copies on api.sci.gov.in.
Respondeat superior meaning
Respondeat superior is commonly rendered “let the master answer” or “let the superior answer” (our rendering). It names a rule of law rather than a section of an Act: when a servant commits a wrong while doing the master’s work, the injured person can hold the master liable as well as the servant. Indian judgments usually call this vicarious liability, meaning liability for the act of another. The phrase itself appears in Indian case law: in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. (1964) the Supreme Court recorded that Chief Justice Rankin of the Calcutta High Court had held that no action in tort lay against the Secretary of State for India “upon the ‘respondent superior'” (the judgment’s spelling) for acts done in the exercise of sovereign power.
The master’s liability depends on the servant’s. Quoting Lord Denning, the Court in Pushpabai said: “the first question is to see whether the servant was liable. If the answer is Yes, the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the servant’s liability.” The link between the two is the course of employment. For other Latin maxims used in Indian courts, see Legal Maxims Explained.
When is the master liable? The course-of-employment test
The Supreme Court set out the test in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. (25 March 1977), relying on its earlier judgment in Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt (1966): “the law is settled that master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servants acting in the course of his employment. Unless the act is done in the course of employment, the servant’s act does not make the employer liable.”
In Pushpabai a company’s manager, driving the company car from Nagpur to Pandhurna on the company’s business, gave a lift to Purshottam Udeshi, who died when the car hit a tree on 18 December 1960. The High Court had called the passenger “no better than a trespasser” and let the company off. The Supreme Court held that the accident “was due to the negligence of the servant in the course of his employment and that the master is liable”, presuming from “the high position of the driver who was the Manager of the company” that he had authority to carry the passenger. It also accepted Lord Denning’s extension for vehicles: “The owner is also liable if the driver is, with the owner’s consent, driving the car on the owner’s business or for the owner’s purposes.”
If the employee disobeyed instructions
A breach of orders does not by itself free the employer. Pushpabai explained the Privy Council’s decision in Canadian Pacific Railway v. Lockhart, where a carpenter used his own uninsured car for a work trip despite the railway’s warning: “the prohibition merely limited the way in which the servant was to execute the work which he was employed to do and that breach of the prohibition did not exclude the liability of the master to third party.”
Acts outside the job
The employer is not liable where the servant does something of a kind he was not employed to do at all. In Conway v. George Wimpey, as described in Pushpabai, a lorry driver under strict orders not to carry outsiders gave a lift to a worker of another firm; that was “the performance of an act of a class which he was not employed to perform at all”. In Sitaram Motilal Kalal a taxi owner was not liable when a cleaner, trained by the driver without the owner’s authority, injured someone while taking his driving test.
Prepared by Century Law Firm from Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (Supreme Court, 25 March 1977, official copy on api.sci.gov.in).
Respondeat superior and the State: Article 300
The Union and the States can be sued for the wrongs of their employees. Article 300(1) of the Constitution says that the Government of India and the Government of a State “may … sue or be sued in relation to their respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the corresponding Provinces or the corresponding Indian States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not been enacted”, subject to any law made by Parliament or the State Legislature. The words “in the like cases” tie the State’s liability to the position before the Constitution, and in Vidhyawati the Court held that “so long as the Legislature has not expressed its intention to the contrary” that old rule continues.
Vidhyawati (1962): the State is liable like any employer
On 11 February 1952 a government driver, bringing the Collector of Udaipur’s jeep back from a repair workshop, knocked down Jagdishlal on a footpath; he died three days later. A five-judge bench (2 February 1962) upheld the Rs. 15,000 decree against the State, because the accident happened “in circumstances wholly dissociated from the exercise of sovereign powers”. In a welfare state, the Court said, “it is too much to claim that the State should be immune from the consequences of tortious acts of its employees committed in the course of their employment as such”. (The case is also written “Vidyawati”.)
Kasturilal (1964): the sovereign-powers exception
In 1947 the Meerut police seized gold from a partner of a bullion firm and never returned it; the State’s case was that the head constable in charge of the malkhana had misappropriated it and fled to Pakistan. Another five-judge bench (29 September 1964) found the police “negligent” but dismissed the claim, asking whether the act was done “in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State”. Arrest, search and seizure were such powers. The Court added that this area “must be strictly determined”, and called the result “not a very satisfactory position in law” that only the Legislature could cure.
Nilabati Behera (1993) and Chandrima Das (2000): the exception narrowed
In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (24 March 1993), a case of death in police custody, the Supreme Court awarded the mother Rs. 1,50,000 and held that compensation under Articles 32 and 226 “is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply”; Kasturilal “is confined to the sphere of liability in tort”. See Article 21 and writ petitions.
In Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (28 January 2000) a Bangladeshi woman had been gang-raped by persons including railway employees at the Rail Yatri Niwas, Howrah, and the Calcutta High Court awarded her Rs. 10 lakh. The Railways argued that rape “cannot be said to be an official act”. The Supreme Court called this “wholly bad”, recorded that the principles of Vidhyawati “were reiterated in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. vs. State of A.P.” (1994), said Kasturi Lal “has not been followed by this Court in the subsequent decisions”, and held that “Running of Railways is a commercial activity” for whose employees’ torts the Union “can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable”. It decided the case “under Public Law domain”, holding that her rights under Article 21 were violated and the State was under a “Constitutional liability to pay compensation to her”. Chandrima Das (two judges) did not say that it overruled Kasturilal (five judges); what the later cases establish is that the exception is narrow and is no defence to compensation for violation of fundamental rights.
Motor accidents: owner’s and insurer’s liability
The owner of a vehicle is liable for the negligence of a driver acting in the course of employment, or driving with the owner’s consent on the owner’s business (Pushpabai, decided under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939). The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in force from 1 July 1989, repealed the 1939 Act and makes the insurer pay:
- Insurance is compulsory: no one may use or allow another to use a motor vehicle in a public place without “a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter” (Section 146(1)).
- Cover: liability for “the death of or bodily injury to any person … or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place” (Section 147(1)(b)(i)).
- Indemnity and payment: the insurer “shall be liable to indemnify” the insured (Section 147(6)) and must pay the claimant the amount of an award against the insured, up to the sum assured, “as if that person were the decree holder”, subject to the defences in Section 150(2) such as driving by a person “who is not duly licenced” (Section 150).
- No-fault amount: five lakh rupees for death or two and a half lakh rupees for grievous hurt, payable by the owner or insurer without proof of “wrongful act or neglect or default” (Section 164).
The “owner” is the registered owner or, for a vehicle on hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation, “the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement” (Section 2(30)). Claims go to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal within six months of the accident (Sections 165 and 166(3)); since 15 August 2026 a proviso inserted by the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2026 lets the Tribunal accept a claim within a further twelve months “if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause”. See Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACT).
Principals and agents; firms and partners
Indian Contract Act, 1872. An agent is “a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons” (Section 182). Contracts made and “obligations arising from acts done by an agent” have “the same legal consequences, as if the contracts had been entered into and the acts done by the principal in person” (Section 226). The principal is bound even by unauthorised acts if “by his words or conduct” he made third persons believe they were within the agent’s authority (Section 237). And “frauds committed, by agents acting in the course of their business for their principals, have the same effect on agreements made by such agents as if such misrepresentations or frauds had been made or committed by the principals”, but not in “matters which do not fall within their authority” (Section 238). More: the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Under Section 26, where “by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm, or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner”. Every partner is liable “jointly with all the other partners and also severally” for acts of the firm done while he is a partner (Section 25).
Criminal law: no vicarious liability unless a statute provides it
Respondeat superior makes the master pay damages; it does not make him guilty of the servant’s crime. In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation (9 January 2015), a three-judge bench held: “it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so.” A director or officer can be made an accused with the company only “if there is sufficient evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent”, or where the statute specifically provides vicarious liability: “When the company is the offendor, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.” In Pushpabai the Court likewise agreed that an English dictum making “the master … responsible for a criminal act of the servant” “went a bit too far”.
Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads: “If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly”. A person is not punished if he “proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence”; directors nominated because they hold an office or employment in the Central or a State Government, or in a financial corporation owned or controlled by either, cannot be prosecuted under this Chapter; and Section 141(2) adds officers whose “consent or connivance” or “neglect” led to the offence. For this section a “company” includes a firm. See Cheque Bounce Case: Section 138 NI Act.
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Constitution (Art. 300), the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (India Code) and the Supreme Court judgments named (official copies).
Respondeat superior case law: key Supreme Court judgments
| Case and date | What happened | What the Court held |
|---|---|---|
| State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati, 2 February 1962 (5 judges) | Government jeep driver knocked down a pedestrian | State liable like any other employer; Rs. 15,000 decree upheld |
| Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P., 29 September 1964 (5 judges) | Gold seized by the police was lost through their negligence | No damages: the act was done in exercise of powers characterised as sovereign |
| Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co., 25 March 1977 | Company manager gave a lift; passenger died in a crash | Manager acted in the course of employment; owner liable |
| Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, 24 March 1993 (3 judges) | Death in police custody | Sovereign immunity no defence to compensation under Articles 32 and 226 |
| Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, 28 January 2000 | Gang rape by persons including railway employees at Rail Yatri Niwas, Howrah | Union can be vicariously liable (Railways a commercial activity); compensation upheld in public law for violation of Article 21 |
| Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, 9 January 2015 (3 judges) | Persons in control of companies summoned as their “alter ego” | No vicarious criminal liability without a statutory provision such as Section 141 NI Act |
Examples of respondeat superior
- A government driver bringing the Collector’s jeep back from the workshop runs over a pedestrian: the State pays (Vidhyawati).
- A company manager driving on company business gives a lift and crashes: the company, as owner, pays (Pushpabai).
- A worker breaks an order on how to do his job (using an uninsured car for a work trip) and injures someone: the employer remains liable (Lockhart, as explained in Pushpabai).
- A sales agent persuades a buyer with a misrepresentation he was not authorised to make: the contract is voidable at the buyer’s option against the principal (Section 238, illustration (a), Contract Act).
Pushpabai also applied res ipsa loquitur, which the Court explained means that the accident “speaks for itself”, to infer the driver’s negligence. Related maxims: res ipsa loquitur and volenti non fit injuria.
रेस्पॉन्डियट सुपीरियर का अर्थ – हिंदी में सारांश (Summary in Hindi)
यह सारांश फर्म का अपना है; केवल जिन अंशों को “आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ” कहा गया है, वे भारत सरकार के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठों से लिए गए हैं।
अर्थ: “रेस्पॉन्डियट सुपीरियर” (respondeat superior) लैटिन सूत्र है, जिसका सरल अर्थ है “मालिक उत्तर दे” (फर्म का अनुवाद)। यदि कोई कर्मचारी मालिक का काम करते हुए, यानी अपने नियोजन के दौरान, किसी को नुकसान पहुंचाता है, तो कर्मचारी के साथ-साथ मालिक भी जिम्मेदार होता है, भले ही मालिक ने स्वयं कोई गलती न की हो। इसे “प्रतिनिधिक दायित्व” (vicarious liability, फर्म का अनुवाद) कहा जा सकता है।
नियोजन के दौरान किया गया कार्य: पुष्पाबाई पुरुषोत्तम उदेशी मामले (1977) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि मालिक तभी जिम्मेदार है जब कार्य मालिक द्वारा अधिकृत हो, या किसी अधिकृत कार्य को करने का गलत और अनधिकृत तरीका हो। उस मामले में कंपनी का मैनेजर कंपनी के काम से कार चला रहा था और उसने एक व्यक्ति को लिफ्ट दी; दुर्घटना में उस व्यक्ति की मृत्यु हुई और कंपनी को जिम्मेदार ठहराया गया। यदि कर्मचारी ने केवल काम करने के तरीके के बारे में दिया गया आदेश तोड़ा है, तो मालिक बच नहीं सकता; लेकिन यदि उसने ऐसा कार्य किया जो उसके काम का हिस्सा ही नहीं था, तो मालिक जिम्मेदार नहीं होता।
सरकार का दायित्व: संविधान के अनुच्छेद 300 का शीर्षक आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में “वाद और कार्यवाहियां” है, और उसके अनुसार “भारत सरकार भारत संघ के नाम से वाद ला सकेगी या उस पर वाद लाया जा सकेगा और किसी राज्य की सरकार उस राज्य के नाम से वाद ला सकेगी या उस पर वाद लाया जा सकेगा”। राजस्थान राज्य बनाम विद्यावती (1962) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि सरकारी जीप के ड्राइवर की लापरवाही से हुई मृत्यु के लिए राज्य उसी प्रकार जिम्मेदार है जैसे कोई अन्य नियोक्ता। कस्तूरीलाल (1964) में गिरफ्तारी, तलाशी और जब्ती जैसी संप्रभु शक्तियों के प्रयोग में हुई लापरवाही के लिए दावा नहीं चला। लेकिन नीलाबती बेहरा (1993) के अनुसार पुलिस हिरासत में मृत्यु जैसे मौलिक अधिकारों के उल्लंघन पर अनुच्छेद 32 और 226 के अंतर्गत मुआवजे में संप्रभु उन्मुक्ति का बचाव उपलब्ध नहीं है, और चंद्रिमा दास (2000) में रेलवे चलाने को वाणिज्यिक गतिविधि मानकर केंद्र सरकार को रेलवे कर्मचारियों के अपकृत्य के लिए जिम्मेदार ठहराया जा सकता है, यह कहा गया; न्यायालय ने वह मामला लोक विधि (public law) के अंतर्गत तय किया और कहा कि पीड़िता के अनुच्छेद 21 के अधिकार का उल्लंघन हुआ, इसलिए राज्य पर मुआवजा देने का संवैधानिक दायित्व था।
मोटर दुर्घटना: वाहन का मालिक अपने ड्राइवर की लापरवाही के लिए जिम्मेदार है, जब ड्राइवर नियोजन के दौरान या मालिक की सहमति से मालिक के काम के लिए वाहन चला रहा हो। मोटर वाहन अधिनियम, 1988 की धारा 146 के अनुसार बीमा अनिवार्य है, और धारा 147(6) तथा 150 के अनुसार बीमा कंपनी को दावा अधिकरण के अवार्ड की राशि, बीमित राशि तक, चुकानी होती है। धारा 164 के अंतर्गत बिना गलती साबित किए मृत्यु पर पांच लाख रुपये और गंभीर चोट (grievous hurt) पर ढाई लाख रुपये मिलते हैं। दावा दुर्घटना के छह महीने के भीतर करना होता है; 15 अगस्त 2026 से पर्याप्त कारण होने पर अधिकरण बारह महीने की अतिरिक्त अवधि में भी दावा ले सकता है।
अभिकर्ता और भागीदार: भारतीय संविदा अधिनियम, 1872 के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में agent को “अभिकर्ता” और principal को “मालिक” कहा गया है (धारा 182)। धारा 238 के आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ के अनुसार “अपने कारबार के अनुक्रम में अपने मालिकों की ओर से कार्य करते हुए अभिकर्ताओं द्वारा किए गए दुर्व्यपदेशन या कपट” का करारों पर वही प्रभाव होता है मानो वे मालिकों द्वारा किए गए हों। भारतीय भागीदारी अधिनियम, 1932 की धारा 26 के अनुसार भागीदार द्वारा फर्म के कारबार के सामान्य अनुक्रम में किए गए गलत कार्य के लिए फर्म उतनी ही जिम्मेदार है जितना वह भागीदार।
आपराधिक कानून: सुनील भारती मित्तल (2015) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि आपराधिक कानून में प्रतिनिधिक दायित्व तभी होता है जब कानून स्पष्ट रूप से ऐसा कहे। इसका उदाहरण परक्राम्य लिखत अधिनियम, 1881 की धारा 141 है, जिसका शीर्षक आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में “कंपनियों द्वारा अपराध” है: चेक बाउंस का अपराध कंपनी द्वारा किए जाने पर हर वह व्यक्ति जो उस समय “उस कंपनी के कारबार के संचालन के लिए उस कंपनी का भारसाधक और उसके प्रति उत्तरदायी था”, कंपनी के साथ दोषी समझा जाएगा; परंतु जो यह साबित कर दे कि अपराध उसकी जानकारी के बिना हुआ या उसने उसे रोकने के लिए पूरी सावधानी बरती, वह दंडित नहीं होगा।
Frequently asked questions
Respondeat superior is a Latin maxim usually rendered as “let the master answer” (our rendering). It is the rule of vicarious liability: an employer is liable for a wrong done by an employee in the course of employment. The Supreme Court put it this way in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (1977): “the master’s liability is based on the ground that the act is done in the scope or course of his employment or authority.”
In the law of torts the doctrine makes the master answer for the servant’s tort, such as negligent driving, done in the course of employment. Following Lord Denning, the Supreme Court asks first whether the servant is liable and, if so, whether the employer must “shoulder the servant’s liability”. The act must be authorised, or “a wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act authorised by the master” (Pushpabai, 1977).
In simple Hindi, respondeat superior means “मालिक उत्तर दे”: the master must answer for the employee’s wrong done while doing the master’s work. This is our rendering; we found no official Hindi rendering of the maxim, and “प्रतिनिधिक दायित्व” for vicarious liability is also our rendering. In the official Hindi text of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agent is “अभिकर्ता” and a principal is “मालिक” (Section 182).
Often yes. If the order only limited the way the employee was to do the job he was employed to do, breaking it does not free the employer: explaining Canadian Pacific Railway v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court said in Pushpabai (1977) that such a breach “did not exclude the liability of the master to third party”. The employer is not liable where the employee does something of a kind he was not employed to do at all, such as a lorry driver carrying outsiders against strict orders.
Yes, as a general rule. Under Article 300 of the Constitution the Union and the States can be sued, and in State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati (1962) the Supreme Court held the State liable, like any other employer, when a government jeep driver killed a pedestrian. The exception in Kasturilal (1964) covers acts done in exercise of powers characterised as sovereign, such as arrest, search and seizure, and the Court said that area “must be strictly determined”.
Only in a narrow area, and never against compensation for violation of fundamental rights. Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) held that compensation under Articles 32 and 226 rests on strict liability “to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply”. In Chandrima Das (2000) the Court said Kasturi Lal “has not been followed by this Court in the subsequent decisions” and that the Union can be vicariously liable for torts of railway employees, as running the Railways is a commercial activity; it upheld the compensation in public law, as the State’s constitutional liability for violation of Article 21.
Yes, if the driver was acting in the course of employment or, as the Supreme Court accepted in Pushpabai (1977), was, in the Court’s words, “with the owner’s consent, driving the car on the owner’s business or for the owner’s purposes”. Under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 the owner is the registered owner, or the person in possession under a hire-purchase, lease or hypothecation agreement. The claim is made to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 166.
Usually yes. Third-party insurance is compulsory under Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Under Section 147(6) the insurer “shall be liable to indemnify” the insured for the liability the policy covers, and under Section 150(1) it must pay the award to the claimant “as if that person were the decree holder”, up to the sum assured. It can defend only on the grounds in Section 150(2), such as driving by an unlicensed person or a policy void for non-disclosure.
Only where a statute makes such persons liable or the director personally took part with criminal intent. In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (9 January 2015) the Supreme Court held that “there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so” and that directors’ liability “cannot be imputed automatically”, giving Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as an example. Section 141 covers every person in charge of and responsible to the company for its business, unless he proves lack of knowledge or due diligence.
From Supreme Court cases: the State paid when a government driver bringing the Collector’s jeep from a workshop killed a pedestrian (Vidhyawati, 1962); a company paid when its manager, driving on company business, crashed with a passenger he had given a lift (Pushpabai, 1977); and in Chandrima Das (2000), a writ case, the Supreme Court upheld compensation of Rs. 10 lakh to a woman gang-raped by persons including railway employees at the Rail Yatri Niwas, Howrah, holding that the Union can be vicariously liable for torts of railway employees because running the Railways is a commercial activity, and that the State was under a constitutional liability to compensate her for violation of Article 21.
They are closely linked. Vicarious liability means being liable for another person’s wrong; respondeat superior is the maxim for its most familiar form, the liability of a master or employer for a servant’s wrong in the course of employment. Statutes create other forms, such as a principal’s liability for an agent under Sections 226 and 238 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and a firm’s liability for a partner under Section 26 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
Conclusion
Respondeat superior, “let the master answer”, makes an employer liable for an employee’s wrong done in the course of employment: an authorised act, or a wrongful way of doing an authorised act. In India it binds the State under Article 300, subject to a narrow sovereign-powers exception that is no defence to compensation for violation of fundamental rights; it underlies the owner’s liability in motor accident claims, which the insurer must meet under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; and the Contract Act and Partnership Act apply the same idea to principals and firms. It does not reach criminal guilt unless a statute, such as Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, says so.
Sources used for this post: the Constitution of India, Article 300, India Code text “As on 1st May, 2026” (item 544213ec-4072-44b2-a6fc-69fb84df2001) and the Legislative Department’s Hindi–English (diglot) edition, printed page 170 (https://www.legislative.gov.in/static/uploads/2025/08/575648bd8ecb7654db902b93115d35e4.pdf); the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Sections 1(3) (footnote), 2(30), 146, 147, 150, 164, 165, 166 and 217, India Code text [As on the 15th August, 2026], including the proviso to Section 166(3) inserted by the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2026 (8 of 2026) with effect from 15 August 2026; the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Sections 182, 226, 237 and 238, India Code English text (a1872-9.pdf) and official Hindi text (H1872-09.pdf); the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, Sections 25 and 26, India Code text [As on the 7th July, 2025]; the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Section 141, India Code English text (a1881-26.pdf) and official Hindi text (H1881-26.pdf); and the Supreme Court of India’s official copies of State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Vidhyawati, 2 February 1962 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/3984.pdf), Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P., 29 September 1964 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/3167.pdf), Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd., 25 March 1977 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/5316.pdf), Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, 24 March 1993 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/12126.pdf), Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das, 28 January 2000 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/16557.pdf) and Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 2015, 9 January 2015 (https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/42239.pdf). Sitaram Motilal Kalal, N. Nagendra Rao, Canadian Pacific Railway v. Lockhart and Conway v. George Wimpey are mentioned only as described in these judgments.
