Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963: Continuing Breach of Contract and Continuing Tort, with the Text in English and Hindi, Section 2(m), Supreme Court Cases and Time Limits

Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with “Continuing breaches and torts”. It says that “In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.” In plain words, while a breach of contract or a tort is still going on, the time for going to court keeps starting again, so it is not counted only from the day the wrong began.

The section helps only where the wrong itself continues. In Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan (1959), followed by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2019), the Supreme Court held that “If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue”, and that an ouster (dispossession) completes the injury on the day it happens. This guide sets out the text in English and Hindi, the meaning of “tort” in Section 2(m), the Supreme Court’s test and its examples, and the limitation periods for contract and tort.

Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Limitation Act is quoted from its English and Hindi texts on India Code, and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.

Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963: the text

Section 22 is headed “Continuing breaches and torts”. As printed in the Act on India Code, it reads:

“22. Continuing breaches and torts.—In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.”

The Limitation Act, 1963 is Act No. 36 of 1963, dated 5 October 1963. Its long title describes it as “An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith.” It extends to the whole of India (the words that once excluded Jammu and Kashmir were omitted with effect from 31 October 2019), and the Central Government brought it into force on 1 January 1964 by notification S.O. 3118 dated 29 October 1963, and in Sikkim from 1 September 1984. Section 22 sits in Part III of the Act, “Computation of period of limitation” (Sections 12 to 24), alongside the rules on excluding time, acknowledgments in writing and part-payments. India Code’s current text, shown “As on the 30th August, 2026”, carries no amendment note against Section 22.

The section does two things. It names the two situations it covers, a continuing breach of contract and a continuing tort, and for them it changes the way time is counted: instead of a single period running from a single starting date, “a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time” during which the breach or the tort continues. The Act does not define “continuing”; its meaning comes from the Supreme Court’s judgments discussed below.

Section 22 in Hindi (official text)

The official Hindi text of the Act, परिसीमा अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का अधिनियम संख्यांक 36), published on India Code, gives Section 22 as follows:

“22. चालू रहने वाले भंग और अपकृत्य—किसी चालू रहने वाले संविदा-भंग या चालू रहने वाले अपकृत्य की दशा में एक नया परिसीमा काल उस समय के दौरान प्रति क्षण चलना आरम्भ होता रहता है जिसमें, यथास्थिति, ऐसा भंग या ऐसा अपकृत्य चालू रहे ।”

In the Hindi text, “continuing” is चालू रहने वाला, “breach of contract” is संविदा-भंग, “tort” is अपकृत्य and “period of limitation” is परिसीमा काल. This page is about Section 22 of the Limitation Act (परिसीमा अधिनियम) only; provisions numbered 22 in other laws deal with different subjects, as explained next. A summary of this guide in Hindi is given further below.

Not to be confused with Article 22, Section 2(21) BNS (formerly Section 22 IPC) or a “Section 22A”

Section 22 should not be confused with Article 22. The Schedule to the Act, which sets out the periods of limitation, is divided into numbered articles, and Article 22 is in Part II, “Suits relating to contracts”. It covers a suit “For money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, including money of a customer in the hands of his banker so payable”, with a period of three years counted from “When the demand is made.” It has nothing to do with continuing wrongs.

Other provisions numbered 22 are also unrelated. Article 22 of the Constitution of India deals with “Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases”. The definition of “movable property” is now in Section 2(21) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 22 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860), while Section 22 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita deals with the act of a person of unsound mind (formerly Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code). Finally, the Limitation Act has no Section 22A: its Arrangement of Sections goes straight from Section 22 to Section 23.

What “tort” means: Section 2(m) of the Limitation Act

Section 22 applies to a “continuing tort”, and the Act defines the word. Section 2(m) says that “tort” means “a civil wrong which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust”. In the official Hindi text the same definition is clause (ड) of Section 2: “(ड) ‘अपकृत्य’ से ऐसा सिविल दोष अभिप्रेत है जो केवल संविदा भंग या न्यासभंग न हो ;”. The Hindi text letters the clauses in Devanagari order, which is why clause (m) appears there as clause (ड).

In plain words, a tort is a civil wrong other than one that is only a breach of contract or only a breach of trust. The Act does not list torts, but the articles in Part VII of the Schedule, “Suits relating to tort”, show the kinds of suits it has in mind, such as suits for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, trespass upon immovable property, obstructing a way or a water-course and infringing copyright. The word “nuisance” does not appear anywhere in the Act, although the Privy Council described obstructions to the flow of water as “continuing nuisances”, a ruling the Supreme Court has discussed (see the examples below). The firm’s article A Deep Dive into Torts discusses civil wrongs more generally.

What is a continuing wrong? The Supreme Court’s test

Section 22 does not say when a breach or a tort is “continuing”. The Supreme Court’s explanation starts with Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, decided by a bench of three judges of the Supreme Court on 26 March 1959 (AIR 1959 SC 798; later judgments spell the names Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare and Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan). The case arose under Section 23 of the 1908 Act. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar said:

“It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.”

The Supreme Court has since used this as the test under Section 22. In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (13 August 2008), it said that Balkrishna explained the concept of continuing wrong “in the context of section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963”. In Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd. (11 January 2022), a consumer case, it turned to Section 22 (paragraph 12), quoted the same passage and applied it.

In M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (9 November 2019), the case about the disputed site at Ayodhya, a Constitution Bench of five judges restated the test. It said that “a distinction must be made between the source of a legal injury and the effect of the injury”, that “A continuing wrong arises where there is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular manner”, and that “What makes a wrong, a wrong of a continuing nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist” (paragraph 267). There must first be a wrong at all: “For a continuing wrong to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong which is actionable because in the absence of a wrong, there can be no continuing wrong.” In Samruddhi the Court put the idea in one sentence: “A continuing wrong occurs when a party continuously breaches an obligation imposed by law or agreement” (paragraph 15).

In practice, therefore, the question is not whether the plaintiff is still suffering, but whether the defendant is still breaking a duty that continues. If the duty is to keep doing something, such as keeping premises in repair, or to keep refraining from something, such as obstructing a right of way, and the defendant is still in breach, the wrong continues and Section 22 gives a fresh period at every moment of the breach. If the wrong was a single act that was complete when it was done, the period is counted from the starting point the Schedule gives for that kind of suit, however long the consequences last. Section 22 does not say in terms how far back compensation can be claimed for a breach or tort that has continued for years, and the judgments discussed on this page do not decide that question for civil suits; the three-year limit on arrears described below was laid down for service claims.

Two statements from Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790, are also part of this line of cases. As quoted by the Supreme Court in M. Siddiq (paragraph 261) and in Samruddhi (paragraph 13), the Court said there: “A wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default.” As quoted in Samruddhi, it added that “the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature.” Suresh Seth was about a penalty for failing to file a wealth-tax return; in Maya Rani Punj v. CIT, (1986) 1 SCC 445, a bench of three judges disapproved of that decision and held that, under the income-tax penalty it was dealing with, the default continued so long as a return was not filed (as described in M. Siddiq, paragraph 262).

What is not a continuing wrong: completed acts and ouster

The facts of Balkrishna show how the test works. The appellants, the Guravs, were hereditary worshippers of the Shree Dnyaneshwar Sansthan at Alandi. In 1922, after the Guravs had taken forcible possession of the temple, the trustees of the Sansthan obtained a decree for possession against them under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act then in force, and the Guravs were dispossessed in execution of that decree. Years later they sued for a declaration of their rights as hereditary worshippers, an injunction and accounts. The Supreme Court held that “the right to sue accrued to the Guravs at the latest on November 4, 1922, when a decree was passed under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act”, so that suits filed “long after the expiration of six years from 1922” were barred under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, its residuary article.

The Guravs argued that the trustees’ conduct was a continuing wrong. The Court rejected the argument: “As soon as the decree was passed and the appellants were dispossessed in execution proceedings, their rights had been completely injured, and though their dispossession continued, it cannot be said that the trustees were committing wrongful acts or acts of tort from moment to moment so as to give the appellants a cause of action de die in diem.” It concluded: “We think there can be no doubt that where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of s. 23 in such a case.” The Court recorded that the result was “unfortunate”, because the Guravs had proved their rights as hereditary worshippers in both the courts below, but their claim had to be rejected “on the ground that they have filed their suits beyond time”.

The Constitution Bench applied the same rule in M. Siddiq. One of the suits there had been filed on 17 December 1959 by Nirmohi Akhara, which claimed, as shebait, the management and charge of the Janmabhumi temple, and it was outside the six-year period of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The Akhara argued that the denial of its rights was a continuing wrong, so that “a fresh cause of action arose every day”. The Court held: “where a wrongful act amounts to an ouster, as in the present case, the resulting injury is complete on the date of the ouster itself. A wrong or default as a result of which the injury is complete is not a continuing wrong or default even though its effect continues to be felt despite its completion” (paragraph 266). Because the Akhara had itself pleaded that its cause of action arose on 5 January 1950, “the ouster which the Akhara asserts from its role as a shebait had taken place and hence, there was no question of the principle of continuing wrong being attracted” (paragraph 268). The Court also said that “if there is no right, there can be no corresponding wrong which can furnish the foundation of a continuing wrong.”

On this reasoning, a person who has been ousted from property cannot rely on Section 22 merely because he or she remains out of possession; in the Supreme Court’s words, the injury is complete on the date of the ouster. Suits for possession of immovable property have their own articles in Part V of the Schedule, “Suits relating to immovable property”. Article 64 covers a suit for possession “based on previous possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed”, with twelve years from “The date of dispossession”, and Article 65 covers a suit for possession “based on title”, with twelve years from “When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff”. Under Section 27, at the end of the period limited for a suit for possession of any property, the person’s “right to such property shall be extinguished”. The firm’s guide to adverse possession in India explains the twelve-year rule.

Continuing wrongs and recurring (successive) wrongs

A continuing wrong must also be distinguished from a wrong that is repeated. In Tarsem Singh the Supreme Court explained: “A ‘continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. ‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action.” Article 55 of the Schedule also separates the two for breach of contract: for a suit for compensation, time runs “When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases.”

The Act does not use the phrase “continuing cause of action”. In a passage quoted by the Supreme Court in Samruddhi (paragraph 13), through its earlier judgment in Suresh Seth, Lord Lindley said in Hole v. Chard Union (1894): “What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought.”

Service cases show how the two ideas work together. In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India (1995), as quoted in Tarsem Singh, the employee’s grievance that his pay had been wrongly fixed was “the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules”, but arrears that had “become time barred would not be recoverable”. Tarsem Singh itself concerned a member of the Indian Army who had been invalided out of service on 13 November 1983 and approached the High Court in 1999 for disability pension. The Court summarised the rule for service claims: relief can be granted despite a long delay where the claim is based on a continuing wrong, unless reopening the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, but “In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition” (paragraph 5). That rule was laid down for service claims brought by writ petition or before the Administrative Tribunal; the firm’s guide to writ petitions explains that remedy.

Recurring rights and payments also have their own articles in the Schedule. A suit “To establish a periodically recurring right” must be brought within three years from “When the plaintiff is first refused the enjoyment of the right” (Article 104); a suit “For arrears of rent” within three years from “When the arrears become due” (Article 52); and a suit for money payable for interest upon money due within three years from “When the interest becomes due” (Article 25).

Examples of continuing wrongs in the courts’ judgments

Whether a wrong is continuing depends on the facts. As the Constitution Bench put it in M. Siddiq, “The notion of what constitutes a continuing wrong has evolved through the decisions of this Court, depending on the factual context involved in each case” (paragraph 260). The examples below are taken from the Supreme Court’s judgments.

Obstructing the flow of water

The earliest of these examples is a Privy Council ruling, Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abdul Hossein (1880). As quoted in M. Siddiq (paragraph 259), the Privy Council said that “the obstructions which interfered with the flow of water to the Plaintiff’s mehal were in the nature of continuing nuisances, as to which the cause of action was renewed de die in diem so long as the obstructions causing such interference were allowed to continue.” In Balkrishna the Supreme Court explained why this was different from an ouster: whenever the defendant “drew off water through the said diversions he was in fact stealing plaintiff’s water and thereby committing fresh wrong every time. Thus this is clearly not a case of exclusion or ouster.”

Interference with worship: Hukum Chand

In Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1933), also decided by the Privy Council, the Swetambaris had placed charans of a new form (representations of the feet of saints) in three shrines, and the Digambaris refused to worship them. Describing that case in Balkrishna, the Supreme Court said: “There is no doubt that the impugned action did not amount to ouster or complete dispossession of the plaintiffs. It was action which was of the character of a continuing wrong and as such it gave rise to a cause of action de die in diem.”

Duties that continue from day to day

In Suresh Seth, as quoted in M. Siddiq (paragraph 261) and Samruddhi (paragraph 13), the Supreme Court said that where the wrong is the omission to perform a positive duty, the test is “whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act”. It said that the breach of a covenant to keep premises in good repair, the breach of a continuing guarantee, the obstruction of a right of way, the obstruction of a person’s right to the unobstructed flow of water, a man’s refusal to maintain the wife and children whom he is bound by law to maintain, and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the measures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen “may be illustrations of continuing breaches or wrongs giving rise to civil or criminal liability”.

A builder’s failure to obtain an occupancy certificate (Samruddhi, 2022)

In Samruddhi, the members of a co-operative housing society had booked their flats in 1993 and got possession in 1997, but the builder had not obtained the occupancy certificate, and still had not done so when the Supreme Court decided the appeal. As a result, they had to pay property tax “at a rate 25% higher than the normal rate” and water charges at a rate “50% higher than the normal charge”. When the society claimed the excess from the builder, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) dismissed the complaint on 3 December 2018, holding that it was barred by limitation because the cause of action arose when the higher charges were first demanded, and that it was not maintainable.

The Supreme Court (Justices D.Y. Chandrachud and A.S. Bopanna) reversed that order. Under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act 1963 (MOFA) and the agreements to sell, the builder was obliged to provide the occupancy certificate and to pay the relevant charges until it was provided. The Court held: “This continuous failure to obtain an occupancy certificate is a breach of the obligations imposed on the respondent under the MOFA and amounts to a continuing wrong. The appellants therefore, are entitled to damages arising out of this continuing wrong and their complaint is not barred by limitation” (paragraph 18). It said that rejecting the complaint as time-barred, when higher taxes were being demanded repeatedly for want of the certificate, was a narrow view, out of keeping with the welfare objective of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It held the complaint maintainable and sent it back to the NCDRC to be decided on its merits within three months.

Samruddhi was decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, whose Section 24A, in the Court’s words, required a complaint to be filed “within two years of the date on which the cause of action has arisen”. That Act has been repealed by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (Section 107(1)), whose relevant provisions came into force on 20 July 2020. Section 69(1) of the 2019 Act says that a Commission “shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen”, and Section 69(2) allows a later complaint if the complainant shows “sufficient cause”, provided the Commission records its reasons for condoning the delay. The firm’s guide to the Consumer Protection Act explains how complaints are filed.

Passing off and trade mark infringement (Bengal Waterproof, 1996)

In Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company (18 November 1996), the owner of the “DUCK BACK” mark for raincoats had filed a second suit for infringement and passing off, and the question was whether Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 barred it. The Supreme Court (Justices A.S. Anand and S.B. Majmudar) said that passing off is “an action in substance of deceit under the Law of Torts”, that “Wherever and whenever fresh deceitful act is committed the person deceived would naturally have a fresh cause of action in his favour”, and that “In cases of continuous causes of action or recurring causes of action bar of Order 2 Rule 2 sub-rule (3) cannot be invoked.” Looking at Section 22 for guidance, it added that “infringement of a registered trade mark would also be a continuing wrong so long as infringement continues”, and it decreed the suit. The Court referred to Section 22 while deciding the Order 2 Rule 2 question; it was not deciding a plea of limitation. The firm’s overview of intellectual property rights in India covers trade marks more generally.

Limitation period for breach of contract

Part II of the Schedule, “Suits relating to contracts”, has separate articles for many kinds of contract claims, such as wages, the price of goods sold, money lent and arrears of rent. Where no more specific article applies, a suit for compensation for breach of contract falls under Article 55: “For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for.” The period is three years, and it runs “When the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases.”

Article 55 is the only article in the Schedule that itself refers to a continuing breach. It gives three starting points: for a single breach, the date on which the contract is broken; for successive breaches, the date of the particular breach for which the suit is brought; and for a continuing breach, the date on which the breach ceases. In the official Hindi text, the last of these reads “(जहां कि भंग निरन्तर हो रहा है वहां) उस भंग का होना बन्द हो जाए”.

Part II also has more specific articles on breach and performance. For example, Article 27 covers a suit “For compensation for breach of a promise to do anything at a specified time, or upon the happening of a specified contingency”, with three years from “When the time specified arrives or the contingency happens”, and Article 54 covers a suit “For specific performance of a contract”, with three years from “The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused”. The firm’s guides to the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the Specific Relief Act, 1963 explain those remedies.

Limitation period for suits in tort

Part VII of the Schedule, headed “Suits relating to tort”, contains Articles 72 to 91. The period is one year for Articles 72 to 81, two years for Articles 82 to 84 and three years for Articles 85 to 91, and each article fixes its own starting point. In summary:

Article	Suit	Period	Time begins to run
72	Compensation for an act or omission alleged to be in pursuance of an enactment in force	One year	When the act or omission takes place
73	Compensation for false imprisonment	One year	When the imprisonment ends
74	Compensation for a malicious prosecution	One year	When the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated
75	Compensation for libel	One year	When the libel is published
76	Compensation for slander	One year	When the words are spoken, or, if they are not actionable in themselves, when the special damage results
77	Compensation for loss of service caused by the seduction of the plaintiff’s servant or daughter	One year	When the loss occurs
78	Compensation for inducing a person to break a contract with the plaintiff	One year	The date of the breach
79	Compensation for an illegal, irregular or excessive distress	One year	The date of the distress
80	Compensation for wrongful seizure of movable property under legal process	One year	The date of the seizure
81	By executors, administrators or representatives under the Legal Representatives’ Suits Act, 1855	One year	The date of the death of the person wronged
82	By executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855	Two years	The date of the death of the person killed
83	Under the Legal Representatives’ Suits Act, 1855, against an executor, administrator or other representative	Two years	When the wrong complained of is done
84	Against one who, having a right to use property for specific purposes, perverts it to other purposes	Two years	When the perversion first becomes known to the person injured by it
85	Compensation for obstructing a way or a water-course	Three years	The date of the obstruction
86	Compensation for diverting a water-course	Three years	The date of the diversion
87	Compensation for trespass upon immovable property	Three years	The date of the trespass
88	Compensation for infringing copyright or any other exclusive privilege	Three years	The date of the infringement
89	To restrain waste	Three years	When the waste begins
90	Compensation for injury caused by an injunction wrongfully obtained	Three years	When the injunction ceases
91(a)	Compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining specific movable property lost, or acquired by theft, dishonest misappropriation or conversion	Three years	When the person entitled to possession first learns in whose possession it is
91(b)	Compensation for wrongfully taking, injuring or detaining any other specific movable property	Three years	When the property is wrongfully taken or injured, or when the detainer’s possession becomes unlawful

Where no article in the Schedule applies, Article 113 in Part X, “Suits for which there is no prescribed period”, covers “Any suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule”, with a period of “Three years” from “When the right to sue accrues.” No article names “nuisance”, and a suit that no specific article covers falls under Article 113. Because each article has its own period and its own starting point, the first step in any limitation question is to find the article that fits the suit. The firm’s limitation calculator helps with the counting once the article and its starting point are known.

How Section 22 fits with the rest of the Limitation Act

The basic rule is in Section 3(1): “Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” Section 22 is among the sections, 4 to 24, to which this bar is subject. The court must apply limitation even if the defendant does not raise it, and a suit is instituted, in an ordinary case, “when the plaint is presented to the proper officer” (Section 3(2)(a)(i)).

Once time has started, it does not stop because of later difficulties. Section 9 says: “Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it”. In counting any period, “the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded” (Section 12(1)).

Two sections give a fresh period in a different way, through the conduct of the person against whom the claim is made. Under Section 18(1), where, before the period expires, an acknowledgment of liability is made in writing signed by the party against whom the property or right is claimed (or by a person through whom he derives his title or liability), “a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed.” Under Section 19, a payment on account of a debt, or of interest on a legacy, made before the period expires by the person liable or his duly authorised agent starts a fresh period from the time of the payment, provided that “an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment” (except for interest paid before 1 January 1928).

Section 23, which follows Section 22, deals with acts that are not actionable without special damage: “In the case of a suit for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless some specific injury actually results therefrom, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the injury results.” Article 76 follows the same idea for slander where the words are not actionable in themselves, running “when the special damage complained of results”.

Section 5, which allows a court to admit an appeal or an application after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant had “sufficient cause”, applies by its words to “Any appeal or any application” (other than an application under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908); it does not mention suits. The firm’s article on condonation of delay discusses that provision.

History: Section 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908

Section 22 corresponds to Section 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which read, as quoted by the Supreme Court in M. Siddiq (paragraph 256): “23. Continuing breaches and wrongs. – In the case of a continuing breach of contract and in the case of a continuing wrong independent of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the wrong, as the case may be, continues.” The 1963 Act uses “continuing tort” where the 1908 Act said “continuing wrong independent of contract”, and it defines “tort” in Section 2(m). In Tarsem Singh the Supreme Court referred to “section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963”, and in Samruddhi it cited Section 22 and applied Balkrishna’s explanation of Section 23.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons printed with the 1963 Act on India Code says that the Bill sought to implement the Third Report of the Law Commission on the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, with one important modification: it was felt that it would be “more advantageous to adhere to the existing scheme which in almost all cases indicates the specific point of time from which the period of limitation begins to run”. The Schedule accordingly has a third column headed “Time from which period begins to run”. In M. Siddiq the Constitution Bench described both Acts in these words: “Both the Limitation Act 1908 and its successor, the Limitation Act of 1963 are statutes of repose.”

Continuing offences in criminal law

Criminal law has a parallel rule for the limitation on taking cognizance of offences. Section 518 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, carried over without change), in force since 1 July 2024, says: “In the case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues.” In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972), as quoted in M. Siddiq (paragraph 260), the Supreme Court said that “A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all.” The firm’s IPC to BNS, CrPC to BNSS comparison tool shows the full mapping of the old and new codes.

Supreme Court judgments on Section 22 at a glance

Case	Date and bench	What it means for Section 22
Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan	26 March 1959, three judges	A continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury; an ouster completes the injury, so the continuing-wrong rule (then Section 23 of the 1908 Act) does not apply
Bengal Waterproof Ltd v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Co.	18 November 1996, two judges	Passing off gives a fresh cause of action with each deceitful act, and trade mark infringement is a continuing wrong while it continues; Section 22 used as a guide on Order 2 Rule 2 CPC
Union of India v. Tarsem Singh	13 August 2008, two judges	A continuing wrong is a single act causing continuing injury; recurring wrongs each give a separate cause of action; service arrears normally limited to three years before the writ petition
M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das	9 November 2019, Constitution Bench of five judges	A continuing wrong needs the breach of a continuing duty; an ouster is complete on its date; the plea failed in Nirmohi Akhara’s suit
Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd.	11 January 2022, two judges	A builder’s continuing failure to obtain the occupancy certificate is a continuing wrong; the consumer complaint was not barred by limitation

धारा 22 परिसीमा अधिनियम, 1963 (Section 22 Limitation Act) – हिंदी में

धारा 22 क्या है? यहाँ जिस धारा 22 की बात है, वह परिसीमा अधिनियम, 1963 (1963 का अधिनियम संख्यांक 36) की धारा 22 है, भारतीय न्याय संहिता, 2023 (पहले भारतीय दंड संहिता) या किसी अन्य कानून की नहीं। यह अधिनियम वादों और अन्य कार्यवाहियों की परिसीमा (समय-सीमा) से सम्बन्धित है और 1 जनवरी 1964 से लागू है। धारा 22 का शीर्षक “चालू रहने वाले भंग और अपकृत्य” है, और इंडिया कोड पर प्रकाशित आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में यह धारा इस प्रकार है:

“22. चालू रहने वाले भंग और अपकृत्य—किसी चालू रहने वाले संविदा-भंग या चालू रहने वाले अपकृत्य की दशा में एक नया परिसीमा काल उस समय के दौरान प्रति क्षण चलना आरम्भ होता रहता है जिसमें, यथास्थिति, ऐसा भंग या ऐसा अपकृत्य चालू रहे ।”

सरल शब्दों में, जब तक संविदा-भंग (breach of contract) या अपकृत्य (tort) चालू रहता है, तब तक वाद लाने का समय नए सिरे से शुरू होता रहता है; समय केवल उस दिन से नहीं गिना जाता जिस दिन गलत कार्य शुरू हुआ था। अपकृत्य की परिभाषा धारा 2(ड) में है (अंग्रेज़ी पाठ में धारा 2(m)): “(ड) ‘अपकृत्य’ से ऐसा सिविल दोष अभिप्रेत है जो केवल संविदा भंग या न्यासभंग न हो ;”। अधिनियम “चालू रहने वाले” की परिभाषा नहीं देता; इसका अर्थ सुप्रीम कोर्ट के निर्णयों से तय हुआ है।

सुप्रीम कोर्ट की कसौटी: बालकृष्ण सावलराम पुजारी बनाम श्री ज्ञानेश्वर महाराज संस्थान (26 मार्च 1959) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि चालू रहने वाला दोष (continuing wrong) ऐसा कार्य है जो क्षति का निरंतर स्रोत उत्पन्न करता है और कार्य करने वाले को उस क्षति के जारी रहने के लिए उत्तरदायी बनाता है। यदि गलत कार्य से हुई क्षति उसी समय पूरी हो गई, तो वह चालू रहने वाला दोष नहीं है, भले ही उससे होने वाला नुकसान आगे भी बना रहे। एम. सिद्दीक बनाम महंत सुरेश दास (9 नवंबर 2019) में संविधान पीठ ने यही कसौटी दोहराई: दोष तभी चालू रहता है जब कोई ऐसा कर्तव्य टूट रहा हो जो समाप्त नहीं हुआ बल्कि बना हुआ है।

बेदखली चालू रहने वाला दोष नहीं है: बालकृष्ण मामले में गुरव (वंशानुगत पुजारी) डिक्री के निष्पादन में बेदखल किए गए थे। सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि बेदखली (ouster) से क्षति उसी तारीख को पूरी हो जाती है, भले ही व्यक्ति कब्जे से बाहर बना रहे, इसलिए उनके वाद समय-सीमा से बाहर माने गए। एम. सिद्दीक में निर्मोही अखाड़ा का ऐसा ही तर्क भी अस्वीकार हुआ। अचल संपत्ति के कब्जे के वादों के लिए अनुसूची में अलग अनुच्छेद हैं, जैसे अनुच्छेद 64 और 65 (बारह वर्ष)।

चालू और आवर्ती दोष में अंतर: यूनियन ऑफ इंडिया बनाम तरसेम सिंह (13 अगस्त 2008) के अनुसार चालू रहने वाला दोष एक ही गलत कार्य है जिससे निरंतर क्षति होती है, जबकि आवर्ती या क्रमिक दोष (recurring/successive wrongs) समय-समय पर होते हैं और हर एक से अलग वाद-हेतुक उत्पन्न होता है। धारा 22 यह स्पष्ट रूप से नहीं कहती कि वर्षों से चल रहे भंग या अपकृत्य के लिए कितने पीछे तक का प्रतिकर माँगा जा सकता है, और इस पृष्ठ पर चर्चित निर्णय सिविल वादों के लिए यह प्रश्न तय नहीं करते; बकाया राशि को सामान्यतः तीन वर्ष तक सीमित करने का नियम सेवा संबंधी दावों के लिए है।

उदाहरण: सुप्रीम कोर्ट के निर्णयों में कहा गया है कि पानी के प्रवाह में बाधा, रास्ते के अधिकार में बाधा और परिसर को अच्छी मरम्मत में रखने की प्रसंविदा का भंग चालू रहने वाले दोष के उदाहरण हो सकते हैं। बंगाल वाटरप्रूफ (18 नवंबर 1996) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि पंजीकृत व्यापार चिह्न (registered trade mark) का उल्लंघन, जब तक वह जारी रहे, चालू रहने वाला दोष है; यह बात सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता के आदेश 2 नियम 2 के प्रश्न पर कही गई थी, परिसीमा के बचाव पर नहीं। समृद्धि को-ऑपरेटिव हाउसिंग सोसाइटी (11 जनवरी 2022) में बिल्डर द्वारा अधिभोग प्रमाणपत्र (occupancy certificate) प्राप्त करने में लगातार विफलता को चालू रहने वाला दोष माना गया।

परिसीमा काल: संविदा-भंग के प्रतिकर के वाद के लिए, जहाँ कोई अधिक विशिष्ट अनुच्छेद लागू न हो, अनुसूची का अनुच्छेद 55 तीन वर्ष देता है। यह समय संविदा भंग होने से, आनुक्रमिक भंग में उस भंग से जिसके बारे में वाद है, और निरंतर भंग में तब से चलता है जब, आधिकारिक पाठ के शब्दों में, “उस भंग का होना बन्द हो जाए”। अपकृत्य के वाद “भाग 7—अपकृत्य सम्बन्धी वाद” (अनुच्छेद 72 से 91) में हैं, जिनमें अपकृत्य के प्रकार के अनुसार एक, दो या तीन वर्ष की अवधि है। जिस वाद के लिए अनुसूची में कहीं और अवधि नहीं दी गई है, उस पर अनुच्छेद 113 लागू होता है: तीन वर्ष, “जब वाद लाने का अधिकार प्रोद्भूत हो” तब से।

अन्य बातें: धारा 3(1) के अनुसार समय बीतने के बाद दायर वाद खारिज किया जाएगा, भले ही प्रतिवादी ने परिसीमा का बचाव न उठाया हो। अनुसूची का अनुच्छेद 22 (माँग पर देय जमा धन के लिए वाद) धारा 22 से अलग है; संविधान का अनुच्छेद 22 कुछ दशाओं में गिरफ्तारी और निरोध से संरक्षण के बारे में है; चल संपत्ति (movable property) की परिभाषा भारतीय न्याय संहिता, 2023 की धारा 2(21) में है (पहले भारतीय दंड संहिता की धारा 22); और परिसीमा अधिनियम में कोई धारा 22A नहीं है।

Frequently asked questions

Conclusion

Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 gives a fresh period of limitation at every moment while a breach of contract or a tort continues, but it helps only where the wrong itself continues, not merely its effects. Since Balkrishna Savalram Pujari (1959), followed by a Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (2019), the Supreme Court has required the breach of a duty that has not ceased; damage that lingers after a completed act is not enough. An ouster is complete on the day it happens, and recurring wrongs each give a separate cause of action.

In practice, the first step is to find the article of the Schedule that fits the suit, such as Article 55 for compensation for breach of a contract that no more specific article covers, an article in Part VII for a tort, or Article 113 where no other article applies, and to note its starting point; the second is to ask whether the defendant is still breaking a continuing duty. A suit filed outside the period must be dismissed even if the defendant does not object, and Section 5, by its words, applies only to appeals and applications.

Sources used for this post: the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. 36 of 1963), Sections 1, 2(m), 3, 5, 9, 12(1), 18(1), 19, 22, 23 and 27, its Statement of Objects and Reasons and Articles 22, 25, 27, 52, 54, 55, 64, 65, 72 to 91, 104 and 113 of its Schedule, in the English text on India Code (as on 30 August 2026), and its official Hindi text on India Code (the title, Sections 2(ड) and 22, Article 55, the heading of Part 7 and Article 113); the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Sections 69 and 107, on India Code; the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Section 518, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Sections 2(21) and 22, on India Code, with the firm’s section-by-section comparison data for the former CrPC and IPC numbers; Article 22 of the Constitution of India in the Legislative Department’s edition; and the Supreme Court of India’s own copies of Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan (26 March 1959, describing the Privy Council’s decisions in Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abdul Hossein (1880) and Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1933)), Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company (18 November 1996), Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (13 August 2008, quoting M.R. Gupta v. Union of India (1995)), M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (9 November 2019, quoting Section 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Rajroop Koer, Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Amritsar v. Suresh Seth (1981), Maya Rani Punj v. CIT (1986) and State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972)) and Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Pvt. Ltd. (11 January 2022, on Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act 1963, quoting Suresh Seth and Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union (1894)).