Article 13 of the Indian Constitution protects the fundamental rights against laws that conflict with them. It is headed “Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights” and has four clauses. Clause (1) makes the laws in force in India immediately before the Constitution’s commencement on 26 January 1950 void “to the extent of such inconsistency” with the fundamental rights in Part III. Clause (2) says that “The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part”, and a law made in breach of it is void “to the extent of the contravention”. Clause (3) defines “law” and “laws in force”, and clause (4), added by the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 with effect from 5 November 1971, says that nothing in the article applies to an amendment of the Constitution made under Article 368.
This guide gives the full text of Article 13 in English and in Hindi, whose official text the Constitution makes authoritative (Article 394A), together with the official Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam and Telugu versions published by the Legislative Department of the Government of India. It then explains each clause with the Supreme Court judgments on it: why Article 13 does not reach back before 1950, the doctrines of eclipse and severability, whether a fundamental right can be waived, the line of cases on whether an amendment of the Constitution is “law” under Article 13, and how a person whose fundamental rights are breached can go to the Supreme Court or a High Court. A summary in Hindi and answers to common questions follow.
Article 13 at a glance
- What it says: laws in force immediately before 26 January 1950 are void to the extent that they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights in Part III (clause (1)), and the State must not make any law that takes away or abridges those rights; a law it makes in contravention is void to that extent (clause (2)).
- Clauses: Article 13 has four clauses, (1) to (4), and clause (3) has two sub-clauses, (a) and (b); there is no Article 13(5).
- What counts as “law”: under clause (3)(a), “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law.
- Clause (4): inserted by Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 with effect from 5 November 1971, it says that nothing in Article 13 applies to an amendment of the Constitution made under Article 368; but since Kesavananda Bharati (1973), as quoted by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills (1980), Article 368 “does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution”.
- In Hindi: अनुच्छेद 13 is headed “मूल अधिकारों से असंगत या उनका अल्पीकरण करने वाली विधियां”, and the Hindi translation published under Article 394A is the authoritative text of the Constitution in Hindi; in it the provision is an अनुच्छेद (article), not a धारा (section).
- Doctrines: Article 13(1) is prospective, not retrospective (Keshavan Madhava Menon, 1951); a pre-1950 law that is inconsistent with a fundamental right is eclipsed, not dead, and revives once the inconsistency is removed (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras, 1955); the valid part of a law survives if it can be separated from the invalid part (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla, 1957); and the right under Article 14 cannot be waived (Basheshar Nath, 1958).
- Remedies: Article 13 does not itself provide a remedy; a person can move the Supreme Court under Article 32 or a High Court under Article 226 for directions, orders or writs, and the Supreme Court has ordered compensation for the deprivation of a fundamental right (Rudul Sah, 1983).
- Other languages: the Legislative Department also publishes official Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam and Telugu versions of the Constitution, and Article 13 from each is reproduced below exactly as printed.
Reviewed and updated by Century Law Firm, Delhi – October 2026. Statutory references are to the Acts as in force on that date. The Constitution is quoted from the Legislative Department’s own editions (English as on 10 September 2026, Hindi as on 1 May 2024, and the Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam and Telugu editions named below), and the judgments from the Supreme Court’s own copies.
Article 13 of the Indian Constitution: the full text
Article 13 comes at the start of Part III of the Constitution, “Fundamental Rights”, under the sub-heading “General”, right after Article 12, which defines “the State”. In the Legislative Department’s edition of the Constitution as on 10 September 2026, which incorporates all the amendments up to the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, Article 13 reads:
“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.—(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”
“(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.”
“(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,—”
“(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;”
“(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.”
“1[(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.]”
The figure 1 and the square brackets around clause (4) point to the footnote printed under the article: “1. Ins. by the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, s. 2 (w.e.f. 5-11-1971).” Clause (4) was therefore inserted by Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, with effect from 5 November 1971. It is the only footnote to Article 13, and the edition’s preface explains that “The foot notes below the text indicate the Constitution Amendment Acts by which such amendments have been made.” Article 13 has thus been amended only once; its heading and its first three clauses stand as originally enacted.
Article 13 ends at clause (4). The English and Hindi texts and the four regional-language editions quoted on this page all have clauses (1) to (4) only, and none of them shows a clause (5), not even as an omitted clause. There is no Article 13(5). The only clause (5) that deals with amendments of the Constitution is in Article 368, the article on amending the Constitution: Article 368(5) was inserted by Section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 3 January 1977, and the official footnote adds: “This section has been declared invalid by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Others vs. Union of India and Others AIR 1980 SC 1789.”
Article 13 in Hindi: the official text (अनुच्छेद 13)
Article 394A of the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1987 with effect from 9 December 1987, requires the President to cause a Hindi translation of the Constitution and of every amendment to be published under his authority, and clause (3) provides that this translation “shall be deemed to be, for all purposes, the authoritative text thereof in the Hindi language”. The Legislative Department’s Hindi edition, भारत का संविधान, as on 1 May 2024 (it includes all amendments up to the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023), prints Article 13 in भाग 3 (Part III), मूल अधिकार (Fundamental Rights), under the sub-heading साधारण (General), as follows:
“13. मूल अधिकारों से असंगत या उनका अल्पीकरण करने वाली विधियां–(1) इस संविधान के प्रारंभ से ठीक पहले भारत के राज्यक्षेत्र में प्रवृत्त सभी विधियां उस मात्रा तक शून्य होंगी जिस तक वे इस भाग के उपबंधों से असंगत हैं ।”
“(2) राज्य ऐसी कोई विधि नहीं बनाएगा जो इस भाग द्वारा प्रदत्त अधिकारों को छीनती है या न्यून करती है और इस खंड के उल्लंघन में बनाई गई प्रत्येक विधि उल्लंघन की मात्रा तक शून्य होगी ।”
“(3) इस अनुच्छेद में, जब तक कि संदर्भ से अन्यथा अपेक्षित न हो,—”
“(क) “विधि” के अंतर्गत भारत के राज्यक्षेत्र में विधि का बल रखने वाला कोई अध्यादेश, आदेश, उपविधि, नियम, विनियम, अधिसूचना, रूढ़ि या प्रथा है;”
“(ख) “प्रवृत्त विधि” के अंतर्गत भारत के राज्यक्षेत्र में किसी विधान-मंडल या अन्य सक्षम प्राधिकारी द्वारा इस संविधान के प्रारंभ से पहले पारित या बनाई गई विधि है जो पहले ही निरसित नहीं कर दी गई है, चाहे ऐसी कोई विधि या उसका कोई भाग उस समय पूर्णतया या विशिष्ट क्षेत्रों में प्रवर्तन में नहीं है ।”
“1[(4) इस अनुच्छेद की कोई बात अनुच्छेद 368 के अधीन किए गए इस संविधान के किसी संशोधन को लागू नहीं होगी ।]”
The footnote to clause (4) reads: “1. संविधान (चौबीसवां संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1971 की धारा 2 द्वारा (5-11-1971 से) अंतःस्थापित ।” In the Hindi text, “law” is विधि, “laws in force” is प्रवृत्त विधि, “void” is शून्य, “the State” is राज्य and “takes away or abridges” is छीनती है या न्यून करती है. The provision is called an अनुच्छेद (article), as in “इस अनुच्छेद में” at the start of clause (3); the word धारा appears only in the footnote, for a section of the amending Act (“अधिनियम, 1971 की धारा 2”). What is sometimes searched for as धारा 13, कला 13 or आर्टिकल 13 of the Constitution is अनुच्छेद 13 in the official text. A summary of this guide in Hindi is given further below.
Article 13 in Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam and Telugu
The Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law and Justice publishes the Constitution in regional languages too: its Official Languages Wing is responsible for the “Publication of versions of the Constitution of India in regional languages and systematic functions for their release”, and its page “Constitution of India in Regional Languages” lists editions in 21 languages, namely Assamese, Bengali, Bodo, Dogri, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Maithili, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Odia, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Santhali, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu. These are official translations, but the Constitution gives authoritative status only to the Hindi translation (Article 394A). Article 13 is reproduced below exactly as printed in the Marathi, Kannada, Malayalam and Telugu editions, including the figure and square brackets that point to the footnote on clause (4).
Article 13 in Marathi (मराठी)
From the Legislative Department’s English–Marathi edition, “Constitution of India (Upto and including the 106th Amendment)”, as modified up to 1 May 2025 and published in 2025 (the Marathi text is on page 64 of the PDF). The figures are printed in Devanagari numerals.
“१३. मूलभूत हक्कांशी विसंगत असलेले अथवा त्यांचे न्यूनीकरण करणारे कायदे.—(१) या संविधानाच्या प्रारंभाच्या लगतपूर्वी भारताच्या राज्यक्षेत्रात अंमलात असलेले सर्व कायदे, जेथवर ते या भागाच्या तरतुदींशी विसंगत असतील तेथवर, अशा विसंगतीच्या व्याप्तीपुरते शून्यवत असतील.”
“(२) राज्य, या भागाने प्रदान केलेले हक्क हिरावून घेणारा किंवा त्यांचा संकोच करणारा कोणताही कायदा करणार नाही आणि या खंडाचे उल्लंघन करून केलेला कोणताही कायदा त्या उल्लंघनाच्या व्याप्तीपुरता शून्यवत असेल.”
“(३) या अनुच्छेदात, संदर्भानुसार अन्यथा आवश्यक नसेल तर,—”
“(क) “ कायदा ” यात, भारताच्या राज्यक्षेत्रात कायद्याइतकाच प्रभावी असलेला कोणताही अध्यादेश, आदेश, उपविधी, नियम, विनियम, अधिसूचना, रूढी किंवा परिपाठ यांचा समावेश आहे ;”
“(ख) “ अंमलात असलेले कायदे ” यात, भारताच्या राज्यक्षेत्रातील विधानमंडळाने किंवा अन्य सक्षम प्राधिकाऱ्याने या संविधानाच्या प्रारंभापूर्वी पारित केलेल्या किंवा केलेल्या व पूर्वी निरसित न झालेल्या कायद्याचा समावेश आहे—मग असा कोणताही कायदा किंवा त्याचा कोणताही भाग त्यावेळी मुळीच किंवा विशिष्ट क्षेत्रांमध्ये अंमलात नसला तरी हरकत नाही.”
“१[(४) या अनुच्छेदातील कोणतीही गोष्ट, अनुच्छेद ३६८ अन्वये केलेल्या या संविधानाच्या कोणत्याही सुधारणेस लागू असणार नाही.]”
The footnote reads: “१. संविधान (चोविसावी सुधारणा) अधिनियम, १९७१ याच्या कलम २ द्वारे समाविष्ट केला (५ नोव्हेंबर, १९७१ रोजी व तेव्हापासून).” Like the Hindi text, the Marathi text calls the provision an अनुच्छेद (clause (3) begins “या अनुच्छेदात”, where the English text has “In this article”), and it uses the word कलम for a section of the amending Act (कलम २ in the footnote). What many readers search for as कलम 13 is अनुच्छेद 13 in the official Marathi text.
Article 13 in Kannada (ಕನ್ನಡ)
From the Legislative Department’s English–Kannada edition of the Constitution as on 11 November 2025, published on behalf of the Government of India by the Directorate, Department of Printing, Stationery and Publication, Government of Karnataka, Bengaluru (the Kannada text is on page 70 of the PDF):
“13. ಮೂಲಭೂತ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳಿಗೆ ಅಸಂಗತವಾದ ಅಥವಾ ಅವುಗಳನ್ನು ಅಲ್ಪೀಕರಿಸುವಂಥ ಕಾನೂನುಗಳು.– (1) ಈ ಸಂವಿಧಾನವು ಪ್ರಾರಂಭವಾಗುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ನಿಕಟಪೂರ್ವದಲ್ಲಿ ಭಾರತದ ರಾಜ್ಯಕ್ಷೇತ್ರದಲ್ಲಿ ಜಾರಿಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಎಲ್ಲಾ ಕಾನೂನುಗಳು ಈ ಭಾಗದ ಉಪಬಂಧಗಳಿಗೆ ಅಸಂಗತವಾಗಿರುವಷ್ಟರ ಮಟ್ಟಿಗೆ ಅನೂರ್ಜಿತವಾಗತಕ್ಕದ್ದು.”
“(2) ಈ ಭಾಗದಿಂದ ಪ್ರದತ್ತವಾದ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ಕಸಿದುಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಅಥವಾ ಮೊಟಕುಗೊಳಿಸುವ ಯಾವುದೇ ಕಾನೂನನ್ನು ರಾಜ್ಯವು ಮಾಡತಕ್ಕದ್ದಲ್ಲ ಮತ್ತು ಈ ಖಂಡವನ್ನು ಉಲ್ಲಂಘಿಸಿ ಮಾಡಲಾದ ಯಾವುದೇ ಕಾನೂನು, ಆ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯಷ್ಟರ ಮಟ್ಟಿಗೆ ಅನೂರ್ಜಿತವಾಗತಕ್ಕದ್ದು.”
“(3) ಈ ಅನುಚ್ಛೇದದಲ್ಲಿ, ಸಂದರ್ಭವು ಅನ್ಯಥಾ ಅಗತ್ಯಪಡಿಸಿದ ಹೊರತು,–”
“(ಎ) “ಕಾನೂನು” ಎಂಬುದು ಯಾವುದೇ ಅಧ್ಯಾದೇಶ, ಆದೇಶ, ಉಪವಿಧಿ, ನಿಯಮ, ವಿನಿಯಮ, ಅಧಿಸೂಚನೆ, ಅಥವಾ ಭಾರತದ ರಾಜ್ಯಕ್ಷೇತ್ರದಲ್ಲಿ ಕಾನೂನಿನ ಬಲವುಳ್ಳ ರೂಢಿ ಅಥವಾ ಆಚರಣೆಯನ್ನು ಒಳಗೊಳ್ಳುತ್ತದೆ;”
“(ಬಿ) “ಜಾರಿಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಕಾನೂನುಗಳು” ಎಂಬುದು ಭಾರತದ ರಾಜ್ಯಕ್ಷೇತ್ರದಲ್ಲಿನ ಯಾವುದೇ ವಿಧಾನಮಂಡಲದಿಂದ ಅಥವಾ ಇತರ ಸಕ್ಷಮ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರದಿಂದ ಈ ಸಂವಿಧಾನವು ಪ್ರಾರಂಭವಾಗುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಮುಂಚೆ ಅಂಗೀಕೃತವಾಗಿದ್ದ ಅಥವಾ ಮಾಡಲಾಗಿದ್ದ ಮತ್ತು ಈ ಹಿಂದೆ ನಿರಸಿತವಾಗಿರದ ಕಾನೂನುಗಳನ್ನು, ಅಂಥ ಯಾವುದೇ ಕಾನೂನು ಅಥವಾ ಅವುಗಳ ಯಾವುದೇ ಭಾಗವು, ಆಗ ಎಲ್ಲ ಪ್ರದೇಶಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಅಥವಾ ನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ಪ್ರದೇಶಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಜಾರಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಇಲ್ಲದಿದ್ದಾಗ್ಯೂ, ಒಳಗೊಳ್ಳುತ್ತದೆ.”
“1[(4) ಈ ಅನುಚ್ಛೇದದಲ್ಲಿ ಇರುವುದು ಯಾವುದೂ, 368ನೆಯ ಅನುಚ್ಛೇದದ ಮೇರೆಗೆ ಮಾಡಲಾದ ಈ ಸಂವಿಧಾನದ ಯಾವುದೇ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಗೆ ಅನ್ವಯವಾಗತಕ್ಕದ್ದಲ್ಲ.]”
The footnote reads: “1 ಸಂವಿಧಾನ (ಇಪ್ಪತ್ತನಾಲ್ಕನೆಯ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ) ಅಧಿನಿಯಮ, 1971ರ 2ನೆಯ ಪ್ರಕರಣದ ಮೂಲಕ (5–11–1971ರಿಂದ ಜಾರಿಗೆ ಬರುವಂತೆ) ಸೇರಿಸಲಾಗಿದೆ.”
Article 13 in Malayalam (മലയാളം)
From the Second Diglot Edition (English–Malayalam) of the Constitution, published in 2024 and inclusive of the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, which was prepared by the Official Language (Legislative) Commission, Kerala, approved by the Official Language Wing of the Ministry of Law and Justice and published on behalf of the Government of India (the Malayalam text is on page 63 of the PDF):
“13. മൗലികാവകാശങ്ങൾക്ക് സംഗതമല്ലാത്തതോ അവയ്ക്ക് ന്യൂനത വരുത്തുന്നതോ ആയ നിയമങ്ങൾ.— (1) ഈ ഭരണഘടനയുടെ പ്രാരംഭത്തിന് തൊട്ടുമുൻപ് ഭാരതത്തിന്റെ ഭൂപ്രദേശത്ത് പ്രാബല്യത്തിലിരുന്ന എല്ലാ നിയമങ്ങളും അവ ഈ ഭാഗത്തിലെ വ്യവസ്ഥകൾക്ക് സംഗതമല്ലാത്തിടത്ത് അങ്ങനെയുള്ള സാംഗത്യമില്ലായ്മയുടെ വ്യാപ്തിയോളം അസാധുവായിരിക്കുന്നതാണ്.”
“(2) ഈ ഭാഗം നൽകിയിട്ടുള്ള അവകാശങ്ങൾ എടുത്തുകളയുകയോ കുറയ്ക്കുകയോ ചെയ്യുന്ന യാതൊരു നിയമവും രാഷ്ട്രം നിർമ്മിക്കുവാൻ പാടില്ലാത്തതും, ഈ ഖണ്ഡം ലംഘിച്ചുകൊണ്ട് നിർമ്മിക്കുന്ന ഏതു നിയമവും ആ ലംഘനത്തിന്റെ വ്യാപ്തിയോളം അസാധുവായിരിക്കുന്നതും ആകുന്നു.”
“(3) ഈ അനുച്ഛേദത്തിൽ, സന്ദർഭം മറ്റുവിധത്തിൽ ആവശ്യപ്പെടാത്തപക്ഷം—”
“(ക) “നിയമം” എന്നതിൽ ഭാരതത്തിന്റെ ഭൂപ്രദേശത്ത് നിയമത്തിന്റെ പ്രഭാവമുള്ള ഏതൊരു ഓർഡിനൻസും ഉത്തരവും ബൈലായും ചട്ടവും റെഗുലേഷനും വിജ്ഞാപനവും ആചാരവും വഴക്കവും ഉൾപ്പെടുന്നതാണ്;”
“(ഖ) “പ്രാബല്യത്തിലുള്ള നിയമങ്ങൾ” എന്നതിൽ ഈ ഭരണഘടനയുടെ പ്രാരംഭത്തിനു മുൻപ് ഭാരതത്തിന്റെ ഭൂപ്രദേശത്തെ ഒരു നിയമനിർമ്മാണമണ്ഡലമോ ക്ഷമതയുള്ള മറ്റ് അധികാരസ്ഥാനമോ പാസ്സാക്കിയതോ ഉണ്ടാക്കിയതോ ആയതും മുൻപ് റദ്ദാക്കിയിട്ടില്ലാത്തതും ആയ നിയമങ്ങൾ, അങ്ങനെയുള്ള ഏതെങ്കിലും നിയമമോ അതിന്റെ ഏതെങ്കിലും ഭാഗമോ ഒട്ടും തന്നെയോ അല്ലെങ്കിൽ പ്രത്യേക പ്രദേശങ്ങളിലോ അപ്പോൾ നിലവിൽ ഇല്ലെന്നിരുന്നാലും, ഉൾപ്പെടുന്നതാണ്.”
“1[(4) ഈ അനുച്ഛേദത്തിലെ യാതൊന്നും 368-ാം അനുച്ഛേദപ്രകാരം ഉണ്ടാക്കിയ ഈ ഭരണഘടനയുടെ ഏതെങ്കിലും ഭേദഗതിക്ക് ബാധകമാകുന്നതല്ല.]”
The footnote reads: “1. 1971-ലെ ഭരണഘടന (ഇരുപത്തിനാലാം ഭേദഗതി) ആക്റ്റ്, 2-ാം വകുപ്പുപ്രകാരം ചേർത്തത്.”
Article 13 in Telugu (తెలుగు)
From the First Diglot (English–Telugu) Edition of the Constitution, published in 2025 and inclusive of the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023, which was prepared by the Law Department, Telangana Secretariat, and printed and published on behalf of the Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Legislative Department, Official Languages Wing (the Telugu text is on page 90 of the PDF). The Telugu text uses the word ఆర్టికల్ for “article”, as in “368వ ఆర్టికల్ క్రింద” in clause (4).
“13. ప్రాథమిక హక్కులకు పరస్పర విరుద్ధముగా ఉన్న లేక వాటి స్థాయిని తగ్గించు శాసనములు:– (1) ఈ రాజ్యాంగ ప్రారంభమునకు ముందు వెంటనే భారతదేశ భూభాగములో అమలులో ఉన్న శాసనములన్నియు, ఈ భాగములోని నిబంధనలకు ఎంతవరకు పరస్పర విరుద్ధముగా ఉండునో అంతమేరకు చెల్లబడవు.”
“(2) ప్రభుత్వము ఈ భాగముచే ఇవ్వబడిన హక్కులను తీసుకొను లేక కుదించునట్లుగా చేయు ఏ శాసనమును చేయరాదు మరియు ఈ క్లాజును ఉల్లంఘించుచు చేయబడిన ఏదైనా శాసనము, అట్లు ఉల్లంఘించినంత మేరకు చెల్లనివగును.”
“(3) ఈ ఆర్టికల్లో, సందర్భము ఇతర విధముగా కోరిననే తప్ప,–”
“(ఎ) “శాసనము” అను పదమునందు ఏదైనా అధ్యాదేశము, ఉత్తరువు, ఉపవిధి, నియమము, వినియమము, అధికారిక ప్రకటన మరియు భారతదేశ భూభాగములో శాసనమువలె అమలు కలిగియున్న ఆచారము లేక వాడుక చేరి ఉండును;”
“(బి) “అమలులోనున్న శాసనములు” అను పదబంధములో, ఈ రాజ్యాంగ ప్రారంభమునకు ముందు భారతదేశ భూభాగమునందలి ఏదైనా శాసన మండలిచే లేక ఇతర సమర్థ అధికార సంస్థచే, ఆమోదించబడి, లేక చేయబడి, అట్టి ఏ శాసనమైనా లేక దానిలోని ఏ భాగమైనా పూర్తిగాగాని లేక కొన్ని ప్రత్యేక ప్రాంతములలో అమలులో లేనప్పటికీ అంతకుముందు రద్దుకాని శాసనములు చేరి ఉండును.”
“1[(4) ఈ ఆర్టికల్లో ఉన్నదేదియు, 368వ ఆర్టికల్ క్రింద ఈ రాజ్యాంగం చేయబడిన ఏదైనా సవరణకు వర్తించదు.]”
The footnote reads: “1. రాజ్యాంగ (ఇరవై నాలుగవ సవరణ) చట్టము, 1971 యొక్క 2వ సెక్షన్ ద్వారా 05.11.1971 నుండి చొప్పించబడినది.”
What Article 13 means, clause by clause
Article 13 deals with two kinds of law: the laws that were already in force when the Constitution began (clause (1)) and the laws that the State makes afterwards (clause (2)). In both cases the result of a conflict with the fundamental rights is the same: the law is void, but only to the extent of the conflict. Clause (3) explains what “law” means for these purposes, and clause (4) keeps amendments of the Constitution outside the article. The Supreme Court has worked out how this applies in practice through a series of judgments, explained below.
Prepared by Century Law Firm from the Constitution of India (Legislative Department edition as on 10 September 2026) and the Supreme Court judgments discussed on this page.
Clause (1): laws in force before 26 January 1950
The Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 1949; the Preamble ends with the words “IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.” Under Article 394, a few articles came into force at once and the rest on “the twenty-sixth day of January, 1950, which day is referred to in this Constitution as the commencement of this Constitution”. Clause (1) of Article 13 deals with the laws that were in force immediately before that day: in so far as they are inconsistent with Part III, they are void “to the extent of such inconsistency”. The term “laws in force” is defined in clause (3)(b), explained below.
Clause (1) does not reach back into the past. In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (22 January 1951), a bench of seven judges dealt with a prosecution begun before the Constitution. In September 1949 a pamphlet was alleged to have been published in Bombay by the petitioner; the authorities treated it as a “news sheet” under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, published without the authority required by Section 15(1) of that Act, and he was prosecuted under Section 18(1). “During the pendency of the proceedings the Constitution of India came into force on January 26, 1950.” The question was whether proceedings begun before the Constitution “could nevertheless be proceeded with”.
In the judgment of Chief Justice Kania and Justices Patanjali Sastri, Das and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, delivered by Justice Das, the Court held: “It must follow, therefore, that article 13(1) can have no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation.” The inconsistent laws, it said, “are not void for all purposes but they are void only to the extent they come into conflict with the fundamental rights”; “the voidness of the existing law is limited to the future exercise of the fundamental rights”; and “Such laws exist for all past transactions and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution.” Justice Mahajan, writing separately, also held that the effect of Article 13(1) is only prospective, so the majority was five to two. The appeal was dismissed, so the prosecution begun before 1950 could continue. Justice Fazl Ali, who disagreed with the majority (Justice Mukherjea agreeing with him), also said that Article 13(1) will “have no retrospective operation” and that “transactions which are past and closed, and rights which have already vested, will remain untouched.”
Clause (1) does not amend or repeal the old laws either. In the Court’s words, “Article 13(1) cannot be read as obliterating the entire operation of the inconsistent laws, or to wipe them out altogether from the statute book”. The continuance of pre-Constitution laws is dealt with by Article 372(1), under which, subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, “all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority”. Article 372(2) allowed the President to adapt or modify such laws, “whether by way of repeal or amendment”, to bring them into accord with the Constitution, but not after the expiry of “three years” from its commencement (Article 372(3)(a)).
The doctrine of eclipse
What happens to such a law if the inconsistency is later removed was decided in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (29 September 1955) by a bench of five judges. The law challenged there had become inconsistent with Article 19(1)(g), the right “to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business”, read with clause (6) of Article 19 as it then stood. Acting Chief Justice S.R. Das, delivering the judgment, said that Article 13(1) had made such a law “ineffectual, nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise of the fundamental right on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution”, and that “the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right.”
On 18 June 1951 the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 amended clause (6) of Article 19. The Court held that its effect was to remove “the shadow” and “to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity”, and that “after the amendment of clause (6) of article 19 on the 18th June 1951, the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens.” Such laws, it said, “were not dead for all purposes”: “It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition”, and “they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens.” The petitions were dismissed.
This is the doctrine of eclipse: the fundamental right overshadows the inconsistent pre-Constitution law without killing it, and when the shadow is removed the law operates again. The Court contrasted pre-Constitution laws with the post-Constitution laws considered in the American authorities, which, it said, “never came to life but were still born as it were”, and observed that those authorities could not fully apply to pre-Constitution laws “which were perfectly valid before the Constitution”, though it said it need not rest its decision on that distinction.
Clause (2): laws made after the Constitution
Clause (2) is addressed to “the State”, which Article 12 defines for Part III: unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” “includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.” The State “shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part”, that is, a law that removes a fundamental right or cuts it down, and a law made in contravention is void “to the extent of the contravention”, not necessarily as a whole.
Clause (2) protects whoever holds the right in question. Some rights in Part III belong only to citizens: Article 15(1) forbids discrimination “against any citizen”, and Article 19(1) begins “All citizens shall have the right”. Others belong to every person, such as Article 14 (“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”) and Article 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”).
The doctrine of severability
Because a law is void only to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention, the question often is whether the rest of it can stand. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (9 April 1957), in the judgment of the Court delivered by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, the Supreme Court summarised “certain rules of construction laid down by the American Courts” on the separability of the valid and invalid parts of a statute, and applied them. The first rule is that “it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor”, and “The test to be applied is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid.”
If the valid and invalid provisions “are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from one another, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the Act in its entirety”; but if they are so distinct and separate that, after striking out what is invalid, “what remains is in itself a complete code independent of the rest, then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest has become unenforceable”. Even distinct provisions fail together “if they all form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a whole”. The remaining rules are that the whole is rejected if what is left is “so thin and truncated as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature”; that separability “does not depend on whether the law is enacted in the same section or different sections”; that if what remains cannot be enforced without alterations and modifications, the whole must be struck down, “as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation”; and that, in judging the legislature’s intention, a court may take into account “the history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it”. The petitions in that case were dismissed with costs.
Clause (3): what counts as “law” and “laws in force”
Clause (3) is a definitions clause. Under clause (3)(a), “law” includes “any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law”. The definition is inclusive and wide. It brings Ordinances, delegated legislation such as rules, regulations, bye-laws and notifications, orders and even customs and usages within the reach of the fundamental rights, so long as they have the force of law in India, in addition to the Acts of Parliament and the State Legislatures.
Clause (3)(b) defines “laws in force”, the laws to which clause (1) applies: the term “includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.” A pre-1950 law that had not been repealed is therefore a “law in force” even if, at the time, it was not in operation at all, or not in particular areas.
Clause (4): amendments of the Constitution
Clause (4) reads: “Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.” It was inserted by Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, an Act dated 5 November 1971, and the Constitution’s footnote gives 5 November 1971 as the date from which it has effect. Section 3 of the same Act made matching changes to Article 368. It gave the article the heading “Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor”; added a new clause (1), under which “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article”; provided that a Bill passed for the purpose is presented to the President, “who shall give his assent to the Bill”; and added clause (3): “Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.”
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, signed by H. R. Gokhale on 22 July 1971, gives the reason. It says that “The Supreme Court in the well-known Golak Nath’s case … reversed, by a narrow majority, its own earlier decisions upholding the power of Parliament to amend all parts of the Constitution including Part III relating to fundamental rights” (it cites the case as 1967, 2 S.C.R. 762), and that “The Bill also seeks to amend article 13 of the Constitution to make it inapplicable to any amendment of the Constitution under article 368.” The cases that led to the amendment, and what the Supreme Court said afterwards, are explained next.
Article 13 and amendments of the Constitution: the Supreme Court cases
Whether an amendment of the Constitution is “law” that Article 13(2) can strike down came before the Supreme Court in Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (5 October 1951), where five judges heard challenges to the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. In the judgment delivered by Justice Patanjali Sastri, the Court said that “there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law, which is made in exercise of legislative power, and constitutional law, which is made in exercise of constituent power”, and that “in the context of article 13 ‘law’ must be taken to mean rules or regulations made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power”. Article 13(2) therefore “does not affect amendments made under article 368”. The petitions were dismissed.
In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (30 October 1964), five judges again dismissed the petitions, and the majority of three took the same view. In the judgment delivered by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar (for himself and Justices Wanchoo and Raghubar Dayal), the Court said that “it would be unreasonable to hold that the word ‘law’ in Art. 13 (2) takes in Constitution Amendment Acts passed under Art. 368”, and that “when Art. 368 confers on Parliament the right to amend the Constitution the power in question can be exercised over all the provisions of the Constitution.” Justices Hidayatullah and Mudholkar wrote separate judgments voicing doubts. Justice Hidayatullah said: “The Constitution gives so many assurances in Part III that it would be difficult to think that they were the play things of a special majority.” Justice Mudholkar said that it was “also a matter for consideration whether making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as an amendment”.
The Court changed its view in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (27 February 1967), the Golak Nath case, heard by eleven judges. Chief Justice Subba Rao delivered the judgment for himself and Justices Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, Justice Hidayatullah delivered a separate judgment, and Justices Wanchoo, Bachawat, Ramaswami, Bhargava and Mitter dissented. Chief Justice Subba Rao said of the definition of “law” in Article 13 that it “gives an inclusive definition. It does not exclude Constitutional law.” The results he recorded for the five judges included that “Amendment is ‘law’ within the meaning of Art. 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if it takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III thereof, it is void”; that the First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments abridged the fundamental rights but, “on the basis of earlier decisions of this Court, they were valid”; that “On the application of the doctrine of ‘prospective over-ruling’, as explained by us earlier, our decision will have only prospective operation and, therefore, the said amendments will continue to be valid”; and “We declare that the Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to take away or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein.”
Justice Hidayatullah concluded “that the Fundamental Rights are outside the amendatory process if the amendment seeks to abridge or take away any of the rights”, so on that point the majority was six to five. He did not rest the earlier amendments on prospective overruling, however; his conclusion was that “the First, Fourth and Seventh Amendments being part of the Constitution by acquiescence for a long time, cannot now be challenged”.
Parliament’s answer was the Twenty-fourth Amendment of 1971, described above, whose Statement of Objects and Reasons says: “It is, therefore, considered necessary to provide expressly that Parliament has power to amend any provision of the Constitution so as to include the provisions of Part III within the scope of the amending power.”
Whether the amending power itself has limits was then considered by thirteen judges in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala (Writ Petition No. 135 of 1970, decided on 24 April 1973). Its majority view is given here as the Supreme Court recorded it in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (31 July 1980), where Chief Justice Chandrachud said that “The summary of the various judgments in Kesavananda Bharati (Supra) was signed by nine out of the thirteen Judges”, that according to paragraph 2 of the summary the majority held that “Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution”, and that “it is undeniable that it correctly reflects the majority view.” This is the basic structure doctrine. The official text of the Constitution also records, in a footnote to Article 31C, words of that article “struck down by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1973, SC 1461” (see the section on the directive principles below).
Minerva Mills applied that limit. Chief Justice Chandrachud, for himself and Justices A.C. Gupta, Untwalia and Kailasam, began by recording that in Kesavananda Bharati the Court “held by a majority” that the amending power “cannot be exercised so as to damage the basic features of the Constitution or so as to destroy its basic structure”, and asked whether Sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 “transgress that limitation”. He said that “The power to destroy is not a power to amend”, and that “a limited amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution and therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed.” His judgment gives the reasons for the order the majority had passed on 9 May 1980: Section 4 “is beyond the amending power of the Parliament and is void”, and Section 55 “is beyond the amending power of the Parliament and is void since it removes all limitations on the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and confers power upon it to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure.” Justice Bhagwati, in a separate judgment, also declared Section 55 “unconstitutional and void”, but held that Section 4 “is within the amending power of Parliament” and declared the amended Article 31C “to be constitutional and valid”, so Section 4 fell by a majority of four to one. Section 55 had added clauses (4) and (5) to Article 368: clause (4) said that no amendment “shall be called in question in any court on any ground”, and clause (5) declared “that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article”. As noted above, the official text still prints both clauses, with a footnote recording that Section 55 has been declared invalid in Minerva Mills.
The result is that an amendment of the Constitution is not tested as “law” under Article 13, because of Article 13(4) and Article 368(3), but it remains subject to the limits on the amending power recognised in Kesavananda Bharati and applied in Minerva Mills. In Minerva Mills Justice Bhagwati also said in his separate judgment: “I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution.” The firm’s article on judicial review in India covers that subject.
Can a fundamental right be waived?
Whether a person can waive a fundamental right was considered in Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan (19 November 1958) by a bench of five judges, which allowed the assessee’s appeal, set aside the Income-tax Commissioner’s order of 29 January 1958 and quashed all proceedings pending to implement the Union Government’s order of 5 July 1954. Chief Justice S.R. Das, delivering the judgment for himself and Justice Kapur, said that, considering the nature of the fundamental right flowing from Article 14, it is not for a citizen or any other person who benefits by its provisions to waive any breach of the obligation on the part of the State, and that whatever other fundamental right a person may or may not waive, “he cannot certainly give up or waive a breach of the fundamental right that is indirectly conferred on him by this constitutional mandate directed to the State.”
Justice Bhagwati agreed with the Chief Justice and Justice S.K. Das that the proceedings under Section 8-A of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 were ultra vires and the settlement reached under it void, but on waiver he said: “I find myself in agreement with the judgment prepared by my brother, Subba Rao, J., and am of the opinion that it is not open to a citizen to waive the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.” Justice Subba Rao held “that the doctrine of waiver has no application in the case of fundamental rights under our Constitution”. Justice S.K. Das took a different view in principle: a right guaranteed by the Constitution which “rests in the individual and is primarily intended for his benefit and does not impinge on the right of others” can be waived, provided “such waiver is not forbidden by law and does not contravene public policy or public morals”; but he held that “there is no foundation on facts to sustain the plea of waiver”. Four of the five judges therefore held that the right under Article 14 cannot be waived, and two of them, Justices Bhagwati and Subba Rao, said the same of all the fundamental rights in Part III.
Who must obey Article 13, and how it is enforced
Article 13(2) binds “the State” as Article 12 defines it (quoted above): the Union and State governments, Parliament and the State Legislatures, and all local or other authorities within India or under the control of the Government of India. Article 13 states the consequence of a breach, that the law is void to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention, but it does not itself provide a remedy. The remedy is in Article 32, in the same Part: “The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed”, and “The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.”
Every High Court has a similar power under Article 226(1): it may issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territories “directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.” The last words take the High Courts’ writ power beyond the fundamental rights. Article 226(3) shows that interim orders can be made on such a petition, “whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner”, and it lays down a procedure, with time limits, for an application to vacate such an order made without giving the affected party copies of the petition and a hearing. See the firm’s guides to the writ petition and to habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court can also order compensation. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1 August 1983), a bench of three judges, in the judgment delivered by Chief Justice Chandrachud, considered “whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 32, this Court can pass an order for the payment of money” in the nature of compensation “consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right”. It said that “Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders to release from illegal detention”, and that “The State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner’s rights.” Noting that Article 32 “cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of Courts”, and that the petitioner could have been relegated to a suit if his claim had been “factually controversial”, it directed “as an interim measure” the payment of “a further sum of Rs. 30,000”, in addition to Rs. 5,000 already paid, described the order as “in the nature of a palliative”, and said that it “will not preclude the petitioner from bringing a suit to recover appropriate damages from the state and its erring officials.”
Some matters can be brought to the Supreme Court as public interest litigation, even by letter. The Court’s compilation of guidelines for entertaining letters and petitions as PIL, based on its full Court decision dated 1 December 1988 and later modifications and reproduced in its Handbook on Practice and Procedure (updated as on 6 October 2025), says: “No petition involving individual/ personal matter shall be entertained as a PIL matter except as indicated hereinafter.” Letter-petitions are ordinarily entertained only in the listed categories, which include bonded labour, neglected children, non-payment of minimum wages, complaints of harassment from jails, petitions against the police, atrocities on women, environmental pollution, riot victims and family pension. Landlord-tenant matters, service matters and those pertaining to pension and gratuity, admission to medical and other educational institutions, and petitions for early hearing of cases pending in the High Courts and subordinate courts are not entertained as PIL. Letter-petitions are first screened in the Court’s PIL Cell, and only those covered by the listed categories are placed before a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice of India for directions.
Article 13 and the Directive Principles of State Policy
Article 13 protects the rights in Part III and says nothing about the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV. Article 37 explains their status: “The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.” Article 13 itself makes no exception for laws that give effect to a directive principle; the exception is in Article 31C.
Article 31C, headed “Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles”, begins “Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13”. It was inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 with effect from 20 April 1972 and, as inserted, covered laws giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing “the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39”, which concern the distribution of the ownership and control of the material resources of the community and the concentration of wealth. It provides that no such law “shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by” Article 14 or Article 19 (the Forty-fourth Amendment removed the reference to Article 31 with effect from 20 June 1979), and a State law is protected only if it has received the President’s assent after being reserved for his consideration.
Two footnotes in the official text record what happened later. Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 replaced the reference to Article 39(b) and (c) with “all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV” with effect from 3 January 1977, and the footnote adds: “Section 4 has been declared invalid by the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Others Vs Union of India and Others, AIR 1980 SC 1789.” The article’s last words, “and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy”, carry the footnote: “The words in italics struck down by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1973, SC 1461.” In Minerva Mills Chief Justice Chandrachud, for the majority, said: “This harmony and balance between fundamental rights and directive principles is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.” In Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024) a bench of nine judges held that “Article 31C to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati … remains in force”; under it, as Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s judgment puts it, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles in clauses (b) or (c) of Article 39 can be challenged as inconsistent with Articles 14 and 19. Justices Nagarathna and Dhulia, who wrote separately, agreed on this point.
Two other articles under the Part III heading “Saving of Certain Laws” also protect certain laws. Article 31A(1), which also begins “Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13”, saves laws for the acquisition by the State of any estate and the other matters it lists from being void for inconsistency with Article 14 or Article 19, and Article 31B, inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 with effect from 18 June 1951, provides that the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall not “be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void” on the ground of inconsistency with Part III. A bench of nine judges has since held, in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (11 January 2007), that all amendments made on or after 24 April 1973 adding laws to the Ninth Schedule “shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles underlying them”.
The right to property: no longer in Part III
The right to property was once in Part III, in Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, under the sub-heading “Right to Property”. The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 omitted Article 19(1)(f) (Section 2), that sub-heading (Section 5) and Article 31 (Section 6), all with effect from 20 June 1979, and by Section 34 inserted Article 300A in Chapter IV of Part XII, “Right to Property”: “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” The right to property is therefore now in Article 300A, outside Part III, the Part whose rights Article 13 protects. The firm’s guide to Article 19 explains what happened to Article 19(1)(f).
भारतीय संविधान का अनुच्छेद 13 (Article 13) – हिंदी में
भारतीय संविधान का अनुच्छेद 13 भाग 3 (मूल अधिकार) में है और इसका शीर्षक है “मूल अधिकारों से असंगत या उनका अल्पीकरण करने वाली विधियां”। सरल शब्दों में, यह उन विधियों (कानूनों) से संबंधित है जो मूल अधिकारों से असंगत हैं या उन्हें छीनती या न्यून करती हैं: ऐसी विधि उस मात्रा तक शून्य होती है जिस तक वह मूल अधिकारों से टकराती है। इसमें चार खंड हैं और खंड (3) में दो उपखंड (क) और (ख) हैं। इसका आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ ऊपर दिया गया है; अनुच्छेद 394क (394A) के अनुसार, उसके अधीन प्रकाशित हिंदी अनुवाद संविधान का हिंदी भाषा में प्राधिकृत पाठ है।
आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में इस प्रावधान को अनुच्छेद कहा गया है, धारा नहीं; धारा शब्द केवल पाद-टिप्पण में संशोधन अधिनियम की धारा के लिए आया है। इसलिए धारा 13, कला 13 या आर्टिकल 13 के नाम से खोजा जाने वाला प्रावधान अनुच्छेद 13 ही है। अनुच्छेद 13 में कोई खंड (5) नहीं है; आधिकारिक पाठों में केवल खंड (1) से (4) हैं। संविधान के संशोधन के विषय में खंड (5) अनुच्छेद 368 में है, जिसके बारे में नीचे बताया गया है।
खंड (1) के अनुसार संविधान के प्रारंभ (26 जनवरी 1950) से ठीक पहले भारत के राज्यक्षेत्र में प्रवृत्त सभी विधियां उस मात्रा तक शून्य होंगी जिस तक वे भाग 3 के उपबंधों से असंगत हैं। केशवन माधव मेनन बनाम बंबई राज्य (22 जनवरी 1951) में सात न्यायाधीशों की पीठ ने पांच और दो के बहुमत से कहा कि अनुच्छेद 13(1) भूतलक्षी (retrospective) नहीं, पूरी तरह भविष्यलक्षी (prospective) है: ऐसी विधियां संविधान से पहले के लेन-देन और उससे पहले प्रोद्भूत अधिकारों और दायित्वों के लिए बनी रहती हैं, इसलिए 1950 से पहले शुरू हुआ अभियोजन जारी रह सकता था।
आच्छादन का सिद्धांत (doctrine of eclipse): भीकाजी नारायण ढाकरस बनाम मध्य प्रदेश राज्य (29 सितंबर 1955) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने कहा कि अनुच्छेद 19(1)(छ) से असंगत पूर्व-संवैधानिक विधि मृत नहीं हुई थी, बल्कि मानो कुछ समय के लिए मूल अधिकार से आच्छादित (eclipsed) हो गई थी। 18 जून 1951 को संविधान (पहला संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1951 द्वारा अनुच्छेद 19 के खंड (6) में संशोधन से यह छाया हट गई और वह विधि नागरिकों के विरुद्ध भी फिर से प्रवर्तनीय हो गई; गैर-नागरिकों के विरुद्ध वह संविधान के बाद भी प्रवर्तन में बनी रही थी।
खंड (2) के अनुसार राज्य ऐसी कोई विधि नहीं बनाएगा जो भाग 3 द्वारा प्रदत्त अधिकारों को छीनती है या न्यून करती है, और इसके उल्लंघन में बनाई गई प्रत्येक विधि उल्लंघन की मात्रा तक शून्य होगी। अनुच्छेद 12 के अनुसार राज्य में भारत की सरकार और संसद, राज्यों की सरकारें और विधान-मंडल, तथा भारत के राज्यक्षेत्र के भीतर या भारत सरकार के नियंत्रण के अधीन सभी स्थानीय और अन्य प्राधिकारी शामिल हैं। पृथक्करणीयता का सिद्धांत (doctrine of severability): आर.एम.डी. चमारबागवाला बनाम भारत संघ (9 अप्रैल 1957) के अनुसार विधि का वैध भाग बच सकता है या नहीं, यह विधायिका के आशय से तय होता है, और कसौटी यह है कि यदि विधायिका को पता होता कि बाकी भाग अवैध है तो क्या वह वैध भाग को अधिनियमित करती।
खंड (3)(क) के अनुसार विधि के अंतर्गत भारत के राज्यक्षेत्र में विधि का बल रखने वाला कोई अध्यादेश, आदेश, उपविधि, नियम, विनियम, अधिसूचना, रूढ़ि या प्रथा है। खंड (3)(ख) के अनुसार प्रवृत्त विधि में संविधान के प्रारंभ से पहले पारित या बनाई गई वह विधि आती है जो पहले निरसित नहीं हुई थी, चाहे वह उस समय प्रवर्तन में न रही हो।
अनुच्छेद 13 में संविधान के संशोधन से संबंधित विशिष्ट शब्द खंड (4) में हैं: “इस अनुच्छेद की कोई बात अनुच्छेद 368 के अधीन किए गए इस संविधान के किसी संशोधन को लागू नहीं होगी”। यह खंड संविधान (चौबीसवां संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1971 की धारा 2 द्वारा 5 नवंबर 1971 से अंतःस्थापित किया गया; अनुच्छेद 13 में यही एकमात्र संशोधन हुआ है। उसी अधिनियम की धारा 3 ने अनुच्छेद 368 में खंड (3) जोड़ा: “अनुच्छेद 13 की कोई बात इस अनुच्छेद के अधीन किए गए किसी संशोधन को लागू नहीं होगी”।
संविधान संशोधन पर निर्णय: शंकरी प्रसाद सिंह देव बनाम भारत संघ (5 अक्टूबर 1951) और सज्जन सिंह बनाम राजस्थान राज्य (30 अक्टूबर 1964) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने माना था कि अनुच्छेद 13 में विधि का अर्थ साधारण विधायी शक्ति से बनी विधि है, संविधायी शक्ति से किया गया संविधान संशोधन नहीं। गोलकनाथ बनाम पंजाब राज्य (27 फरवरी 1967) में ग्यारह न्यायाधीशों ने छह और पांच के बहुमत से यह मत बदल दिया और माना कि संशोधन द्वारा मूल अधिकार छीने या न्यून नहीं किए जा सकते। मुख्य न्यायमूर्ति सुब्बा राव ने पांच न्यायाधीशों की ओर से कहा कि संशोधन अनुच्छेद 13 के अर्थ में विधि है, और प्रॉस्पेक्टिव ओवररूलिंग (prospective overruling) का सिद्धांत लागू करके कहा कि पहला, चौथा और सत्रहवां संशोधन वैध बने रहेंगे और निर्णय की तारीख से संसद को भाग 3 के मूल अधिकार छीनने या न्यून करने के लिए संविधान का संशोधन करने की शक्ति नहीं होगी; छठे न्यायाधीश, न्यायमूर्ति हिदायतुल्ला ने कहा कि पहला, चौथा और सातवां संशोधन लंबे समय से स्वीकृति (acquiescence) के कारण संविधान का भाग बन चुके हैं और अब उन्हें चुनौती नहीं दी जा सकती। इसके बाद चौबीसवां संशोधन आया, जिसके उद्देश्यों और कारणों के कथन में गोलकनाथ मामले का उल्लेख है।
मूल ढांचे का सिद्धांत (basic structure): केशवानंद भारती बनाम केरल राज्य (24 अप्रैल 1973) में तेरह न्यायाधीशों ने सुनवाई की। मिनर्वा मिल्स लिमिटेड बनाम भारत संघ (31 जुलाई 1980) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने दर्ज किया कि उस मामले के निर्णयों के सारांश के अनुसार बहुमत का मत था कि अनुच्छेद 368 संसद को संविधान के मूल ढांचे को बदलने में समर्थ नहीं बनाता। मिनर्वा मिल्स में मुख्य न्यायमूर्ति चंद्रचूड़ ने बहुमत की ओर से कहा कि नष्ट करने की शक्ति संशोधन करने की शक्ति नहीं है। संविधान (बयालीसवां संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1976 की धारा 55 ने अनुच्छेद 368 में खंड (4) और (5) जोड़े थे; आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ के पाद-टिप्पण के अनुसार “उच्चतम न्यायालय ने मिनर्वा मिल्स लिमिटेड और अन्य बनाम भारत संघ और अन्य ए.आई.आर. 1980 एस.सी. 1789 के मामले में इस धारा को अविधिमान्य घोषित किया है”। इस प्रकार संविधान संशोधन की जांच अनुच्छेद 13 के अधीन नहीं होती, पर वह संशोधन शक्ति की इन सीमाओं के अधीन है।
अधित्यजन (waiver): बशेशर नाथ बनाम आयकर आयुक्त (19 नवंबर 1958) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट के पांच में से चार न्यायाधीशों ने माना कि अनुच्छेद 14 के मूल अधिकार का अधित्यजन नहीं किया जा सकता; न्यायमूर्ति सुब्बा राव और उनसे सहमत न्यायमूर्ति भगवती ने कहा कि भाग 3 द्वारा प्रदत्त किसी भी मूल अधिकार का अधित्यजन नहीं किया जा सकता।
उपचार: अनुच्छेद 13 स्वयं कोई उपचार नहीं देता। अनुच्छेद 32 के अधीन सुप्रीम कोर्ट और अनुच्छेद 226 के अधीन हाई कोर्ट मूल अधिकारों के प्रवर्तन के लिए निदेश, आदेश या रिट जारी कर सकते हैं, जिनमें बंदी प्रत्यक्षीकरण (habeas corpus), परमादेश (mandamus), प्रतिषेध (prohibition), अधिकार-पृच्छा (quo warranto) और उत्प्रेषण (certiorari) की प्रकृति की रिट शामिल हैं; हाई कोर्ट यह शक्ति किसी अन्य प्रयोजन के लिए भी प्रयोग कर सकते हैं। रुदल साह बनाम बिहार राज्य (1 अगस्त 1983) में सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने मूल अधिकार से वंचित किए जाने पर अनुच्छेद 32 के अधीन अंतरिम उपाय के रूप में प्रतिकर (compensation) दिलाया, और कहा कि याचिकाकर्ता राज्य और उसके अधिकारियों से नुकसानी (damages) के लिए वाद भी ला सकता है।
नीति-निदेशक तत्व (भाग 4) अनुच्छेद 37 के अनुसार किसी न्यायालय द्वारा प्रवर्तनीय नहीं हैं, फिर भी देश के शासन में मूलभूत हैं। अनुच्छेद 13 इनके लिए कोई अपवाद नहीं देता; अपवाद अनुच्छेद 31ग (31C) में है, जो अपने मूल रूप में (पच्चीसवां संशोधन, 20 अप्रैल 1972 से) अनुच्छेद 39 के खंड (ख) या (ग) के तत्वों को प्रभावी करने वाली विधि को अनुच्छेद 14, 19 या 31 से असंगति के आधार पर शून्य होने से बचाता था (अनुच्छेद 31 का उल्लेख 20 जून 1979 से हटा दिया गया)। इसे भाग 4 के सभी तत्वों तक बढ़ाने वाली बयालीसवें संशोधन की धारा 4 को मिनर्वा मिल्स में चार और एक के बहुमत से अविधिमान्य घोषित किया गया। प्रॉपर्टी ओनर्स एसोसिएशन बनाम महाराष्ट्र राज्य (5 नवंबर 2024) में नौ न्यायाधीशों ने एकमत से माना कि केशवानंद भारती में जिस सीमा तक अनुच्छेद 31ग को वैध ठहराया गया था, उस सीमा तक वह प्रवृत्त है; अतः अनुच्छेद 39(ख) या (ग) के तत्वों को प्रभावी करने वाली विधि को अनुच्छेद 14 या 19 से असंगति के आधार पर चुनौती नहीं दी जा सकती।
संपत्ति का अधिकार: अनुच्छेद 19(1)(च) और अनुच्छेद 31 को संविधान (चवालीसवां संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1978 द्वारा 20 जून 1979 से हटा दिया गया, और उसी अधिनियम ने भाग 12 में अनुच्छेद 300क (300A) जोड़ा, जिसके अनुसार किसी व्यक्ति को विधि के प्राधिकार के बिना उसकी संपत्ति से वंचित नहीं किया जाएगा। इसलिए संपत्ति का अधिकार अब भाग 3 से बाहर है।
विधायी विभाग संविधान को 21 क्षेत्रीय भाषाओं में भी प्रकाशित करता है, और अनुच्छेद 13 का मराठी, कन्नड़, मलयालम और तेलुगु पाठ ऊपर उन्हीं आधिकारिक संस्करणों से दिया गया है। ये आधिकारिक अनुवाद हैं, पर प्राधिकृत पाठ का दर्जा केवल हिंदी अनुवाद को है (अनुच्छेद 394क)।
Frequently asked questions
Fundamental rights are in Part III of the Constitution, grouped as the Right to Equality, the Right to Freedom, the Right against Exploitation, the Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and Educational Rights and the Right to Constitutional Remedies; some belong only to citizens, while others, such as Articles 14 and 21, protect every person. Article 13 makes laws void to the extent that they conflict with these rights, which can be enforced through Articles 32 and 226. The directive principles are in Part IV, and under Article 37 they “shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country”.
Article 13 deals only with laws that are inconsistent with the fundamental rights in Part III; whether a law is invalid for other reasons is outside this article. A law in force before 26 January 1950 is void to the extent of the inconsistency, but only from that date (Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay, 1951), and a law made by the State afterwards is void to the extent that it takes away or abridges a fundamental right. If the valid part of the law can be separated from the invalid part, the valid part survives (R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957).
In the Supreme Court, a letter or petition is entertained as public interest litigation (PIL) under the Court’s compilation of guidelines for entertaining letters and petitions as PIL, based on a full Court decision of 1 December 1988 and later modifications and reproduced in the Court’s Handbook on Practice and Procedure (updated as on 6 October 2025). Letter-petitions are ordinarily entertained only in listed categories, such as bonded labour, neglected children, non-payment of minimum wages, complaints of harassment from jails, petitions against the police, atrocities on women, environmental pollution, riot victims and family pension; a petition involving an individual or personal matter is not entertained as PIL except as the guidelines indicate, and landlord-tenant, service and admission matters are excluded. Letters are screened in the PIL Cell, and only those covered by the listed categories are placed before a Judge nominated by the Chief Justice of India for directions.
Not under Article 13, which makes no exception for the directive principles. The saving is in Article 31C, which begins “Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13”; as inserted with effect from 20 April 1972, it protected laws giving effect to the principles in Article 39(b) and (c) from being void for inconsistency with Article 14, 19 or 31 (the reference to Article 31 was removed with effect from 20 June 1979), and a State law needs the President’s assent for the protection. The official text records that the Forty-second Amendment’s extension of Article 31C to all the principles in Part IV was declared invalid in Minerva Mills (1980), and that its words barring courts from questioning a law’s declaration that it gives effect to such policy were struck down in Kesavananda Bharati (1973). In Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024) all nine judges agreed that “Article 31C to the extent that it was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati … remains in force”, so a law giving effect to the principles in Article 39(b) or (c) cannot be challenged as inconsistent with Article 14 or 19.
Article 13 says that laws must respect the fundamental rights in Part III. Laws in force before 26 January 1950 are void to the extent that they are inconsistent with those rights (clause (1)), and the State must not make any law that takes away or abridges them; a law made in breach is void to that extent (clause (2)). Clause (3) defines “law” widely, and clause (4) says that the article does not apply to amendments of the Constitution made under Article 368.
Article 13 has four clauses, (1) to (4), and clause (3) has two sub-clauses, (a) and (b). There is no clause (5) in Article 13 in the official English, Hindi or regional-language texts, not even as an omitted clause. A clause (5) on amendments of the Constitution exists only in Article 368; it was inserted by Section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, which the official text records as declared invalid in Minerva Mills (1980).
Clause (4) was inserted by Section 2 of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, an Act dated 5 November 1971, with effect from that date according to the official footnote. Section 3 of the same Act inserted the matching clause (3) in Article 368: “Nothing in article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.” The Bill’s Statement of Objects and Reasons refers to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Golak Nath’s case (1967).
In the official Hindi text of the Constitution, Article 13(4) reads: “इस अनुच्छेद की कोई बात अनुच्छेद 368 के अधीन किए गए इस संविधान के किसी संशोधन को लागू नहीं होगी”. These are the words in Article 13 that deal with amendments of the Constitution. The footnote records that the clause was inserted by Section 2 of the संविधान (चौबीसवां संशोधन) अधिनियम, 1971 (the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971) with effect from 5 November 1971.
Under Article 13(3)(a), “law” includes “any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law”, so a custom or usage is included if it has the force of law. Under Article 13(3)(b), “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in India before the commencement of the Constitution and not previously repealed, even if they were not then in operation at all or in particular areas.
No. In Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (22 January 1951) the Supreme Court held by a majority of five judges to two that “article 13(1) can have no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation”. Inconsistent pre-Constitution laws still exist for all past transactions and for enforcing rights and liabilities accrued before the Constitution, so a prosecution begun under such a law before 26 January 1950 could continue.
It is the rule that a pre-Constitution law which is inconsistent with a fundamental right is not dead but overshadowed by the right, and operates again once the inconsistency is removed. In Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (29 September 1955) the Supreme Court said that such a law “became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right”, and that after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 amended Article 19(6), the law challenged there “became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens” (against non-citizens it had remained operative throughout).
Because Article 13 makes a law void only to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention, the valid part of the law can survive if it can be separated from the invalid part. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (9 April 1957) the Supreme Court said that “it is the intention of the legislature that is the determining factor”, the test being whether the legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. If the valid and invalid parts are inextricably mixed up, or form a single scheme meant to operate as a whole, the whole law fails.
The Supreme Court has held that the right under Article 14 cannot be waived. In Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax (19 November 1958) Chief Justice S.R. Das, for himself and Justice Kapur, said that a person cannot give up or waive a breach of the fundamental right conferred on him by Article 14, which he described as a constitutional mandate directed to the State. Justices Subba Rao and Bhagwati went further and held that no fundamental right in Part III can be waived, while Justice S.K. Das held that a right primarily for the individual’s benefit could in principle be waived; on the facts, the plea of waiver failed.
No. Article 13(4), in force from 5 November 1971, and Article 368(3) say that nothing in Article 13 applies to an amendment made under Article 368. Before that, the Supreme Court had held in Sankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1964) that “law” in Article 13 did not include constitutional amendments, and in Golak Nath (1967), by six judges to five, that it did. Amendments are instead subject to the limit recognised in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and applied in Minerva Mills (1980): Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
As the Supreme Court recorded in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (31 July 1980), the majority in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (24 April 1973) held that “Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution”. Because Article 13(4) keeps amendments outside Article 13, an amendment is tested against this limit on the amending power instead. In Minerva Mills Chief Justice Chandrachud, for the majority, said that “a limited amending power is one of the basic features of our Constitution”, and the official text records that the Court declared Sections 4 and 55 of the Forty-second Amendment invalid (Section 4 by a majority of four to one).
Under Article 12, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” in Part III includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and the Legislature of each of the States, and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. Article 13(2) forbids the State so defined from making any law that takes away or abridges the fundamental rights.
Article 13 makes such a law void to the extent of the violation, but the remedy lies under Articles 32 and 226. Article 32 guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights, and the Supreme Court and the High Courts (under Article 226) can issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. A High Court’s power under Article 226 also extends beyond the fundamental rights, “for any other purpose”.
Yes. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1 August 1983) the Supreme Court held that, in its jurisdiction under Article 32, it can pass an order for the payment of money in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. It said that “The State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner’s rights” and directed the payment of a further Rs. 30,000, in addition to Rs. 5,000 already paid. The Court added that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the ordinary processes of the courts and that a claim which is factually controversial can be left to a suit; the payment was ordered as an interim measure, and the petitioner remained free to sue the State and its officials for damages.
The right to property is no longer in Part III, the Part of the Constitution headed “Fundamental Rights”. Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 were omitted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from 20 June 1979, and the same Act inserted Article 300A in Part XII: “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.”
भारतीय संविधान का अनुच्छेद 13 भाग 3 (मूल अधिकार) में है और इसका शीर्षक “मूल अधिकारों से असंगत या उनका अल्पीकरण करने वाली विधियां” है। यह उन विधियों से संबंधित है जो मूल अधिकारों से असंगत हैं या उन्हें छीनती या न्यून करती हैं; ऐसी विधि उस मात्रा तक शून्य होती है। इसके चार खंड हैं, और खंड (4) के अनुसार अनुच्छेद 368 के अधीन किए गए संविधान संशोधन पर यह अनुच्छेद लागू नहीं होता। आधिकारिक हिंदी पाठ में इसे अनुच्छेद कहा गया है, धारा नहीं।
Yes. The Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law and Justice publishes the Constitution in 21 regional languages, including an English–Marathi edition as modified up to 1 May 2025, an English–Kannada edition as on 11 November 2025, the Second Diglot Edition in English and Malayalam (2024) and the First Diglot (English–Telugu) Edition (2025), and Article 13 from each is reproduced on this page. These are official translations, but the Constitution gives authoritative status only to the Hindi translation (Article 394A).
Conclusion
Article 13 makes the fundamental rights in Part III a limit on the laws of India, old and new. Laws in force before 26 January 1950 are void only to the extent of their inconsistency with those rights, and only from that date; they are eclipsed rather than dead, and revive if the inconsistency is removed. Laws made afterwards are void to the extent that they take away or abridge the rights, and the part that can be severed survives. “Law” is defined widely, to include Ordinances, orders, rules, regulations, notifications and customs having the force of law, and the right under Article 14 cannot be waived.
Since 5 November 1971, clause (4) has kept amendments of the Constitution outside Article 13, but the amending power has its own limit: as the Supreme Court recorded in Minerva Mills, Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. Article 13 does not itself provide a remedy. A person whose fundamental rights are affected can go to the Supreme Court under Article 32 or to a High Court under Article 226; both can issue writs, and the Supreme Court has ordered compensation for the deprivation of a fundamental right (Rudul Sah, 1983).
Sources used for this post: the Constitution of India, namely the Preamble and Articles 12, 13, 14, 15(1), 19(1), 21, 31 (omitted), 31A, 31B, 31C, 32, 37, 39(b) and (c), 226, 300A, 368, 372, 394 and 394A, in the Legislative Department’s English edition as on 10 September 2026 (checked against the copy on India Code); Articles 13 and 368(3) to (5) in the Legislative Department’s Hindi edition as on 1 May 2024; Article 13 in its English–Marathi edition as modified up to 1 May 2025, English–Kannada edition as on 11 November 2025, Second Diglot (English–Malayalam) Edition of 2024 and First Diglot (English–Telugu) Edition of 2025, with its page “Constitution of India in Regional Languages”; the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, Sections 2 and 3, with its Statement of Objects and Reasons (Legislative Department copy); the Supreme Court of India’s own copies of Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (22 January 1951), Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (5 October 1951), Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (29 September 1955), R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (9 April 1957), Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan (19 November 1958), Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (30 October 1964), I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (27 February 1967), Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (31 July 1980), which quotes the summary of the judgments in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State of Kerala (24 April 1973), Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1 August 1983), I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (11 January 2007) and Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024); the Supreme Court’s own page on the Kesavananda Bharati judgment; and the Supreme Court’s compilation of guidelines for entertaining letters and petitions as public interest litigation, as reproduced in its Handbook on Practice and Procedure (updated as on 6 October 2025).
